Select Page

Ergonomics Meets Human Factors: Building Safer, Smarter Workplaces with Dr. Era Poddar

Ergonomics Meets Human Factors: Building Safer, Smarter Workplaces with Dr. Era Poddar

LISTEN TO THE EPISODE: 

ABOUT THE EPISODE

In this week’s episode of The Safety Guru, we’re joined by Dr. Era Poddar, who shares her extensive expertise in ergonomics and human factors to explore what these principles are, why they matter, and how organizations can proactively integrate them into workplace design to transform safety outcomes, boost productivity, and build safer, smarter workplaces. She discusses the wide-ranging benefits of integrating these principles, including better decision-making, reduced cognitive load for employees, fewer errors, a lower risk of serious injuries and fatalities, and measurable returns on investment (ROI) through improvements in quality, productivity, and overall safety performance. This insightful discussion also highlights how leaders can champion ergonomic improvements, leverage emerging technologies that are reshaping workplace design, and foster a culture of continuous learning and improvement. Tune in to discover how ergonomics and human factors work together to build safer, healthier, and more productive organizations. Don’t miss this episode!

READ THE EPISODE

Real leaders leave a legacy. They capture the hearts and minds of their teams. Their origin story puts the safety and well-being of their people first. Great companies ubiquitously have safe yet productive operations. For those companies, safety is an investment, not a cost for the C-suite. It’s a real topic of daily focus. This is The Safety Guru with your host, Eric Michrowski, a globally recognized ops and safety guru, public speaker, and author. Are you ready to leave a safety legacy? Your legacy success story begins now.

Hi and welcome to The Safety Guru. Today, I’m very excited to have with me Dr. Era Poddar. She has a PhD in industrial ergonomics, an MBA from UBC, does a lot of consulting work in the ergonomic space, and is also an adjunct professor at the University of British Columbia. Era, so happy to have you with me today on the show.

Thank you, Eric, for the introduction. And I would like to just— mini-MBA.

Mini MBA?

Yeah, it’s not the full MBA at length, but I will reflect on that a little bit. Okay. Why I mentioned that. Yeah, thank you. I’m really glad to be talking to you today.

Absolutely. So, tell me a little bit about how you got started in ergonomics and the passion you’ve gotten for safety and ergo.

Right, it’s a very interesting question, and I, I have been asked about this for so many times. I remember talking to in one of the platforms in my previous employer, some people were talking about different epiphany happened to them, and that’s what they came. To be very honest, I never had such, such incidents, or I would say positive incidents, but what I had in the— I first, to, to be very honest, I learned about the subject when I went to the university to do my master’s program. And so, it’s a human physiology master’s from University of Calcutta. They had a specialization in ergonomics and human factors. So that’s where first I came across the subject. No one knew about this. I was pretty intrigued about the subject because it has direct implications on human life. Like, of course, industry to design and everything. So eventually, I got to love the subject, and I became passionate about it.

And it’s taking you all around the world. And so that gives you fairly unique perspectives as well in terms of how you’ve applied ergonomics in that space. Maybe let’s start with what is ergonomics and why is it so important?

Right. I should go back to a little bit because I had to also touch base on things which, which intrigued me to be part of this subject. One was like, I started my career in a design project, a mining scenario, and I thought that would be pretty interesting for the audience. So, this project ran for 1.5 years, and then we, we redeveloped or redesigned, uh, certain equipment’s, over 10 of them. And during that time, I realized this subject has a different application and we need to pursue more. That’s where I started doing PhD and all that, all the things. Uh, but as you know, life happens, things change, and I, I started my career in a university setting teaching after completing, uh, my PhD. So, while teaching, there are different design applications from physical product design to interaction design and all that. Stuff. So then, as usual, things change, uh, and I followed my husband to Middle East, and that’s where, uh, it’s a different, uh, scenario of ergonomics kind of came into my understanding because it’s a business side of it. That’s when I started my business because there was less scope of applying in the education domain.

Sure.

And before that, I lived a little, uh, time teaching in Nepal, one of the universities, medical school. So, all these things and, uh, kind of intrigued me to apply different domains of this area as well as leaving my comfort zone, I guess. So, in Dubai, we kind of, uh, what we did was, as I said, there’s less education apply— like application or courses. However, there was a scope, uh, to represent companies who had multiple offices across Middle East to help them in their ergonomics initiatives. So, you could call it a beginning of a mini-MBA for me, hands-on practice, and which I wouldn’t have done otherwise if I wouldn’t be leaving my secured career path. And that’s where it’s a different approach which, which is taken from there. And then onwards, I lived in the US and practiced, and then it came back to Canada at one point. So, through all this journey, which why I, I wanted to mention that I— it gathered to me, one is I understood the local practices, standards, and all that.

Sure.

It also did an interesting thing to me. I became more and more open and like it grew empathy to me more. And that is one of the key factors we practitioners in ergonomics do. And it’s really one of the key important factors to be successful in this field. Right. And coming back to your question, what is human factors and ergonomics? Is essentially reducing the mismatch between product or system and the user. So, in one word, however, there are several, um, definitions you could find. That is, it’s a science of work design, science of workplace design, and so on and so forth. But we always emphasize on one important aspect aspects of ergonomics and human factors, two different words. Yeah, coined together, they actually mean the same according to International Ergonomic Association. Uh, the overall— I mean, uh, the definition is, is like human factors or ergonomics is concerned with the understanding of interactions among humans and other elements of a and this profession applies theory, principle, data, and methods to design and optimize human well-being and overall system performance. So, we always focus into the system level, uh, changes so that it affects in an effective way for long term.

So yeah, in one word, it helps, uh, I think, reduce any mismatch between any system and product. And improve productivity.

And so why is it so important for businesses to look at that combination of ergonomics and human factors? And what’s the ROI that comes from it? 

It is a very interesting question. And we still, I mean, it’s proven, understood that it’s a business-friendly concept.

Sure.

Why? As I said, it reduces mismatch in very different ways. From building design to the product design, even for software design. So, there is a coin word called usability. That’s actually how you reduce the mismatch between human and the software or any interface design. So, over the years, it has been shown to be kind of helpful for the business. And why it is helpful? It reduces error, less time, and sometimes the processes are improved in, like we call them, ineffective time. How you reduce them? All this together, as well as a different reachability and use— usability, or ease of usage of any, any such product. Or given— I will just give you some examples.

Yeah, that would be good.

Yeah. Like for, uh, suppose a company who has a production line who produces certain products. Now if the workstations are higher compared to who are operating and there are a lot of reaches, like you move your hands pretty quickly and there’s long reaches. Now if we do it once or twice, that’s fine, right? And if you do it throughout 8-hour shift, sometime industry have 12-hour shift. To. Sure. So, these are the different aspects. One is size-wise, one, one is process-wise. And suppose you have kept certain products or so stored certain products in a different section. Now the employee has to go bring them. So, there are different touch points and different level of postures which is happening, which could have avoided with a better design.

Sure.

When the industry is built or when the workstation— yes, when the workstation was designed. So that’s where if we incorporate these issues, like how this whole process works, where, where people has to interact, and who will be the person who will be interacting. It is a range of people, not every— like, for even given, uh, different genders, there are sizes. And suppose, giving example, 95% percentile stature, people may not be having 95th percentile hand length or arm length, right?

Right.

So, all these challenges kind of available, or it is there within any workstation workplace setup. So, the more we kind of accommodate these requirements since the beginning, you definitely kind of benefit. And end of the day, product quality also improved. So, this whole span of activities, if we consider it effectively, we will save on time, we will reduce injuries, and the injuries will be less fatal, as well as there will be less error. As a result, you will get a product which is quality-wise better and more product. So, it’s an overall win-win for both employees and the employers in a way. I hope I understood.

No, no, absolutely. Yeah. So, and it’s something, as you talked about, it can mean how I design a plant for how the workers are going to work in. But I could also retroactively drive some improvements. So, there is less movement that’s unnecessary, less lifting, bending, stretching, overreach occurring throughout the day.

Also, less decision-making.

Sure.

Because more and more workplaces becoming automated.

Yeah.

And people are even in regular manufacturing settings; we see employees has to interact with machines where they have to put input and given that the cycle number and what is the output number and all that. So, these— all these interactions are happening at like simultaneously.

Sure.

So, there are cognitive demand as well as physical demand. I, I just gave you a very simple industrial scenario. So, there are complex scenarios like pilots interacting with machines, or we are driving a car. There are so many distractions these days, from external to internal to phone and displays and stuff. So yeah, it makes more sense to incorporate through the design at the beginning. However, it could be applied in every stage.

Sure. Yeah, to drive improvements, to improve the work practices, but also the cognitive load that you mentioned before in terms of the decision-making. I like your example of the car as well. So very, very beneficial. As you said, there’s a The ROI is really because it’s helping, one, the workers, but it’s also helping productivity directly. If you have less distractions, you have less complexity in your decision-making and less movement to complete the task. Is that fair?

It is fair. And I should also add where it is, most of the time, the ergonomics or human factors concepts are applied towards later phase, like when you have an injury, right? And this is not that proactive, more reactive approach. Unfortunately, in— especially not even only in Canada, I have seen in the US or even in the Middle East, that’s where we are called as a practitioner. So, when everything is all set, you have a process set, you have a design set, and there are also different teams working together, not including one of, like, human factors or ergonomics professionals within. So, what it does is there’s always a gap remaining. So, end of the day, which we see, there is an incident, and most popular incident which relates to ergonomics, human factors, that’s musculoskeletal injuries.

Yep. 

And that’s where people think that’s what ergonomics is, which is not at all, uh, right directions. But that’s where most of the time we are called in. So as there also huge number of dollars are lost every year, if we see the recent statistics even through WorkSafe BC locally. It’s over $2 billion of cost. 

Sure.

And over the year, like recent years. So that is something has to be definitely seen as one of the ROI where we could control this cost.

And ideally done proactively, right? So, as you mentioned in the plant design, or even at a later stage to drive improvement.

Yeah, true. Unfortunately, that is not always done that way. 

Yeah, unfortunately not. Yes. Yeah, unfortunately, sometimes you need an event to realize it wasn’t designed the right way. So, one of the things I know when we first connected that you touched on, which I thought was very interesting, is around changing workplaces. And there’s a lot of changes in the current workplace. How does that impact the space of ergonomics and human factors.

This episode of the Safety Guru Podcast is brought to you by Propulo Consulting, the leading safety and safety culture advisory firm. Whether you are looking to assess your safety culture, develop strategies to level up your safety performance, introduce human performance capabilities, re-energize your BBS program, enhance supervisory safety capabilities, or introduce unique safety leadership training and talent solutions, Propulo has you covered. Visit us at propolo.com.

Few things we have to understand. Since World War II, when the subject evolved, many organizing factors, there’s very less understanding across other disciplines about the breadth an application of the subject. So, when, uh, the workplace changes considerations came into play, especially in Canada with the Inclusive Act and all that thing, uh, the concept remained pretty old. Like, it’s not that new, right? Uh, so the changing workplace has been— we see, just giving you an example, if we visit, even you come to any public place or any workplace, you will see different variations of populations coming from different cultures, background. So how does it affect the workplaces? Uh, one is size, like your anthropometric measurements. You have a different language spoken throughout like when growing up. So, you are learning a different language, you are getting instructions through different languages. As the same— at the same time, we have different, uh, equipment’s incorporated into the workplace, more like recent AI. And over the years, we have seen a lot of more automation happen. So, employees are interacting with various different as I mentioned earlier as well, the physical, like manual material handling to giving input to the machine to do a proper setup speed.

Sure. And the production. At the same time, you are getting information through your handle devices.

Yep.

And you are also interacting with some of those displays. And there’s a workplace changes happen through the age. We have older work curse, who has limited ability to interact with digital devices, right? So, these are a complex scenario where you have different, different genders, you have different background, you have different language, culturally different thinking. We don’t have enough time to talk about that stereotype things, but it is there. We think differently, we perform, understand differently. So, these vast and different sizes, as I mentioned, we incorporate this whole group of population within a particular workplace. Right. So, definitely there will be repercussion on that. Yeah. Unless it is really designed well or it is accommodating all this requirement. And at the same time, you have differently abled people who have limitation like moving or different level of cognitive abilities. So, there are so many different challenges within that place. So, when we say the accessible or universal design concept, so we, we talk about all of these people is welcome in that workplace or any space, and they can easily interact with all these different things. And how we make those things user-friendly for them. So that’s when we talk about different level of accessibility or universal design.

Which really means a lot more flexibility in terms of how you would interface with equipment, the technology, potentially very different sitting position, if in that scenario, you’re talking about, where there’s flexibility of adjusting depending on what’s right for that particular individual.

Yeah, I can provide you another simple example. Suppose you are accessing, uh, like an ATM machine, right? Right. So now, for people like you and me, I will go walk, park the car, go walk and access. It’s not a big deal. We know these are bigger buttons and everything. Now consider this person who cannot move, who is on the wheelchair.

Yeah.

Now there are different level of accessibility they need. So, he has to access the building first. There has to be certain ramp where they can access. And then there has to be certain reach so that they can see it, still see it, and interact with the machine, right? Not only physical buttons, but there are also digital buttons. 

Sure.

So, then there are all these requirements. So, you have a person who will operate this machine standing, there’s a person who may come on the wheelchair, there’s a person who may come in differently, other way of different, and there is person who cannot see. And also, the language-wise, so people may read English well, some may not, some may come from suppose Mandarin They speak Mandarin, reads Mandarin or Japanese.

Sure.

So, consider a world where all these people live together and interact with the machine. So that’s where the usable or universal design or accessibility come.

And bringing that to workplaces as well, because the same example, it’s how do I design a work environment, whatever that work environment might be, to have that flexibility in terms of interaction.

That’s right.

Excellent. And I know one of the themes we also touched on is around now that we’re hearing more and more about exoskeletons. How does that play into these human factors and ergonomics space?

That is another interesting area of time. Anytime we talk to colleagues, they come up with this question. So, I was recently listening to one of the webinars done by— I don’t remember the organization, but the person who was presenting, Dr. Christopher Reed from Boeing, he was reflecting on many such research and applied within the Boeing scenario. I will refer some of her— some of his topics. So, exoskeleton is, of course, related to ergonomics. It’s not like insects and others. So, it’s an external structure which helps us to support while working. 

Sure.

So, we call them industrial exoskeleton. And there are different types. Some are automated. I mean, they are more advanced these days. But essentially, it is built to support while working.

Right, sure.

So, few, a few different types. I’m very broadly, I’m touching this. One is made for postural assist system, like when someone is working within an environment or very concise space where you cannot do any engineering changes, where you cannot implement those changes. So that person has to work in a certain position, suppose electrician, in that space. You cannot bring in any other equipment. So continuous working within that space and having those shoulder and arm muscles in the, like, over above shoulder level. So that’s when this type of exoskeleton helps. Like, it’s a postural support where hands and shoulders and— sure, other, other part is supported. There is other type of where you have full body support, like especially doing manual material handling where any other engineering changes or equipment could be provided in such certain scenario. It seems that quite a few other companies, including Boeing, is using them while making the airplanes, not— I mean, after it is done, so before that part. So since employees are using them, I had also interacted with few local clients Sometimes, uh, some of the workers like it, some don’t.

Of course.

So, some of them— I, I was amazed to hear this— the— my contact person who was saying that 2 or 3 of them didn’t like it, so they never would wear them.

Sure.

So, there are 1 or 2, it happened that they wouldn’t open it. Without that, they cannot perform. So, there are different varied level of acceptance. Sure, there’s definitely different types of acceptance level as well as, uh, I mean, the type of work people does. Depending on that, this is effective. So, it’s always the first thing we as a professional suggest. If there is option, engineering changes is better options. In any day. However, there is no, I mean, opening to incorporate such changes, then explore this. Still, there’s a lot to— yeah, there is a lot of research has to go in. It’s still developing.

Yeah, absolutely. I think for me, the first example I saw of this was, I’m going to say it’s almost a decade ago, and it was in Japan with baggage handlers, and it was around how do we reduce the lifting and switching that’s happening when they’re moving bags, which sounded very interesting if you think about the repetitive motions and the— you don’t even know how heavy a particular bag is going to be, which adds a lot more risk as well to that equation.

Yeah, you’re right. And also, I remember mentioning I think 6, 7 years back, uh, still the COVID at the beginning of COVID or before that, there were, uh, we ordered some furniture’s and people came to deliver. Some of the company who was contracted to do that, so the employees, their employees were using those exoskeletons to move those furniture’s. Yeah, so I have seen, it’s interesting, few companies adopted them pretty well. And then sometimes, as I said, it’s, yeah, not always accepted.

And as you talk about change, I think one of the things that makes good sense to transition to is what’s the role of a leader in driving that change, right? So, they can— we talked about your role coming in and assessing, but how can a leader support change?

It’s a Very important and interesting topic, and that’s one of my other passion area these days— how to incorporate human factors ergonomic concept within the strategy, right? So, we all know this concept is old enough. However, it’s less accepted amongst the senior leadership.

Sure.

One main reason is the language we speak. So, language has to be such so it is acceptable to the senior leadership. And senior leadership, one and important part which I realized over the years is, of course, they have to be trained in certain aspects. So, we as a professional has to be able to speak that language which caters to that group. At the same time, leadership has to be a little bit open towards these new concepts coming in, right, which is beyond the conventional, okay, they have— there are standards, engineering standards, and we— sure, we have it, then it is all done. It is not always the case because at the end of the day, users are human, right, right. And or whoever is using it, they are the one who is manipulating with the system.

Right. 

So, the leadership’s main, I think, the initiative would be understanding, like keeping a little open mind, one. Second is putting a human factor economics concept as a strategy goal, which is actually part of their business decisions. Then if you have a budget, allocated already, then it’s much easier to implement at the design stage than at the level when an injury already happened.

It really touches the whole space of safety by design, even in terms of if you, if you do things right at the front end, and you’re putting in the time and the effort, you’ll be much better off later.

Exactly. And also, we always say this, you have as a company, every company has their standard operating procedure or SOPs. So, it is always smart to align the programs, including safety, ergonomics, and other programs, to that, right? It’s, it’s much— it makes a lot more sense. And if you remember, I touched upon briefly on a certain point that we have various departments within a company. Unfortunately, some of them, they don’t always interact, or there’s less, less scope, or whatever may be the reason, that interaction is very important. And leadership can bring in that interaction so that same things are simultaneously done but not applied effectively. I have seen that in my practice. That quality team had come up with an idea which is not fully applicable because of the other challenges, However, there was another department have developed a newer idea and applying them within the team which others didn’t know. So again, the communication, communication, and allowing this communication to happen free flowing among different departments without a bias. So that is another leadership role I, I think would be very helpful in such initiatives.

Sure, absolutely. And so, if somebody wants to get in touch with you, what’s the best way to do so? And maybe share a little bit about the type of work that you do to help organizations in this space. 

Right. So best way to reach me through LinkedIn. Also, we have our website, www.argoera.com. You can and definitely click to that website and see our services.

Yep. 

We do offer different types of services. We do offer the program support where the corporations can— an ergonomist like us or others can work together to come up with a plan or aligning their SOPs, which is more long-term. And I think we focus more into that. However, as I— excuse me— as I said, there are a lot more focus into risk assessment or management. So that’s where a lot of business come through that area. So, we do, of course, cover that risk assessment. It could be your industrial risk assessment to corporate. At the same time, we also do worker compensation. Kind of support. I mean, you do need that kind of risk assessment as well, and all, uh, different types of workshops, being it the executive workshops to strategy level workshops, and also participatory ergonomics.

Makes sense. Excellent. So, Era, thank you so much for joining me today. Appreciate your time.

Thank you so much.

Thank you for listening to The Safety Guru on C-suite Radio. Leave a legacy. Distinguish yourself from the past. Grow your success. Capture the hearts and minds of your teams. Elevate your safety. Like every successful athlete, top leaders continuously invest in their safety leadership with an expert coach to boost safety performance. Begin your journey at execsafetycoach.com. Come back in two weeks for the next episode with your host, Eric Michrowski. This podcast is powered by Propulo Consulting.

ABOUT THE GUEST

Dr. Era Poddar is a Canadian Certified Professional Ergonomist (CCPE) and safety specialist, with broad international experience across North America, the Middle East, and Asia. Her expertise covers industry, academia, corporate, and government sectors. She holds a Ph.D. in Industrial Ergonomics, a NEBOSH International General Certificate in Occupational Health and Safety (practical applications), and a mini-executive MBA from the Sauder School of Business, UBC.

With more than twenty years in consulting, coaching, training, and research related to ergonomics, human factors, workplace accommodation, and safety, Dr. Poddar helps organizations meet goals in health and safety, ergonomics, and MSI control. She currently sits on the Board of Directors for the Canadian College for the Certification of Professional Ergonomists (CCCPE) and actively contributes to the International Ergonomics Association (IEA) Health and Safety Technical Committee, where she leads a group advising on ISO 45001: Guidelines for Ergonomic Processes. Additionally, she is part of the Canadian Mirror Committee (CMC) to the ISO Ergonomics TC 159.

Era is the founder director of Ergoera Services Inc. (https://ergoera.com), which provides customized ergonomics and occupational health and safety services and training. She also serves as an Adjunct Professor at the University of British Columbia, guiding master’s students and professionals in industrial ergonomics, injury prevention, design ergonomics, human-centered design, and user research.

Known as an innovative entrepreneur, leader, and public speaker, Era balances her roles as consultant, educator, researcher, and mentor. She has successfully managed multicultural teams globally, including in North America, Asia, the Middle East, and India. Her work involves leading excellence initiatives, promoting accessibility and universal design, developing safety and ergonomics strategies, and implementing quality improvement programs. Throughout her career, Era has spearheaded ergonomics programs, risk assessments, participatory projects, gap analyses, and process improvements in sectors like manufacturing, mining, food processing, government, corporate environments, and healthcare. Her evidence-based, user-centered approach supports healthier, safer, more functional, and productive workplaces, reflecting her commitment to “Design for All.”

For more information: https://ergoera.com/

RELATED EPISODE

STAY CONNECTED

The Safety Guru with Eric Michrowski

More Episodes: https://thesafetyculture.guru/

C-Suite Radio: https://c-suitenetwork.com/the-safety-guru/

Powered By Propulo Consulting: https://propulo.com/

Eric Michrowski: https://ericmichrowski.com

EXECUTIVE SAFETY COACHING

Like every successful athlete, top leaders continuously invest in their Safety Leadership with an expert coach to boost safety performance.

Safety Leadership coaching has been limited, expensive, and exclusive for too long.

As part of Propulo Consulting’s subscription-based executive membership, our coaching partnership is tailored for top business executives that are motivated to improve safety leadership and commitment.
Unlock your full potential with the only Executive Safety Coaching for Ops & HSE leaders available on the market.
Explore your journey with Executive Safety Coaching at https://www.execsafetycoach.com.
Executive Safety Coaching_Propulo

Lessons from Aviation Psychology: The Importance of Competencies and a Broader View of Human Factors with Aleksandra Kapela

Lessons from Aviation Psychology: The Importance of Competencies and a Broader View of Human Factors with Aleksandra Kapela

LISTEN TO THE EPISODE: 

ABOUT THE EPISODE

In this episode of The Safety Guru, we’re joined by certified aviation psychologist Aleksandra Kapela for a deep dive into aviation psychology and human factors, exploring what other safety-critical industries can learn from aviation. Aleksandra shares how modern thinking on human factors has evolved, emphasizing the importance of understanding the environment in which we operate, as well as the capabilities and limitations of the human brain. She breaks down the importance of identifying core competencies and explains why competency-based training and assessment (CBTA) is essential for preparing individuals to perform effectively in unpredictable, safety-critical situations and how these principles can be applied across a wide range of industries. She also explains why a broader, more holistic view of human factors is essential for improving safety performance and building sustainable safety cultures where people feel supported, are encouraged to speak up, and perform at their best. Don’t miss this informative episode packed with valuable lessons from aviation psychology!

READ THE EPISODE

Real leaders leave a legacy. They capture the hearts and minds of their teams. Their origin story puts the safety and well-being of their people first. Great companies ubiquitously have safe, yet productive operations. For those companies, safety is an investment, not a cost for the C-suite. It’s a real topic of daily focus. This is the Safety Guru with your host, Eric Michrowski, a globally recognized ops and safety guru, public speaker, and author. Are you ready to leave a safety legacy? Your legacy success story begins now.

Hi, and welcome to the Safety Guru. Today, I’m very excited to have Aleksandra Kapela with me. She’s an aviation psychologist and human factor specialist. So, Aleksandra, first, as we get started, that’s not a common thing to be an aviation psychologist. So, I’d love to hear a little bit about how you got started, what you do, and the passion you have around this space. Let’s start there.

Sure, absolutely. Thank you very much, first of all, for having me. It’s a pleasure to be here and talk about such important topics. In my stories, usually in aviation, the story goes the same way. People, they fall in love with flying first. They become pilots, cabin crew, and engineers, and only later do they start becoming interested in safety, human factors, or psychology. But for me, for me, that was the other way around. I always knew that I wanted to be a psychologist. Long before aviation entered my life, I was fascinated and fell in love with the human brain. So, behavior, decision making, neurology, and especially human potential. Why do people act the way they do, how they perform under pressure, and how the environment can unlock their potential or, let’s say, limit it? That’s why I started the master’s programs in psychology and human resource management. I knew quite early on that I didn’t want to be a clinical psychologist or psychotherapist. I wanted to work with people and organizations in real, complex environments, helping them understand how and why this behavior might emerge and how systems can support them in that.

Aviation came into my life almost by coincidence. It was supposed to be a summer job at the local flight school to try something new. My friend, he was working there at that time. When I stepped into that environment, I fell in love with the industry as well. I think mostly with people at the beginning. But even more, later, I became fascinated by the safety element and safety culture. Sure. In such a critical, safety-critical domain, when a decision is made, they matter every single day. Actually, I assume that psychology and human factors would be fully embedded. I imagine that at every flight school, not to mention the airline. They would have at least one aviation psychologist supported by a team of human factor specialists. But that was a big surprise that it wasn’t the case. Even though aviation, compared with many other safety-critical industries, is usually thought to be really advanced in terms of safety awareness. I quickly realized that there was still quite a big gap between what we know today in modern psychology, neuroscience, and behavioral psychology, and how stress, attention, decision-making, and the human brain actually work, and how systems are designed and managed in the industry.

That’s when I started to look into how you can become properly qualified in this field of aviation psychology. I discovered that it is a really small, highly specialized discipline. Globally, there are only around 100 officially accredited aviation psychologists with a bit larger group of human factor specialists, of course, as let’s say, the entry requirements are a bit less demanding, you don’t need to be a psychologist. Becoming accredited required a lengthy certification journey, but it allowed me to work exactly at this intersection of psychology, safety, and operations. Today, I work in a few, let’s say, complementary roles. I run my own company, My Wingman, which focuses on supporting airlines and flight schools from the human side of safety. So, competency-based training and assessment, leadership development, instructor support, and well-being initiatives are directly linked to operational performance. At the same time, I also work as an Associate Aviation Psychologist with Symbiotics, a company known for assessment and selection solutions. Along with that, a large part of my work involves speaking and teaching, including delivering speeches, workshops, and training programs for leaders, instructors, and operational teams, mainly in Aviation but also in other safety-critical industries.

I’m also a ground instructor, so I work with students, which I really enjoy. And recently, I’ve been working on a book about Human Factors in Aviation, which is a very big project that is still a bit in the making. So, the book is still with the editor for the final editing. But this is a very exciting project I’ve been working on for the last 2 years.

Interesting. I’d love to start with human factors and really a modern perspective on what is happening in that space, when we’ve talked about it before in terms of capabilities, limitations in your mind, and the environment. Tell me a little more about how this space has evolved.

The modern view of human factors has led us to a bit more uncomfortable truth: the human brain is incredibly capable but also very limited. Sure. As its core, the modern human factor starts with this shift. Instead of asking what’s wrong with the person, why something happened, we ask what was happening inside their mind and how the environment also shaped what was possible in that moment. Because it’s really easy to say what we would do from our couch, but actually, in a specific moment, in a specific situation, with the specific limitations and capabilities of one’s mind, that might be very different. Now we focus on the capabilities and limitations of a brain as such, but also of a person at the moment. We know, for example, that attention can be our biggest help, but also our biggest enemy in stressful moments and in specific environments. We try to blend together the person, those limitations and capabilities, but also the environment, and also the system that the person operates in, which is really important. We have this systemic approach now, so we don’t look at individuals only, but we look at all those elements that made the situation happen in this specific scenario.

Somebody else or in a different environment could behave in a different way or maybe the same way. This is something that we always need to check.

Rear view mirror, once something happens, a more holistic view of what will occur, how can it practically help proactively? To ensure we act on the environment, we act on capabilities and limitations before something occurs.

Basically, if we take this more holistic perspective, then we are able to actually change things for the better for the future. If we would only focus on, let’s say, for example, in aviation, we’ve used to focus on how we can improve the aircraft for this situation not to happen again? Let’s say a certain switch was connected to this situation. How can we update or redesign the switch to help in the next situation? The problem is that the situations are so complicated that we will never be in the same situation again. Even though we replace the switch or we redesign something, which, of course, is also one of the approaches that we should have, and of course, improve that and upgrade as we can. But also, if we only hope that after changing this one switch, the situation will not happen again, or the bad situations will not happen, then this is a bit of false thinking. We need to understand how complex it is. We need to understand that things are happening both inside and outside. If we focus on this holistic approach, it’s also easier to think, even with changing that one switch of thinking, okay, but if somebody else were working with that switch, would that help them if we redesign it?

Or if this person is in this and this environment, in this company, let’s say, even in this culture, would that help them as well in the future? It helps people to rethink and redesign bigger systems. Also, it helps us educate not only system operators but also leaders and authorities, so they understand that a single change can make a big difference. That’s why, as we understand people more now and gain more knowledge about how we function and the environment, we need to use this knowledge. We need to use these findings, of course, slowly but to help improve safety and change the situation for the better in the future. So, not to add more hours, for example, in case of aviation training, but try to focus, okay, what we can change that actually, regardless of the hours, can help in the future in a similar setting, in a similar situation.

Is there anything that can be done, if I’m thinking particularly of the capabilities, but also some of the limitations, proactively from competencies development, or in terms of assessing competencies as well, for those circumstances that may exist?

Absolutely. This is one of the biggest concepts we focus on right now: competencies and some behaviors connected to them. So, they come out of our competencies. This is really important to focus on at the very beginning because, again, as I mentioned, we can add more hours, more training, more education in different industries. But again, if somebody had a low level of certain competencies, they would, regardless of the training, their knowledge, they would not be able to cope with a specific situation. If the situation becomes more stressful and more complicated, they need to adapt to this specific situation that might quickly evolve into a change. In that way, competencies and this whole approach of competency-based training and assessment, or CBTA, now focus on how we can improve human beings at the beginning. Sure. For them to be able to behave in a situation that we cannot predict. In the past, we tried to predict every possible situation, and we failed in that because those environments, even automation, everything becomes more and more advanced and complicated. One thing can change the situation that we couldn’t predict. Instead of doing that, we now shift, and we try to answer a case.

If this person had those competencies on a very high level, then it might actually be easier for them to cope with any situation. We don’t have to focus on those situations so much, but we focus on people who are capable, within their limits and capabilities of their brain, to react to different situations in different settings with different people. That’s why we first focus on those competencies. Those competencies are, there might be also a bit more technical, but we focus even more on those non-technical aspects. We focus on things that we used to talk about already in the case of human factors. But some of those things we know are actually. We are able to improve them if we know how to work on them. For example, decision making, for example, problem solving, communication, and workload management, those aspects, we know that if we have the right tools and also tools to assess them at the very beginning, and then if it improved, then actually they are proven to be those barriers that actually can stop this bad situation from continuing to happen. Now we focus on, okay, if we know the entry level of someone’s, let’s say, communication skills, then I know this level, that’s the first step.

Then I can, with the right tools, try to improve this. In the future, this person, despite stress, despite a very dangerous situation, will still be able to communicate with others, even though the possibilities of their brain would narrow their attention and their memory. Still, they would have the communication on such a high level that they would be able to communicate, even if the situation is very demanding. We know that in those safety-critical environments, proper communication with your teammates, with some people who might be responsible for the next steps, for example, is crucial. So very often this communication would be the first part that would be really affected by the stress, by this very demanding situation. Because this is a natural tendency of our brain. If we have a very stressful situation, we need to limit our attention; we need to limit what we say to others in order to be able to survive. In that way, if we focus on communication skills despite the stress, despite different problems that might occur, then we keep this relatively high level of communication, even though our brain and the situation want us to maybe limit this ability a bit.

That’s why we focus now on those core competencies, as we call them, because we know that also for the success stories that we have. Sure. Of course, in aviation, those success stories are really spectacular, let’s say. But for those stories, we know that those individuals who saved the day had a very high level of those competencies. In that way, we need to focus on this positive safety approach, as we call it safety to approach. We focus on improving the positives instead of trying to limit the negatives.

Sure. In aviation, you use the example of communication. In many cases, you have a job that is, for the most part, fairly routine until something goes horribly wrong. Then, as you mentioned, high intensity. If you think about the Air France incident where autopilots disconnect, all sorts of signals are giving you contradicting information, and you’ve got to process. Communication and stress levels are incredibly high, and you’ve got very short periods of time to address the risk in front of you. In a lot of other businesses, a lot of other industries, sometimes that difference between routine and high stress isn’t as pronounced, but in some cases, it might still be. How could some of these principles translate to other industries to still help? As you mentioned, communication. On a good day, you could be a very good communicator, but in that peak moment of stress where you really need that communication, that’s where you need at next level performance.

The beautiful and also problematic thing about our brain is that it cannot really recognize the settings that we’re in. In that way, it doesn’t matter really if we are 30,000 feet in the air, and anyone would say that that’s a really dangerous situation if something happens. Or it can be at your workplace, at your desk, but something very suddenly increases your stress level. For our brain, that would be the same situation. Very basic instincts and very basic reactions, they start to happen. We have our fight or flight response that is still really, really strong, even though we don’t have to run away from a lion anymore. But still, our nervous system doesn’t understand that. It doesn’t really matter if it’s a situation in the air or it might be a situation, let’s say, in the operating room. Still, this high peak of stress would narrow our possibilities in the same way. Our brain needs to be really focused on the basic things to survive. That’s why those higher functions, let’s say, like keeping the attention on different sources or communicating with others using complicated sentences, are something that first would be just raised.

In that way, for example, in the case of attention, I think it’s really relevant for different safety-critical domains that you need to keep your attention at a high level. You need to be sure that you’re not making any mistakes. In that way, your attention really needs to be at a high, highly functioning level. In that way, it’s really important to train those abilities. No matter what stress hits you, you can still maintain this high level of performance and teamwork, for example, because this is another competency that is pretty core. Being able to work within a team, which is, of course, connected with some other competencies. They all relate to each other. But most of the safety-critical environments need the same competencies. They need a high level of attention and situational awareness. They need communication, teamwork, and the ability to solve problems and make good, timely decisions. Of course, aviation is the industry that is the most, let’s say, spectacular in that way. But if you imagine someone working in any other safety-critical industry, they need the same competencies. But what would be different is the behaviors, so how they perform or how they use those competencies with specific behaviors.

The pilot would need to behave differently, and let’s say the surgeon would need to behave differently, but they would still need to use, let’s say, the same source and competencies. Of course, I focus mainly on aviation, but I also consult on other industries as well. I use my experience from aviation, but actually, I see more and more that it’s really the same thing, the same elements, because our brain is the same. It just needs to be used differently. That’s why we have certain training. Let’s say this technical part and the educational part are what will be different. But how we act in this really highly stressful situation is something that would be the same across different domains and industries. If we just lack those competencies, our performance will be affected. It doesn’t matter what industry it is. We aim to achieve the highest possible performance to increase safety. To do When you do that, your capacity needs to be enough to handle that situation. Of course, there are some other things, like psychological safety, that need to be at the proper level.

Your, let’s say, physical abilities need to be at the proper level. But we see that those abilities of your brain, in terms of competencies, are one of the most important things to be able to perform at a safe level in any situation that you need to perform.

This episode of the Safety Guru podcast is brought to you by Propulo Consulting, the leading safety and safety culture advisory firm. Whether you are looking to assess your safety culture, develop strategies to level up your safety performance, introduce human performance capabilities, re-energize your BBS program, enhance supervisory safety capabilities, or introduce unique safety leadership training and talent solutions, Propulo has you covered. Visit us at propulo.com.

CBTA really helps us understand competencies that are needed, where I am at, and how I am progressing through different interventions, potentially?

Yes. They also answered the question of why those limitations exist. For example, I might repeat the same mistake in my work, and I might have more training, more education. I will be more frustrated. Still, I would not perform well in certain situations. Sometimes, a very simple key for that is just to improve the competency level. If somebody were, let’s say, very good at, say, communication, again, but they would not be very good at decision-making. They might talk with others. It might help them with other competencies as well. But they still would not be able to make timely decisions, and this can sometimes be really critical for safety. That’s why it’s really important to know those levels right from the start. If somebody enters the training or a job environment. We, as people, would be responsible for training that person. But also, this person themselves would want to know what level of those competencies I have. Because very often people cannot realize that they wouldn’t think about it earlier, that they might have problems with certain competencies because they do quite well, they progress, they live in society, etc. But actually, those levels need to be a bit higher for that safety-critical work.

In that way, it is so crucial to know it at the very beginning, and then only you will benefit from that if you retest it. If you check it again, then you know if the person can progress, if you’re doing the right things in case of the training. And also, they start to feel more and more at ease. So, they might not realize that this is their issue, their problem that they have. But after a certain period of time, we see that people with a raised level of those competencies just feel better, they function better, not even in these very stressful moments, but daily. So, in that way, it gives them more space, more capacity to work with any situation that they face. If the CBTA is done well, the safety conversation also changes. We stop asking who made a mistake and what exactly happened in that situation. We also stop blaming individuals, but we start asking whether the system built the competencies needed to deal with what actually happened. To do anything. It worked both directions, we might say, because we know that people are not perfect, systems are not perfect.

But we try to find ways to increase both of those elements together. And by increasing competencies, we see that everything goes up.

And how does this connect with psychometrics? Because of the scenario you just shared, somebody who is good at communication, but may not be great at decision-making in a peak moment of stress. And so that could make you incredibly functional in many roles. In some functions, you can have the liberty of time to make decisions. For a pilot, you don’t typically have unlimited time in terms of that decision-making. How do we start checking around for a specific work environment, and how does that connect back to CBTA?

So, of course, in the case of CBTA, the last letter is A. So, this is the assessment. And this is more connected with how the competencies can improve. So, if we can learn, if we can improve them. In case of competencies themselves, it’s a bit easier work because if, let’s say, your baseline is okay, if you don’t have any disabilities, learning disabilities, or any, let’s say, disorders that would not make it possible to increase those levels, you can work with competencies. You can improve your competencies. If you have the right tools, if you know what to work on, you can improve them. Competencies are something that we use on a daily basis in different environments. This is something people sometimes do not realize they can improve if they work on it. It’s like with our memory. We can improve it if we don’t have any disabilities in that area. Sometimes we joke that it’s like a muscle we can just improve by working on it. In assessments, we don’t focus solely on competencies; we also consider other things, like personality or attitudes, which are a bit more core to people.

They are usually built from the beginning of our life, connected with how our nervous system is built. So, they are a bit more difficult to change. Regarding personality aspects, we can also check this. So, with the right tools, with the right assessments, we can check what traits, what, let’s say, tendencies you might have. This might make you better or worse in some specific environments or jobs. Let’s say there is one personality trait called conscientiousness, which is associated with people who like to be organized and structured. They like things. They like routine. This is something that is pretty core in you. People would be higher or lower on conscientiousness. In the case of pilots, for example, we like to have pilots who are high in case of conscientiousness because they need to work with routine most of the time. They need to pay attention to procedures, follow them, etc. They need to be organized, and everything needs to be neat. In that way, if somebody were higher on that trait, it would be easier for them to feel good in this environment.

If someone has a low level of conscientiousness, it doesn’t mean they cannot become a pilot, but it does mean they would just struggle, and that struggle would make them less able to perform well under stress. It will make them less able to train in case of their competencies as well, because those things just go together. For example, there are certain traits that, let’s say, a good accountant should have. I wouldn’t be a good accountant myself for sure, knowing my personality. If I were still trying to keep this job, I would probably be really frustrated, unhappy, and struggling with my performance. In some jobs, that would just make people unhappy. But in safety-critical industries, it’s really important to have people who are a bit better suited to this specific job. Psychometrics is one of the most, let’s say, misunderstood tools in safety-critical industries, I feel, because for some people, the word itself immediately triggers fear of labeling, discrimination, and being put in a box. But that fear is understandable because psychometrics has sometimes been used poorly, so not to use the right tools, not to use the results in the right way.

But when it’s used correctly, they are not about exclusion; they are about information. If we have this information, then, for example, we can place somebody who still wants, let’s say, they really want to be a doctor, but with those traits, they might struggle, they might be not so good, for example, being a surgeon. It would be better for them to work as some other type of doctor. In that way, and for example, for pilots, it’s maybe not best for you to work in an airline when the routine is there, and work is almost the same every day. Maybe it’s better for you to go to flying, which there is less routine, more changes, and a bit more risk. Some people need to have a bit more going on to feel good. That’s why it’s so important to check it at the beginning, not to spend a lot of money, a lot of time, and invest in something that might just be some concept that you might have in your head but does not really fit your capabilities and limitations. A big part of my work is also to explain that to people, that it’s not like yes or no.

It’s more than we need that information to increase safety, because if people who are not fit for certain jobs perform those jobs, it’s the first step toward unsafe acts in this environment. It’s not a verdict; it’s a map that we use for the future.

I think it also, to your point, if you’re going to be frustrated, unhappy in that work environment, that’s not an environment that’s conducive to your well-being, and also will create more friction in terms of the work in addition to some of the safety elements that you brought up. It can also be a vehicle to get to know yourself in terms of where your best fit might be.

Yes, exactly. If you’re more frustrated, a bit more stressed, then the first thing that happens is that your limitations come to the surface. If you’re angrier, sadder, or more frustrated, then you would simply make more mistakes. Then if you make more mistakes, you will be even more frustrated. Then you start to blame, usually people, they start to blame others rather than themselves, because this is what they wanted and why it doesn’t work. Also, in some of those industries, it is really difficult to stop or to say, I’m struggling. In that way, as you said, it is really connected to well-being because not only do you feel bad and angrier, frustrated, but you will have more problems with your family and friends. But also, it adds to that silence that if something is wrong with them or me, maybe I should just keep on going, but then I see that nothing is changing. So, my level of well-being is dropping dramatically, and I might not have a safe place to question that, to ask those questions. So that’s why it is so important to have this information at the very beginning. Sometimes, also what I’ve seen is for those different industries, especially if somebody young is starting in those industries, then parents, it is very important for them, for their kids to perform well and support their dreams.

But if everybody got this information at the beginning, maybe it’s time to rethink, maybe adjust a bit this path that you want to have, then eventually everyone would be happier, more satisfied, and their well-being would be higher. So, all those things that we do at the very beginning are not to make people’s lives more stressful or more difficult, but to make it less stressful and less difficult later.

Yeah. And on this topic of well-being, what other things can an organization do to create a really safe environment where people prosper from a safety standpoint?

That’s a really interesting topic because well-being is something that we hear quite a lot about now. We are more and more about well-being, well-being. We need to ensure that there is a healthy work environment. But what is most important about well-being is to understand it. Again, to understand how people’s brains work, what well-being actually is, and what levels it has, so you can create well-being programs or actions in your workplace. Very often, there is a well-being website, sometimes that is focused on well-being, but this is just like an end product. If there is no box-sticking exercise, when there is no understanding of what really makes people well in the workplace, then it might actually not change anything, but also make things even worse. What is really important is, first of all, that well-being is closely connected to what we call safety culture, as well as psychological safety in the environment. In that way, we might create a lot of things, yoga classes or any other things that should make people more relaxed. But when the workplace is not supporting this culture, nothing really will change.

The first and most difficult element is organization’s working with the culture of the culture. When people feel good about sharing things, especially things they may have done wrong, if they are not blamed for it but it is accepted, and people focus on improving it, they are thankful you share that. Of course, it might be connected with some more serious action as well. But what is really important is that you don’t feel this fear. You have this state of mind that you can talk about everything, about what was okay, but also what was not okay. In that demanding environment, people learn really quickly what is acceptable and what is not acceptable to show. If the safety culture in the workplace is high, then people will start to follow that pretty quickly. If the safety culture is low, people will learn very quickly that you can miss some things, you cannot report some things, and that’s okay. It is really important to understand what safety culture is and how it can be built. That is also, again, connected with the environment on the outside, but also with people from the inside.

What is, I think, most important is to start with education because people are not educated about their own well-being. What does it mean? What does it mean in this specific industry or company, in the training place? People, they need to understand how they might feel. They also don’t have to feel happy every day. But what is, let’s say, in the norm? Also, what they should do very quickly if they feel that something is not right is not wait; everything is open for them to share it. Again, that brings me back to competencies once more, because, again, people with a higher level of competencies deal with some well-being fluctuation better. If you have a higher level of communication and teamwork, then it’s easier for you to share something with others, to communicate it. But without a proper safety culture, you can have great levels of communication, but if you cannot communicate it, then nothing will change. Those are two things: safety culture in an organization. People from the top levels who will set this culture, who will understand that people need to feel good to be safe and to perform well. And then from the bottom, also for people to understand what Wellbeing is.

That is not just a nice word to repeat, but what does it actually mean, and what does it mean in my job? Because for different jobs, it might be connected with a bit different elements. Let’s say in the job of a flight attendant, being a bit lonelier in a sense of not having your family all the time next to you or a lot of people, a lot of crowds to share things with. This is also typical for this job. Again, if you understand that, and do you know what tools you have if something feels different? Also, if you have the right, again, personality and competencies to deal with this specific environment. Everything connects. That’s why this holistic view is really important, no matter if it’s well-being, competencies, or any other assessment, so anything connected with safety. We are only now starting to understand it. It is a bit more difficult now for us because we built those systems that were not built for that, for the holistic view. It’s more built for, again, adding more hours of training or improving one part of something. But now we need to learn, and we start to understand that only changing things from this holistic level can actually improve safety.

So, thank you so much, Aleksandra. We covered a lot of ground today from a modern view of human factors, as you said, that talks about capabilities, limitations, the environment, connects very well to the CBTAs and how do we understand competencies and how we can you give us a little bit more about how you get involved in this element of psychometrics, and is it the right fit? Are there better fits for you? And how that also links back to well-being, which connects back to what we talked about in the environment where we operate. So, thank you very much for joining us today to share some of your insights. Somebody wants to get in touch with you. What’s the best way to do so?

I would say the fastest way would be to contact me on LinkedIn. I’m there with my full name or try to reach me through my wingman site as well. But I’m on LinkedIn every day. I post quite a lot, also about human factors and safety. That would be the best way to contact me.

Excellent. Thank you so much, Aleksandra.

Thank you for listening to The Safety Guru on C-suite Radio. Leave a legacy. Distinguish yourself from the past. Grow your success. Capture the hearts and minds of your teams. Elevate your safety. Like every successful athlete, top leaders continuously invest in their safety leadership with an expert coach to boost safety performance. Begin your journey at execsafetycoach.com. Come back in two weeks for the next episode with your host, Eric Michrowski. This podcast is powered by Propulo Consulting.

ABOUT THE GUEST

Aleksandra Kapela is a certified aviation psychologist, speaker, author, and independent consultant specializing in human factors, safety, and competency-based training and assessment (CBTA) programs. She works with airlines, flight schools, and other safety-critical industries, supporting organizations where performance, decision-making under pressure, and human reliability are critical. Her work focuses on human potential, well-being, operational performance, and modern, evidence-based approaches to human behavior in complex systems. Aleksandra is the founder of MyWingman.eu and the author of an upcoming book on human factors for pilots and aviation professionals.
For more information: https://www.mywingman.eu/

RELATED EPISODE

STAY CONNECTED

The Safety Guru with Eric Michrowski

More Episodes: https://thesafetyculture.guru/

C-Suite Radio: https://c-suitenetwork.com/the-safety-guru/

Powered By Propulo Consulting: https://propulo.com/

Eric Michrowski: https://ericmichrowski.com

EXECUTIVE SAFETY COACHING

Like every successful athlete, top leaders continuously invest in their Safety Leadership with an expert coach to boost safety performance.

Safety Leadership coaching has been limited, expensive, and exclusive for too long.

As part of Propulo Consulting’s subscription-based executive membership, our coaching partnership is tailored for top business executives that are motivated to improve safety leadership and commitment.
Unlock your full potential with the only Executive Safety Coaching for Ops & HSE leaders available on the market.

Explore your journey with Executive Safety Coaching at https://www.execsafetycoach.com.
Executive Safety Coaching_Propulo

The Debrief Culture: Human Factors Leadership for Accountability and Learning with Brandon Williams

The Debrief Culture: Human Factors Leadership for Accountability and Learning with Brandon Williams

LISTEN TO THE EPISODE: 

ABOUT THE EPISODE

We welcome back Brandon Williams, former fighter pilot and seasoned expert in human factors and safety leadership, for another profound episode of The Safety Guru that you won’t want to miss! In this intriguing conversation, we explore The Debrief Culture, a powerful approach rooted in the debriefing method and mindset of elite fighter pilots that transforms organizational performance and builds a culture of continuous improvement. Drawing on his experience in high-stakes aviation environments, Brandon shares insights on creating a structured debrief culture that can be applied across industries to drive consistent accountability, clear communication, continuous learning, and sustainable growth. Tune in for a contemplative discussion on human factors leadership for accountability and learning, as Brandon unpacks actionable, practical strategies to help leaders build an effective debrief culture that fosters a high-growth mindset, combats complacency, and drives learning from both wins and missteps. Join us!

READ THE EPISODE

Real leaders leave a legacy. They capture the hearts and minds of their teams. Their origin story puts the safety and well-being of their people first. Great companies ubiquitously have safe yet productive operations. For those companies, safety is an investment, not a cost. For the C-Suite, it’s a real topic of daily focus. This is the Safety Guru with your host, Eric Michrowski, a globally recognized ops and safety guru, public speaker and author. Are you ready to leave a safety legacy? Your legacy success story begins now.

Hi and welcome to the Safety Guru. Today I’m very excited to have with me Brandon Williams, who’s back for a second episode. He’s a former U.S. air Force fighter pilot with over two decades of experience leading teams in complex high-risk environments. He’s now a captain with a major airline and is a safety and human factors expert. Brandon, really happy to have you back with me. Our first episode, I think got a lot of interest, so would love to continue the conversation today.

Awesome. Well, Eric, again, thanks for having me back on the podcast. Like you said a few years ago now, but it was, it was a great talk. I remember we had a lot of good discussion there. And as always, I love talking about, you know, anything safety, human factors related because as I’m sure we’ll get into it and as you know, critically important and high reliability in these churches. But really anything you do; human factors is always at play. And so, for leaders, understanding that is so important. So again, thank you for having me on.

Absolutely. So, so maybe let’s start there. I want to make sure we spend a lot of time today on Debrief Culture. But before, let’s do a bit of a recap in terms of what is human factors. I know we talked about it in our first episode, but let’s start there. 

Yeah. Well, anyone in the safety world, most people probably know about human factors, right? Typically, it’s associated with an engineering concept. You know, the idea of engineering technology for the human to interact with it. So, you know, these laptops were on the chairs we’re sitting in the desk, we’re sitting in the cars we drive, the airplanes I fly, you know, everything had all those pieces of technology, had some human factors designed into it, how the humans going to interact with that. And so, it takes into account all of our human factors and human errors that we’re prone to. You know, for example, from the flying world, you know, a red light goes off or master warning caution. Why is that bright and yellow right in front of my face? Because that’s going to get my attention right away. Right. Same thing in your car. Right. I mean, why don’t we have, you know, the, the, the modern cars now with the sensors on the front and the back, which will alert you to you’re about to hit something, and a lot of them now will even start braking for you if it says you’re going to hit this type thing.

So that’s how far we’ve come in human factors, you know, engineering, design and technology. Well, what I’ve taken from that, you know, a few years ago when I came up with this idea of human factors leadership was, hey, look, we talk about human factors all the time in, you know, how we design things, how we design procedures. But I said we don’t really always consider it. When we think about our teams. Sure. I don’t think. Or how we had signed our teams, or how leaders have to understand human factors of their people. And when we talk safety, obviously that’s a huge idea. I mean, human factors really have become, you know, what aviation safety is all about. You know, understanding that when someone shows up to work, a professional, no one shows up saying, hey, I’m going to make a mistake today. I’m going to make a bad decision that’s going to result in a bad outcome. I mean, nobody shows up. I don’t show up to my job, you know, as a major airline pilot, saying, hey, I’m going to miss a switch or I’m going to do this. No, but it’s because of those human factors, right, that drives us there, that, you know, our limitations as humans.

But hey, that’s okay because that’s what makes us human. At the end of the day, you know, my talks always like to say, you know, raise your hand if you’ve never made a mistake.

And I do the same. One person is their hand once.

There’ll be a few people that don’t. And I like to, and I always like to kind of point say, congratulations, this is amazing. You’ve never made a mistake. That’s phenomenal. But, but it’s so true. But that’s what makes us human. Right? And I think there’s. This is another conversation, but I think, you know, that human factor, I think that’s actually going to become more important in this world we’re in now as AI starts to become way more involved in what we do. That human touch, if you will, I think it’s going to be even more valuable in so many other industries. But that’s another conversation. But the human factors, like you said and like we’re talking about, is really why we as humans make decisions in certain environments. Right. And so, from a safety standpoint, just a pure technical safety standpoint, that’s critical in understanding how we design our procedures, our process, as, you know, our safety gaps, you know, in the system. For example, me as a, again, major airline pilot, I think there are four areas where I check my flap settings required to before we even take off. Why? Because that’s such a critical feature.

And in the, you know, many, many years we’ve had airplanes with flaps, we’ve had pilots take off within proper flap settings, unfortunately, some that have resulted in accidents. And so that’s a critical feature which we have many checks and balances, I call it, in the system that requires us to. To check that in in many different areas. So just an example how you design a process. Right. But as leaders, it’s also critical to understand, you know, these things like fatigue, mental and physical complacency, you know, normalization of deviance, which I know people in safety understand what that is. But, you know, we. This idea that we cut corners a little bit. A little bit. A little bit, A little bit. And then what happens, you know, this cutting the corner becomes the norm, and now there’s a set procedure that’s been knocked out, not because we, you know, we’re not. We want to willfully disregard rules, but because we thought we were doing something good to make something better. But in actuality, we’re deviating from a standard procedure, right. In our brain, it says, hey, I’m doing something more efficient. But the problem is we’re missing gaps or checks and balances supposed to help us, you know, do something.

So human factors really go back to, again, Eric, understanding why we as humans make decisions in certain environments, but also as leaders designing our teams and processes to help our people, you know, mitigate those human errors and those human factors. So, we do ultimately drive better performance. Because at the end of the day, you know, better performance, whether its safety is what, you know, no mishaps, you know, no injuries, no damaged equipment, machinery. But also, for any team, performance is critical. Right. So, at the end of the day, it’s all about driving better performance.

And to get to that better performance, one of the pieces you’ve written lots of articles, lots of blogs on, is the debrief concept. That’s really, really key in. In aviation fighter pilots. And I want to get to a debrief culture. But before we go there, maybe if you could share a little bit about what a debrief is.

Right, absolutely. And. And I’m glad you brought that up because you’re right, there’s a few different parts of what I talk about when you talk about this, human factors, leadership. But the debrief, I think is probably, in my opinion, the most powerful piece of this. And it’s kind of what I finish on when I do my keynotes, because it’s a really great idea to finish on. And debrief is all about the debrief. At the end of the day, all it’s, its whole entire purpose is to, like I said earlier, is to drive better performance for the team, period. Dot. I mean, that’s, that’s what it’s all about now, how you get there and what’s involved in that debrief. There is a structure that we have and there’s a way you do that, but at the end of the day, you know, that’s what it’s all about. And so, you know, when we talk about safety, when we talk about, you know, whatever industry you’re in, what are we trying to do? You know, if you’re trying to make better safety metrics, you’re trying to design better, safer processes, you’ve got to find a way that really pulls out those gaps in the system.

Right. You’ve got to find a way that is going to bring this to light.

Sure.

Now, any good safety system, any good reliable safety program has what a very open, you know, reporting system or should some way that, that, you know, your frontline leaders, frontline people can report, hey, here’s an issue I see. Here’s a gap in the system I see. Right. You’ve got to have that. So that’s one piece of it which can be incorporated into debriefs. But the other piece of that is debriefing after tasks, projects, you know, whatever, whatever you’re doing. So immediately after that we can talk about some, some things maybe that didn’t go right or some things that did go right. That’s a key piece of debrief. We debrief after everything, even, especially after things go right, because we discover near misses. We want to get best practices out of that. Right. But the whole point of that debrief is to set an environment where we can get open and honest. That’s the key piece there. Open and honest, a tone of accountability, I call it open and honest inputs from that so that we can ultimately drive better performance, get lessons learned out of that and drive that back. Now, I know a lot of people are saying, well, we do this, we have after actions or we have Debriefs or we, you know, we have, you know, team huddles or we do this after, you know, this or that and that.

And I think it’s great that people are, are leaning towards that way. You know, I see that a lot in healthcare. I work with a lot of hospitals, and I’ll ask them, hey, do you debrief after this? Like, well, you know, after code blues or maybe after major procedure surgery or after this, we’ll talk and I’ll ask them, okay, well, how do you do that? You know, and, and a lot of times, well, we get the team together and I’m like, who runs the debrief? Like, typically it’s the, you know, the attending physician or the surgeon or, you know, you know, whatever, or the lead nurse or, you know, whatever, whoever was in that, that task. And I’m like, okay, would you get honest feedback? You know, does it go well? Typically, you know, whoever’s leading it would just say, hey, here’s what happened, and anybody got anything? And you know, maybe sometimes someone will say something and, okay, great, you know, let’s, let’s go about our day and, you know, maybe they’ll learn something out of that and then we’ll move on. So, which the good. The part of that, I mean, it’s great they do that and there is learning that happens in those.

And that’s important. But I think the key piece and what makes the debrief, the fighter pilot debriefs, which is where I got this idea from, so different than anything else you’ve ever heard that’s similar to this is how you set that tone of accountability. Okay. How you set that tone where we bring down those barriers to communication and everyone, all the way down to the most junior member on that team feels like they can speak up. And it’s this mindset that we’re not trying to. It’s not a. Don’t think of it as an individual evaluation. Right? What I always say, we’re trying to get away from that blame and train feel that we, I think we’ve, we’re so accustomed to, in, in the professional world, to a learning and growing mindset, right? It’s not about evaluation. It’s not about individual performance. This is purely about what happened, why it happened, and how we’re going to make things better for the team next time. Not just our team, but anyone in our organization. Maybe there’s things we need to change. Maybe there’s things we need to take back to leadership, some processes and some learning that’s going to happen out of that.

But that’s the key, you know, the key difference, I think, in anything else that, you know, you’ve seen when you, when you talk about what happened and why it happened. But it’s. You’ve got to have that, like I said, open, honest tone of accountability type, type environment.

And so how. How do you go about introducing this in your culture? Right, because this is through and through aviation.

Right.

Probably at least Since World War I, from what I’ve, I’ve heard in, in terms of the history, it’s ingrained. But how do you start building that into a culture? You talked about healthcare as an example.

Right, right. And that’s a great question, too, because that’s one of the biggest, you know, questions I get from teams that I work with. And they say, well, you know, this is great, Brandon, but I mean, how do you, how do you get people to be open and honest, you know, talk about their missteps or missteps of their peers or even leaders sometimes in these. And I said, that’s a great, great question. And like you said, your kind of just alluded to one. And actually, just so you know, the fighter pilot debris kind of goes back to the Vietnam era, is where we trace this back to when, when we realized fighter pilots were realizing that, hey, if you make it through 10 missions, these young fighter pilots coming over, they made it through 10 missions, their chance of survival exponentially went up. Why? Because after 10 missions, you. That’s experience you’re gaining, right? And so, they said, how can we accelerate that learning? How could we get every ounce of learning out of combat and training missions? So, we kind of simulate this first 10 missions. And so first it was, hey, we’re going to make our training as realistic as we can, which we learned from that.

And then things like Red Flag out Nilis, that all came about. But the other key piece was the debrief. You know, how do we accelerate learning? And we’re going to debrief; we’re going to reconstruct what happened and we’re going to find the root causes. And that’s why we as fighter pilots hold it so near and dear, because we said the real learning always happens in the debrief. I mean, yes, you got to have experience, but when we learn what happened and why it happened, that happens in the debrief. So that’s the first piece is you’ve got to do it. It’s got to be part of. That’s why I call it a debrief. Culture, it’s got to be part of how you do things. Because as we know as humans, the more we do something, what happens? The better we get at it, the better we. More we get used to it, right? I mean, you know, again, going back to the Air Force as a fighter pilot from day one of pilot training, you know, brand new, never many times, a lot of us, hardly any aviation experience whatsoever. We go out, we fly that first man.

What do we do when we first come back? We debrief. And then from there on out, every single sortie you do as an Air Force pilot, you will debrief. So literally thousands of debriefs I’ve done just as a, you know, fighter pilot in my time. So that’s the first thing, is making it how you do business, right? And it doesn’t even have to be this thing where we go and shut the door and sit down and, you know, talk for an hour or 30 minutes. I do this a lot with. Sometimes I work with sales teams, and I do this all the time. I say, hey, look, you can debrief after a sales call. Just sit down. If you had another team member you and. Or maybe you went and had a sales pitch, sit down, you know, take. Go to a cup of coffee, sit down, 15, 20 minutes, just talk about it. You know, what happened? Why did this happen? What could we do different next time? You know, so it’s. It’s this idea of ingraining it and how you do business, you know, ingraining it in a tool for your. For your teams to use.

So that’s the first thing is making it part of your culture, like you said. And then the second thing, you know, the second major part of this is, is like most things, I mean, shockingly, guess where it starts is, is with leadership, right? With. With team leaders, with organizational leaders. Because you as a leader have to do what. You have to show your own transparency and accountability. And if you are involved in a debrief, you’ve got to be one of the first people to speak up and talk about your missteps and talk about things, you know, you’ve done or you could have done better for the team. You know, the. The Blue Angels debrief that I’ve. I’ve talked about. There’s one. The reason I show. It’s about a minute and a half clip that I show my keynotes a lot of times, and I know I’ve given you access to that, so you can go watch that. But I think the key part of that is before they even start talking about their execution and, you know, watching the tape and trying to. What they could have done better and what they need to improve on.

They go around the room, they call it a safety. And each one of them, each member on that team fesses up to some things they, you know, didn’t do well that day or they could have done better. Like they were off air speed, their power control wasn’t good. They did this, they did all the way up to the team leader. The boss says that, you know, what they could have done better. And what’s the whole purpose of that, Eric, is purely just to bring down those barriers to communication. Right. I mean, we’re talking the Blue Angels, right? So, like, best of the best type A individuals, right, that. That, you know, essentially the best at what they do. And so. But I think it’s so powerful. The one key thing I pass on to my clients and people I work with is, hey, especially leaders, again, going back to this, what you have to have in organization is leaders that are transparent, leaders that hold themselves accountable, and leaders that bring down that, you know, those barriers, communication by, again, things I could have done better for you as a team. And I know you’ve probably been part of teams where you’ve seen this and how powerful that is when you have a leader that can do that.

And then also how extremely demoralizing it is when you. That. That can’t do that or even worse, you know, will kind of point out the errors of their team members, you know, without, you know, talking about their own. Their own missteps. So that. That’s the Q2 key pieces, though, is making it part of your culture, how you do it, you know, so people get used to it. But also having that tone of accountability within your organization, starting at the top.

And it does require very high growth mindset. Right. Because people have to recognize that, yeah, I’ve done this a million times, but I can do this better.

Right.

In aviation, there’s really this mindset of it’s an unforgiving environment. Once I’m up in the air, if something goes wrong, I need to know as much as I can.

Right.

That mindset of growth, and that can always get better isn’t always present in every organization. So how do you overcome that?

Yeah, that growth mindset, I think that goes back to, you know, again, realizing what you do. Right. And. And kind of like you said, you know, we always say, like you said, I love you. You talked about aviation’s unforgiving. You know, it’s the Famous quote is. I’m not even sure who said it, but we talk about all the time is aviation itself is not inherently dangerous, but it’s incredibly unforgiving, you know, incredibly unforgiving. What does that mean? Just like you said, you know, if you ever get into that complacent mindset of, I know it all, I’ve seen it all, you know, aviation has a way of throwing things at you that you never in a million years would have trained for, it would have thought for. I mean, there’s. You go back and look at so many incidents, so many. I don’t know if you remember back in the. Was it late 80s, the Sioux City DC10 with engine failure and how they had to. Or, sorry, the flight controls where it burned through the hydraulics, and they basically controlled the airplane with the power. Now, unfortunately, there was some loss of life, but they saved a lot of people, too.

And there’s so many things that came out of that, you know, crew coordination, how they did that working, you know, just so many things. But the point of that is, like they said when they. When that first happened, and the captain, he’s talking to, you know, back to his operations center, and they’ve got the engineers on the line and like, well, that can’t happen. And he’s like, well, I’m telling you, this is what’s happened. It severed our lines. We have no idea. They’re like, well, that can’t happen. It’s not designed that way. You’re like, well, this happened. So, it just. Aviation has a, you know, an incredibly sick sense of humor, of humbling you. And even the thousands and thousands of hours you have throwing things at you, whether it’s decision making, you know, aircraft issues, you name it, of throwing something at you. So, I think to you. To you. Back to your question is this idea of, you know, always say, you know, the number one enemy of all this stuff of. Of situation awareness, as we call it, of getting better is always complacency. And I think it’s. It’s. It’s a natural human instinct to be complacent.

I mean, that’s where we want to be. We. We. Our human mindset goes back to, you know, comfort, right? Once we get everything solid, we have food, we have water, we have shelter. Okay, now I can relax a little bit, right? It’s what you want to do. So, I think what I always tell people is this constant. I use this term, healthy paranoia sometimes, because it’s this idea that I got, again, I got from aviation, you Know what could go wrong? What have I not thought about? I mean, you’re not always paranoid, but you are in the back of your mind, little mind, that little thing of, what have we not done? What if? What have we not thought about? Hey, if I’m flying along here, if this engine does fail, where’s my closest piece of concrete I’d set this airplane down at, right? And so, I think that’s what it goes back to, is leaders having that heightened sense of situational awareness and also passing on to our people of, hey, what have we not thought about? Are we getting complacent? Because that’s a key part, again, of human factors, is again, we want to be comfortable, we want to be complacent.

Unfortunately, it’s where our mindset goes. But it’s this idea of never falling into that trap of getting completely complacent because as we know, that’s where mistakes are going to happen, right? That’s where this human error is going to seep in. That’s when something’s going to happen. So, I think it’s always going back to understanding. We haven’t. We don’t know everything. We haven’t seen everything. You know, like, just like your example earlier of, hey, I’ve done this thousand times. We’ve never had anything bad happen. Why would it happen now? And that’s when something’s going to happen, which I know you’ve probably seen this your world, but that’s one of the main reasons people would argue against, you know, safety programs. Like, we’ve done this for so long and nothing bad has ever happened. Which, as we know, that’s never a. It only takes one bad incident to, you know, unfortunately hurt someone or, you know, lose money or lose your business. So, I think it’s this idea of combating that complacency and thinking, you know, what have we not thought about and what do we need to learn? Where do we need to grow?

This episode of the Safety Guru podcast is brought to you by Propulo Consulting, the leading safety and safety culture advisory firm. Whether you are looking to assess your safety culture, develop. Develop strategies to level up your safety performance, introduce human performance capabilities, re-energize your BBS program, enhance supervisory safety capabilities, or introduce unique safety leadership training and talent solutions. Propulo has you covered. Visit [email protected].

It’s interesting you bring up Sioux City, because recently I came across, I was looking at the Japan Airline mass decompression on 747. That happened a couple years before and apparently one of the pilots, I believe they were deadheading on the flight, or they might have been a passenger had been studying. Exactly. And run multiple scenarios on the 747 where they had lost the rotors, go stabilizers and so forth. He right away came to give some advice because he had run 50, 60 simulations of how I would handle the same scenario of mass decompression, loss of hydraulics.

Yeah.

And that plane I think was flying for 32 minutes with very limited control, with no hydraulics.

That’s interesting. Yeah. There was a pilot who came up and helped and assisted with the power. He was like you said, I think he was just as. Or I know he was just a passenger, but yeah, you’re correct. I didn’t know that about that. That’s awesome. Unbelievable. 

But that, that’s, it’s incredible because it shows you’re expecting something to go wrong. Nobody’s expecting that. You have total loss of your hydraulics.

Right, right. And a key part of my, you know, outside of the debrief, but that’s why I incorporate in my planning model kind of that last piece. I always say the what ifs, you know, what are the what ifs? And now you could sit, you know, you could sit here all day and talk about what ifs. Right. I mean, what if, what if zombies come back and you know, But I, I say, you know, just take a few minutes. It’s a way for the team to re cage after you’ve been so involved in this planning process and say, okay, let’s step back, let’s think about what, you know, what have we not thought about? What could be the one thing that throws this, you know, a curveball. One of the most common things is what if our, what if someone on our team puts in their two weeks’ notice tomorrow, you know, or something like that, or what? You know, just things like that that you don’t think about. You’re like, that’s a good idea, let’s talk about that. But that’s my key piece is always, you know, take a minute and just think about, let’s think about some major what ifs here which helps us become.

What helps us become more proactive versus reactive to those changes.

Interesting. One of the things, because some people work alone you talk about is also you can do a self-debrief. Tell me a little bit about what that would look like.

Absolutely. Well, you know, debriefing implies that the team should be involved and a lot of times you do need someone else to, you know, point out some Errors or missteps for the team. But let’s be honest, a lot of times we know, whether we want to admit it or not, we know our own, you know, mistakes we did or maybe a way we could have done something better. I mean, think about it, you know, as humans say, you have a negative interaction with a, with a co-worker or, you know, another person, and later on you’re thinking about that, it may even be that night, and you’re like, you know what? Probably could have handled that a little differently. I probably should have done this and said this, and it probably wouldn’t have blown up. Or I probably should have said it like this. Or maybe they got what they wanted, and you were in a bit of a minor negotiation. You’re like, you know, what if I would have done this, then probably would have ended a little better. So, we all do that right after the fact. Why? Because it’s again, this goes back to human factors.

That survival mechanism in our, in our brain always wants us to win. So, it’s always trying to find ways we could have done something better. And so I turn that into, I say, look, you know, even after, you know, minor interact, things like what I just talked about, interaction with co-workers, a task you’ve done on your own, you know, you can do this with your, you know, things around the house, projects you’ve done and just self-debrief, you know, be honest with yourself, hey, here’s what happened. Here’s you know, why it happened and really dig deep, you know, whether it’s the five whys technique of asking why five times and trying to get to that. We call that really deep level, prop, root cause, causal factor, as I always say, and really find down to that root. So, we can do that and then take that back and say, you know, next time, here’s how I could do that. You know, next time, here’s some things I can take back. And again, this can be done, you know, in your personal life, in your professional life. There are so many different areas. And I do this all the time.

I mean, after a keynote, you know, with it, with a client, I always love to say, if they had any video of it, I always say, can I get a copy of that? And what I do is I sit down, I’ll watch it, kind of go through it one time first just to kind of see big picture. Okay, here’s how it went. And then I’ll go through it and stop and say, okay, take notes. Okay. You know, my hand motion was, was poor. Here I Need to stress this word more. My voice inflection or I was talking too fast at this point or change this to this. This sounds. Probably sounds better. Relook at how you tell this story or just. And every time I do that, I find little bits and pieces on how I can make it better. And so even though if a keynote goes well and the great client loves it, there’s always ways, you know, I can improve and, you know, drive my better performance. And that’s one way I do it. So, I think, you know, debris with a team is always the best or someone else that you can deeper foot.

But I think solve degree boosts are incredibly valuable for people.

And I think really like what you’re talking about. It’s, it’s really about learning not just from failure, but from success to say, how can we get to continuous improvement? I think your tagline is learn, adapt, improve around the debrief checklist.

Totally.

But it’s very much this mindset, we can always get better.

Absolutely. And I think that’s. That goes back to everything. Right. You know, I mean, I always say in my thousands and thousands and thousands of flying, I would have never had the perfect flight. So, I don’t think I probably ever will. But we, we strive to get there. Right. It’s like the Vince Lombardi quote I love kind of defines us. It’s like perfection is not attainable, but if we chase perfection, we can catch excellence. Right. So, you’re always trying to, to, you know, find that perfect flight. Always trying. You probably won’t get there, but in that pursuit, we’re making ourselves better. And that goes in any industry. Anything you do, I think is 100% right. That mindset of growth and performance improvement and as safety professionals especially, why I love working with these teams is because, I mean, let’s face it, in safety, you’re always trying to improve, right? We’re always trying to drive better. You know whether it’s metrics you’re concerned with or you’re just trying to find, you know, drive better safety outcomes, better ways to do things, better processes that incorporate safety, but without, you know, harming the business and things like that.

So, I think that’s, you know, just as that inherently that’s what you’re always doing in that role.

So, one of the quotes you, you talk about in your speeches on debrief is this concept of artificial harmony versus respectful truth. Tell me a little bit about the difference between both.

Well, yeah, so I talked earlier about that, that tone of accountability as I called it. So, remember, you know, where do we, as humans typically live? We want to avoid conflict for the most part, right? And so where are we typically at in that artificial harmony? You know, think about it. You know, when you, you know, I just talked about this with my, my kids the other day. We were talking about different cultures, and I’m like, you know how we say, hey, how are you doing? You pass someone on the street or, hey, how’s it going? I’m like, do you really honestly care, like, if you don’t know, especially, like, now? Sometimes we do. Maybe you call a family member or friend and they’ve been sick, hey, how you doing? Like, and you can tell with the body language and voice, but when we say, hey, how you doing? I’m like, I talk to my kids. I’m like, do you really honestly think we care, like, how they’re doing? I mean, it’s reading almost like it’s like saying, hi, we’re being nice and respectful and kind, but it’s a greeting. I said, you know, in other cultures, I was saying for a journey, for example, I said, when someone asks you how you’re doing, they’re honestly wanting to know, like, how are you doing?

Like, as other cultures, they really, they don’t just use it as a, as a, you know, as a greeting. So, so going back to that, that’s kind of that, you know, artificial harmony, right? Think about a cocktail party, you know, where you ask people and I talk, I tell my kid, you know, how to win friends and influence people, right? Type thing of. What do you always do? Ask. You ask them how they’re doing; you ask people about them. You know, you’re trying to build that rapport, right? So, it’s, where do we try to be? We try to avoid that conflict. So that’s that respectful or sorry, that’s that artificial harmony. Some or manufactured harmony we try to make a lot of times, right, just getting along, just trying to avoid conflict, you know, nothing critical here. Let’s just move on. Well, in a debrief, that’s not a great idea. And why? Because then you’re not going to get what I call the truth data out, right? Because if someone thinks that they saw an error or misstep, they don’t want to speak up because they don’t want to. I don’t want to accuse you of anything.

I don’t want to look like that. Especially a new person in an organization, right? What do they do? They just keep that in and say, well, it’s not Going to be a big deal. I’m just not going to say that, well, we’re never going to improve that way.

Correct.

We’re never going to get better. Right. If this stuff is not put out there. And so, you have to have what I call that respectful truth, which is that tone of accountability, which again, it’s not, it’s not investigation. We’re not trying to assign blame again, we’re getting away from the blame and train right, to learn and grow. But it’s about how we could have done better as a team. And so how do you establish that respectful truth? That’s why the first step in my model, I say set the environment and keep. Part of that is setting the tone. And it’s your job as the team leader of that debrief to set that tone. And just like the Blue Angels video I talked about, the first thing you have to do as the team leader is said, hey, here’s some things I could have done better today for the team. And you’ve got to do that part because if you don’t, everyone else is going to, you know, just keep all this stuff inside. Because after you do that, then you go around there and say, what, Eric? What. What could you. What do you have for me?

What could I have done better? And you try to give them to give you some, some inputs and feedback. Now what has that done that’s take down some of that barrier. Right now, people say, okay, we’re in a, you know, open, honest environment here. The team leader can speak up. Then I can definitely speak up and talk about my own shortcomings or maybe some things we saw that the team did other way, good way to do that is as you’re talking about your missteps, not saying, hey, Eric, you didn’t do this, versus saying, hey, we as a team, we missed this. And I think Eric would have done this if we would have done this for him or we would have provided this for him. So, you know, it also goes back to how you, you angle things with that respectful truth. But that’s the key part of that, is that artificial harmony is great, like I said, for cocktail parties, for happy hour, for, you know, just hanging out and small talk. But not great for debriefs, not great when we’re trying to improve. Right? Because that’s where you, that’s the whole purpose of improving, is finding where we had some shortcomings and where we can do better.

I’m really hearing about this is a consistent thing. We’re doing it Good or bad. We’re constantly trying to hold ourselves accountable. Not each other like you talked about blaming each other but holding each other accountable to the best level, understand system dimensions. What are the things that are occurring that maybe we aren’t aware having as a leader, the humility to. Humility, vulnerability to explore that I’m not perfect so that you have that respectful truth occurring across the board. But it’s really about embedding deep learning day in and day out from good and from bad.

Absolutely. Yeah, it is, it’s, it’s, that’s why I call it a debrief culture, right? Is because it’s this cycle of constant improvement. You know, no matter what, you know, process improvement model you adhere to, or people look at, almost all of them have some sort of at the end of it, you know, how do we improve, how do we improve? How do we go back and make this better? And that’s where the debrief serves to do that. And like I said, it really is a debrief culture and I call it a culture because of all things you just said. It takes leaders at the top that, that are vulnerable, takes leaders that are transparent that hold themselves accountable. You know, one of the things I talk about in my talks, this idea of mutual support, which is another key layer of this debrief culture and a building block of it. And mutual support is really deep level peer accountability, right? I mean it’s the kind of accountability that, that peers, we hold ourselves accountable and not of this, you know, this accountability thing. When I hear it, I always think of, I think we may have talked, talked about this on our first podcast, but you know, when I hear accountability, it’s always a negative connotation.

Like I always think of my, my, my assistant vice principal when I, in elementary school, you know, like the enforcer of the, when you got in trouble, you know, who you were going to go see. And so, but accountability I think gets that conn a lot of times, like it’s a bad word, like do this or else or you’re going to get fired or job action or whatever. And, and, and when I talk about it, I say I, I call it mutual support because that’s really what it is, right? Is, is peer level accountability is mutual support. And it’s not that I’m backing you up, Eric, because if I don’t, you know, something bad’s going to happen to me or job action, but it’s because I want you to look good when you’re leading a project. I want you to look good. I want the team to look good. You know why? Because I know you, I know you got a family, or I know what’s going on with you. And its that human connection going back to human factors again, right? And so that’s another thing you have to have with an organization I think to be a high performing team and ultimately to set up this debrief culture is that mutual support, you know, deep level camaraderie within a team with an organization making everybody human. 

And in this idea that we’re there to drive the team better. And that goes back to how leaders lead their teams, how they incentivize their teams, all kind of things, things again. But that’s a key part of that is that mutual support mindset. And like you said, I mean at the end of the day it’s how you do business, right? It’s leaders admitting their own shortcomings and showing where they could have done better. So then that, that filters down kind of, kind of through the teams and just on that, you know, I, because I hear this a lot of times like well Brandon, you know, I work in a team organization where not a lot of, you know, no name, no rank culture within my team or my leader really doesn’t. He’s not going to adhere to this. He’s not a, you know, big accountability person. So, what do I do? And I said Well influence where you can, right? I mean, because everyone is a leader in some sense. Everyone. And so, influence where, whether it’s just self-debriefs, whether it’s you and, and two or three other co-workers you can debrief on a project you’re doing, I mean influence where you can, right? 

And then that will slowly build hopefully from out to other people like that. And if there’s leaders you have that just aren’t going to embrace it, I mean there’s nothing you can do about that. But if you show, if you can do it within your own world, in your own little bubble, then you will see improvement.

And so last quick closing thought you talked about the debrief. There’s some organizations talk about after action reviews from the US Army. You also talk about the SEAL framework. Are there really differences between the different pieces? Are there things that we need to get that we can approach different ways or is really something unique about the debrief checklist?

Yeah, like you said, the deeper checklist, the model I came up with, I used a SEAL acronym, scald and that, that is a, that is a tick of the hat to I’ve worked with some other special operators before, so Navy SEALs and they use very similar type culture of what they do. High performing military teams, obviously, same reason, firepower, right? Because literally it can mean loss of life. They don’t improve in those type of environment. So, I do, I did come up with that acronym to kind of help. The S is for set the environment. Right. Just really quick, which is what we’ve talked about, you know, setting that tone of accountability. Why is that? First, because if you don’t do that, then you can forget about, you know, getting the rest of the brief working. The truth data, all the things we’ve talked about. Next is execution. So, what are you really looking at there? What was your objective? Right? Was it a clearly defined objective, first, and how did we do to measure up to that? You know, what were our results? And then from that, what is going to be what I call our debrief focus points.

Because, you know, when you look at a result, you could probably look at several things you want to talk about, but in the interest of time, you want to kind of narrow that down to maybe the two or three top areas we want to focus on. This is for major big projects, right, that you want to look at. And why don’t we have that, that even that step of execution? Because just like in the, if you watch the Blue Angels video, they’ll go through and watch the tape and just like I told you earlier in my keynote, I’ll go through and watch the tape. That’s the actual truth data, right? And that’s important because we all want to be on the same page of what actually happened before we start analyzing. Because I’m sure we’ve been in, you know, similar meetings where we’re talking about what happened and there’s a lot of assumptions and people are like, that’s not really what happened. So, we all got to be on the same page first before we start analyzing. Then we go into the analysis, which is the, the meat of that debrief, which is the a, which is really looking at, hey, what happened?

You know, what were some contributing human factors. Contributing factors, I call it, you know, whether it’s, you know, task saturation, overload, fatigue, lack of communication, we look at all those things. But what we’re really trying to get down to is that root cause or what I call that probable cause or that causal factor, sorry, which is say you, you know, something happened, and you really dig down. Yeah, but why did that happen? Why did that happen? So, you know, I use Example, the special, you know, special challenger, right? And so, I’ll ask people, why did that accident happen? They’re like, well, the O rings, you know, okay, that’s the active thing that you’re right. But let’s go back to why. And you keep asking why. I keep. And what it comes down to, you know, and this is what the investigation found too, is NASA didn’t have a solid go, no go process. I mean, at the end of the day, that was a root cause, plenty other contributing factors, right? And we talk about, you know, how they made those decisions, the influences they had, money, shuttle program. But the end of the day, they didn’t have a solid go, no go process that they used.

So, you want to dig down, like I said earlier, the five why is a great technique, but you’re just trying to get to that deep level why things happen finally. L is the lessons learned, which is after we know those root causes now, what are we going to change? You know, what are we going to get better? What are we going to implement within the organization processes, behaviors, patterns, you know, things we need to take back to leadership potentially? What are things we’re going to, we’re going to change, basically. And if you note in that checklist, one key piece I have there is you’ve got to assign, again, accountability to who’s going to oversee that change, right? And that’s a key piece of that. So, I gave you that overview. But to your question, yeah, I always tell people this all the time, look, you don’t have to take everything back, you know that I, that I tell you that I use and redo everything, but if you can just pull a few things out of here, if they can just pull out that, setting that tone of accountability piece out, you know, how you do that, I mean, that’s, that’s critical.

Or just how you analyze mishaps and really getting down to that deep level root cause or analyzing projects or tasks, I mean, if they can just take a few parts of it, that, that’s what I always say. That’s the key part of this. But having an understanding that at the backdrop of this is again going back to human factors, right, that go into that debrief, knowing that, hey, look, we know none of us made these mistakes or errors on purpose. None of us showed up here saying we’re going to do this, so let’s really get down to the deep level root cause. You know, what were the human factors at play? Maybe we didn’t have great communication. You know, like I said earlier, maybe we were mentally and physically fatigued. Maybe we’re running that revving the engine too high here. You know, there’s things that are going to come out of that that you’re going to, you’re going to really need to take step back and think about. So, I think that’s that all those pieces combined, it’s a great framework. But if you can just take a few pieces out of that, I think you’ll definitely see improvement both in how you run debriefs and then how you run your organization as well.

So, Brendan, thank you very much for coming back on the show. You’re a very engaging speaker. You talked last time about some of the elements of human factors. This time you went deeper on the debrief culture. I think it’s a hugely important piece. You also do keynotes, you do workshops. Somebody’s interested in, in tapping into some of your thinking around human factors, continuous learning debriefs. How can they get in touch with you?

Absolutely. Thanks for bringing that up, Eric. And again, thank you for having me on the show. It’s just a great time. I love talking this stuff, as you can tell, hopefully. But yeah, brandonwilliamsspeaker.com is my website. Go in there and you can reach out to me through there and find all kind of information as well. LinkedIn Brandon Williams, Speaker Just search that up and you should be able to find me. I’m also on Instagram, Facebook, leadership speaker pilot on those, if you search those and then [email protected] is my, is my email as well. So, feel free to reach out. And like I said, I love to give people, you know, the guides, free stuff all the time, things like that, because I think they’ll see how credibly valuable, useful it is when they do get it. So, thank you for bringing that up though.

Perfect.

Thank you for listening to The Safety Guru on C-suite Radio. Leave a legacy. Distinguish yourself from the past. Grow your success. Capture the hearts and minds of your teams. Elevate your safety. Like every successful athlete, top leaders continuously invest in their safety leadership with an expert coach to boost safety performance. Begin your journey at execsafetycoach.com. Come back in two weeks for the next episode with your host, Eric Michrowski. This podcast is powered by Propulo Consulting.

ABOUT THE GUEST

Brandon Williams is a highly sought-after speaker, airline pilot, and human factors professor with over two decades of experience leading teams in some of the world’s most dynamic, complex, and high-risk environments. A former U.S. Air Force Fighter Pilot, Lieutenant Colonel, and Safety Officer, Brandon brings a unique blend of military precision, safety expertise, and real-world leadership to organizations striving for excellence in high-reliability industries.

As a recognized expert in Human Factors and organizational safety, Brandon equips leaders with the strategies and tools to build High-Reliability Organizations (HROs) and High-Performance Teams across sectors including transportation, healthcare, energy, construction, and manufacturing. His powerful keynotes and training sessions are grounded in military aviation principles and safety science, offering actionable insights into system-level thinking, human error mitigation, and decision-making under pressure.

Brandon’s approach is both practical and transformative—he helps organizations understand the critical role of safety culture, Just Culture, and situational awareness in preventing incidents and enhancing team performance. Through compelling storytelling and proven methodologies, he empowers leaders to navigate uncertainty, manage complexity, and create resilient teams that thrive in high-stakes environments.

With his deep expertise and engaging presentation style, Brandon Williams is the go-to expert for organizations looking to elevate their safety leadership and operational excellence.

For more information: brandonwilliamsspeaker.com

Email: [email protected]

LinkedIn: www.linkedin.com/in/brandon-williams-speaker/

RELATED EPISODE

STAY CONNECTED

The Safety Guru with Eric Michrowski

More Episodes: https://thesafetyculture.guru/

C-Suite Radio: https://c-suitenetwork.com/the-safety-guru/

Powered By Propulo Consulting: https://propulo.com/

Eric Michrowski: https://ericmichrowski.com

EXECUTIVE SAFETY COACHING

Like every successful athlete, top leaders continuously invest in their Safety Leadership with an expert coach to boost safety performance.

Safety Leadership coaching has been limited, expensive, and exclusive for too long.

As part of Propulo Consulting’s subscription-based executive membership, our coaching partnership is tailored for top business executives that are motivated to improve safety leadership and commitment.
Unlock your full potential with the only Executive Safety Coaching for Ops & HSE leaders available on the market.

Explore your journey with Executive Safety Coaching at https://www.execsafetycoach.com.
Executive Safety Coaching_Propulo

Why Systems Thinking Matters for Safety with Dr Paul Salmon

Why Systems Thinking Matters for Safety with Dr. Paul Salmon

LISTEN TO THE EPISODE: 

ABOUT THE EPISODE

Join us on The Safety Guru for a thought-provoking conversation with Dr Paul Salmon, professor and seasoned expert in applied human factors and systems science research. In this insightful episode, Paul breaks down how interconnected systems and both direct and indirect decision-making impact safety outcomes, and how every individual plays a role. He also explains the difference between the old and new views of safety, sharing real-world examples to deepen our understanding of complex systems. Discover why systems thinking matters for safety and learn how to apply it across your organization with practical, actionable strategies. Don’t miss this powerful episode!

READ THE EPISODE

Real leaders leave a legacy. They capture the hearts and minds of their teams. Their origin story puts the safety and well-being of their people first. Great companies ubiquitously have safe, yet productive operations. For those companies, safety is an investment, not a cost for the C-suite. It’s a real topic of daily focus. This is the Safety Guru with your host, Eric Michrowski, a globally recognized ops and safety guru, public speaker and author. Are you ready to leave a safety legacy? Your legacy success story begins now. 

Hi, and welcome to the Safety Guru. Today, I’m very excited to have with me Professor Paul Sammon. He’s from the University of Sunshine Coast. Paul, welcome to the show. Very excited to have you with me.

Hi, Eric. It’s great to be here. Thanks for having me.

Why don’t we get started with how you got into safety and some of your background because it’s quite fascinating.

Yeah, sure. It’s quite an interesting journey to where I am now. I’m a professor of human factors at the moment who doing a lot of safety work, but I actually started out life as a sports scientist. I did an undergraduate degree in sports science. During my studies there, I had access to things like Anthropometrics, and I became interested in football boot design. I knew about physical ergonomics and things that. And at the end of the degree, I saw a master’s degree in applied Ergonomics being advertised. I’d heard of ergonomics, and I was quite interested in doing further studies. I thought that would be interesting. So, I applied for that. And on that master’s degree, there was a module around accident causation investigation. And so, we did a case study. I remember it very clearly. It was on the Herald of Free enterprise, the Brugger disaster, where a roll-on-roll-off ferry capsized just after leaving Port and killing a number of people and crew. And we did a case study on that. We were exposed to reasons, Swiss cheese model, and I just I’m completely fascinated in accident causation and disasters and went from there, really. So that’s where it all started for me.

From sports science, football boot design through to major incidents.

Quite diverse set A lot of experiences, but it is the whole Swiss cheese and all that is incredibly fascinating from a safety standpoint. Which gets me to speak about one of the most critical parts that we’re starting to finally embrace in safety is really the systems thinking. Can you tell me a little bit more around why systems thinking is so critical to safety and maybe how you move to that perspective? 

Yeah, I mean, look, I think the movement to that perspective is another interesting story, so maybe I’ll talk about that first. Sure. After the master’s degree, I worked on a project with Professor Neville Stanton and Professor Don Harris, Brunell University and Cranfield University at the time. We were developing a human error, what’s called a human error identification technique. It was specifically for identifying potential pilot errors in cockpit certification processes. Sure. Through that, I was to things like reasons, generic error modeling system, Barry Kerwin’s work on human error identification, Sydney Decker’s work on the old and new views, and then methods like Sherpa, Tracer, and CREEM. So, I was I was working in the space of human error. I guess reading around all of that work, I became exposed to different models of error, different models of failure, and things like Rasmussen’s Risk Management Framework, Perro’s Normal Accident Theory, and so on. And I started, towards the end of that project, I started to get this idea that focusing on errors alone is actually quite misleading. And I became interested in what Factors are actually influencing people to make errors. And so, I started to really look at those systems issues.

But the real incident that really got me firmly into systems I was thinking was that I then was working in defense research. And so, I was asked to look at an incident which was a fratricide or blue on blue or friendly fire incident that you might call it, where UK tank had fired upon one of its own tanks, killing two crew members, and I think severely injuring another two. And what I found really interesting in this case was that no matter how you looked at the incident or no matter what analysis method you used, the decision to fire at the target always made sense. So, I couldn’t find any errors. The system was actually behaving exactly as it should, given the circumstances. And so, I started to question, is human Is there actually a real thing, or is it just a label that we’ve put on performance variability where factors across the system are interacting to influence behavior? And from then, I just really immerse myself in the models, the methods, and started applying them in all different contexts.

Interesting.

Yeah. And I think the reason why it is so critical as an approach is that it lets you actually understand what is driving behavior Rather than just looking at a behavior in of itself or a behavioral issue like human error or loss of situation awareness, it lets you understand all of the things across a broader socio-technical system that interacted to create that behavior. I think when you do that, you really get a very different understanding of why something happened in the way that it did.

Are you able to expand on why those decisions in that incident you mentioned all made sense? To give a bit of an illustration of… Because I think most people think there’s obviously somebody who made a mistake, and so it’s very easy to get to that. I don’t know if you’re able to share a little bit about the background that provides context where these decisions made sense.

Yeah, sure. In the circumstance, if we look at the decision to fire upon the target, I think there was a thermal signature that was representative of an enemy coming out of a weapons bunker. So, the signals being provided by the technology were that it was enemy. I think in the planning of the incident, there was no information given to the people involved that there would be other friendly forces in that area of the boundary. So, there was no prior communication around that. So, they were basically going through a process that had been gone through many times. They were getting the information that was telling them that there’s enemy, and the response to that in that circumstance was to fire upon the enemy. So whatever way you look at that, you can say the decision to fire is an error in hindsight. But actually, at the point in time, the decision to fire made perfect sense to the person who made it, given all of the information, all of the training, all of the planning, all of the things in the system that were present, that actually made sense to the individual. I think that’s one of the key aspects of systems thinking is rather than try to label something as a mistake or an error, what you’re actually doing is you’re saying, Well, why did this action make sense to the person that made it at the time?

Often you find that actually it’s not an error. They’re actually doing what is expected.

I think that ties in to touched on it a little bit before, but the view, old view versus new view of safety. Can you share a little bit more in terms of what it means, I think, to a lot of safety professionals, very common language, but it’s still fairly new in some circles in terms of the points of difference between this old view and new view?

Yeah, sure. The old view really is this idea that when systems fail, it’s typically caused by humans that have made an error or a mistake of some sort. It’s a view really that systems are really well designed. They fail because of unreliable or erratic human beings who make some error. Really the way to make systems safe is to use things like training, procedures, or appraisals to restrict human behavior so that they don’t make any errors. It takes this view, this interesting view that systems are really well designed, and its only unreliable people that break them. And the new view is very different. So, the new view actually says that actually systems are highly complex. They comprise humans interacting with things and technologies. They’re very brutal. They’re very prone to failure. Actually, humans are the glue that are keeping these systems together. And so when systems do fail, what instead we should be doing is going, what Sydney Decker says, go up and out into the broader system rather than down and in to the human in the decision and go up and out into the broader system and try and understand how all of the components interacted to get to the point of an error.

So why did the decision that we’re calling an error with hindsight makes sense to the person who made it at the time. Sure. Then in response to that, rather than these ideas of restricting human behavior through procedures, which paradoxically make the system far more complex and even more prone to failure, we need to understand what leverage points there are in the system. What is actually influencing behavior and what leverage points can we target with interventions that will actually influence behavior in a positive way? 

When you mentioned in the old view, you bring up basically systems are well-designed, but those systems are well-designed by humans that have been themselves in an area imperfect. That’s right. You can’t design a system that’s perfect.

Absolutely. I think everybody can reflect on their own occupations and say that systems are just not well-designed. They’re complex. They’re layered with processes that don’t work together. I think we’ve all experienced systems that don’t work particularly well.

I think there’s also quite a bit of arguments to say that systems have become much more complex as you start layering technologies, as you start layering specialization. The examples I’ve heard was even if you go back in history, for a doctor, you will need one specialist for a particular operation. Now, you need a whole team of experts. If it’s, for example, cancer treatment, even when you’re building a used to be a very simple design, but now you have lots of specialized expertise that are building it that all speak different languages.

That’s right. That’s absolutely right. I was presenting only the other day on AI safety and Liz Anne Bainbridge’s paper on the Ironies of Automation, which is, I think, was published in 1983. She talked about how introducing advanced technologies basically makes systems far more complex and brutal and more prone to failure. We’ve known about this for many years, and we can see it happening right now with AI, for example.

I think even I’m going to touch on aviation when you touch on the elements. If you think about the Air France crashes many moons ago, you had a system that was sending all sorts of alerts. You’re on autopilot, so you’re expecting things to be normal, and suddenly things go wrong. Even the 737 max, you have the system failing, and you’re hoping this human can figure a solution to something they’ve not been trained to.

Yeah, Air France 447 is a really great example of system syncing, and we use that a lot in our teachings and lecturing’s, just about the idea around why the action made sense to the individuals at the time. There are points in that unfolding scenario where the pilots, I think, don’t even know if they’re going up or down. The messages that they’re getting from the system are just not assisting them in any way, really.

You’ve got seconds to make decisions, and you’ve not been trained for the system failing around you. Same with the 737 max, where the autopilot was kicking and doing things that nobody could understand how to take off.

That’s right.

Absolutely. This view of systems thinking, I think, is one thing to understand the impact. I think more and more people are starting to realize the impact of the system and starting to bring a lot. But it’s a lot more complex in many ways because it’s very easy to blame the person who made a mistake. When you’re trying to do it proactively from a systems thinking standpoint, there’s a lot of decisions people that are, in some cases, unrelated to the work being performed that are in head offices that make decisions that ultimately impact the system. What are some of the ways that an organization can start looking at really driving this shift towards systems thinking?

Yeah, that’s a really interesting question. I think based on the experiences we’ve had. The first thing is there’s really an education piece. I think there’s an education piece where you have stakeholders from across whatever system you’re working in and you’re educating them on the philosophy, the principles, the approaches. I think one of the interesting things is often there’s an assumption that all we’re really trying to do is shift blame higher up into higher levels of the system. So, from the frontline workers to more people in managers and things like that. I think there’s an education piece about what it’s about, what its power is, and certainly in the work we’ve done, we’ve always had what we call our industry champions who are in the sector who are preaching and communicating the principles of system sinking. I think once the education piece starts to gain traction, I think then it’s really about the methods that are used for safety management. I lose count about the times when we’ve been doing work in sectors and the methods that they use just are not going to enable a shift towards systems thinking. I’m thinking about things like incident reporting and learning systems that would only let you report one cause of an incident that you’re reporting.

And so that just limits what you can learn. Or an accident investigation Delegation method that doesn’t look at contribute factors across the system and doesn’t look at interactions between contribute factors. So, it’s about then, I think, developing appropriate safety management methods and all of the training piece around that and implementing the methods and evaluating them to show that they actually are beneficial. I think the methods part is really critical because what we do see in most sectors is a significant research practice gap where the methods that are being used by researchers in our ivory towers all the time in the world to do this analysis, they haven’t really been effectively translated in practice. So, you have organizations who really are willing to embrace a system-sinking approach, but they just don’t have the methods to do it, which is a challenge. Sure.

This episode of the Safety Guru podcast is brought to you by Propulo Consulting, the leading safety and safety culture advisory firm. Whether you are looking to assess your safety culture, develop strategies to level up your safety performance, introduce human performance capabilities, re-energize your BBS program, enhance supervisory safety capabilities, or introduce unique safety leadership training and talent solutions, Propulo has you covered. Visit us at propulo.com.

It is, and I’d say the other part I’m also seeing in many organizations is it shifts from safety is the role of operations and safety to the entire organization really impacts the system. We haven’t necessarily educated in organizations for somebody in finance, as an example, to understand how you impact safety. But if you look at Deepwater Horizon as an example, or even Texas City, both traces back to financial decisions that were made and how they were interpreted by other decision-makers at the end of the day. I think there was a dollar called Every Dollar Counts. I have a program that was called Every Dollar Counts. My point, usually want to bring that up, is other oil and gas supermajors have also had cost-saving programs but didn’t have the same impact in the decision-making that came as a follow-on.

Yeah, absolutely. That’s really interesting because we We’ve written some pieces around this, and my view is systems thinking should be taught in schools. Because I think there’s an argument. I can’t remember who makes the argument, one of the prominent figures, I forget the name. But they say that we start life out as systems thinkers, and it’s actually driven out of us through the education system that we go through. It’s interesting to me that we could be teaching this very early on, and people could be coming out naturally as systems thinkers, and whatever role they’re in within organization, they’re able to apply that thinking.

That’s a really good observation because at the end of the day, systems thinking has a huge impact on safety. But it has impact on P&L. I remember even some executive I was talking about that was complaining about how somebody had cut some budget in marketing, and it reduced certain print materials, and it passed the dollars, magnified them by to the next group in the organization. You saved maybe a million dollars, and you created $2 millions of cost somewhere else.

Yeah, that’s right. A lot of the work that we do in the center, for example, applying systems thinking in sport, yes, we’ve been doing it, looking at injury management and things like that. But a key part of that is that it’s about performance optimization. So, you’re getting safety benefits, but you’re really getting benefits It’s across the board in terms of performance, cost saving, efficiencies, and things like that. I think it’s definitely a good skill to have.

I love your point about increasing awareness, about introducing even training or awareness around systems thinking. What are some of the approaches that organizations can look at to mitigate risk? And are there some things that could be done from a risk assessment standpoint that are more proactive? Because it’s easy after an event, and aviation has done very well in terms of doing really detailed investigations following an event that are not single-handedly laying blame in one place but also has pushed to see a lot more in your miss reporting overall. But that’s not something that’s common across all industry.

Yeah, no, that’s another great question. I think there’s no doubt that when I mentioned the research practice gap, prospective risk assessment methods are a very good example for that. You have whichever, I guess, domain you look in. We have very limited risk assessment methods currently being used where it’s based heavily on experience. We identify the risks that we’ve seen happen before, often brainstorming or a checklist or something like that. But really, a really good risk assessment method has some key parts to it that really not many have currently. And a good example of that is, you’re basing the risk assessment on a description of the work system. And it’s really interesting to me how few methods do that. So, if I think of something like, for example, Nancy Leveson’s stamp, SPA, prospective risk assessment or the networked hazard analysis risk management system that we’ve developed with myself, Claire Dalet and a few others. These methods, really, the first step in those approaches are to develop a model of the socio-technical system that understands, that describes and understands all of the interactions going on in that system. I think if you have a risk assessment method that doesn’t do that, you can’t get any handle on the likely risks that are going to emerge in that system.

I think that’s the first point. I think adopting these methods to actually build a model of the work system first is critical. I think then the most important thing is that the methods that you’re using, they look across the work system for risk. You could argue that we’ve got a very good understanding of the risks that might emerge in a cockpit, in a control room, in a train cabin. What these methods don’t do really is understand risks in the broader socio-technical system. They don’t look, for example, at risks that happen at the work design stage, risks that are present in policies and procedures, risks in training programs. They’re really missing a big part of the picture. A lot of the work we’ve done has shown that by looking at these broader socio-technical systems risks and how they interact, you really get a much better handle on what potentially can go wrong at the sharp end or whatever you want to call it. I think methods that do that are really important. Again, those are methods like stamp, STPA, net harms, and things like that. There are very few methods that do that, though.

Can you really wrap your head around the full system in the age of complexity we’re in? I’m thinking many organizations don’t even have a process map that tells them how the work is being done. Or the process map is outdated by 10 years.

That’s right.

The system can be incredibly complex.

That’s right. When I say a description of the full work system, I acknowledge that we’re never really describing the full system or getting a full handle on it. But I think at least you need to base your risk assessment on some model of the broader socio-technical system and how work is actually designed, planned, and then undertaken. I like the idea, for example, that organizations can have living, breathing models of the work system, and when they implement change, they can then update their models. We’ve looked at doing that thing like Nancy Leveson’s stamp control structure. I do acknowledge that that’s a big undertaking and you never fully getting to grips with what’s actually going on in the system. But I think at least some model of that allows you to get a better sense of all of these different risks that you need to manage.

Are there some additional pieces from a risk assessment standpoint in terms of, if I think about from a safety management system, management of change, trying to understand as you make decisions, how could it be layering in? There could be more steps where we’re forcing people to understand. I saw in one organization, they introduce a language, planning red flags whenever they’re introducing risk. Because in the Swiss cheese part, it’s the layering of the risk as well. So, one risk on its own may be a necessary evil of running business but understanding where we’re planning risk in a particular decision-making process.

Yeah. So, I think there’s more that people can do. And I think some of that, trying to understand about things that are being introduced and what potential unwanted consequences might emerge from that. It is a really good process for organizations to go through. And I think as we get more sophisticated with dynamic modeling tools, we can become better at that. So, we can become better at understanding how if we’re introducing a certain policy or a new procedure or new technology, what the knock-on effects of that are across the broader system. Some of the work that we’re doing at the minute, for example, is we’re using things like computational modeling to try and simulate the behavior of a system over time and see what happens when we introduce different interventions. Does it solve the problem we’re trying to solve, but does it also create unwanted effects elsewhere in the system? And that’s a very academic, again, ivory tower exercise. But as we get more advanced software programs and tools, I would think that would be something that organizations can start to do themselves.

I think, as you said, the first step is to understand that there is a system impact and understand, getting people to better understand how they impact indirectly decision making, where the rubber hits the road and start understanding, having the conversations around it to then be able to identify the risks that we’re introducing.

That’s right. A good example. I’ve mentioned Claire Dalet’s work, who was a PhD student of mine. Her work was in the space of led outdoor activities. Basically, when kids are taken on school camps and there’s an educational component, but they’re led by an instructor. We’ve done a lot of work in that sector. Her work involved developing the net harms prospective risk assessment method. But I think the most powerful piece of her PhD was actually she did what we call a hierarchical task analysis of how an organization sets up, plans, organizes, and delivers. I think it was a five-day hike for a school, a bunch of school kids, right? Sure. I think the most powerful part of her PhD was to say, look, there’s this whole system of work, and actually there are, I think, five times more risks in the planning and organization phase of the work than actually delivering the hike on the ground out in the wilderness. And that was such an education piece for the sector because it was really saying, yes, we can dynamically manage risks as they occur during the hike, and we have a good experience and knowledge of what those are.

But actually, all of the more powerful and difficult risks are in there before we even get out there. They’re in the organization when we’re planning and organizing this hike. So that was really a really powerful piece of work, I think, for that reason.

Another thought is, is there anything that can be done as well in terms of how we train, educate those that are in the field? Because there’s a system part. But if I think about the flight deck as an environment, a lot of it is really how do we get better decision making, how do we communicate in those circumstances versus what you mentioned before, the procedures tend to get you to think in a very linear way in a very complex system.

Yeah, I mean, absolutely. I think dynamic risk assessment, obviously, is something we can train. But I think really, I’m always reticent to fall back on the training argument because I’ve seen it as a solution proposed so many times to cover up problems in the design of the work and the design of the technologies that the people are using. So, I think really the key is joint optimization. If we’re really thinking about jointly optimizing humans, procedures, and technologies from the get-go, we’re not going to really need to step in with additional training programs to manage things. We’re going to be sorting these issues out through the design of the work and the technologies.

I think where it’s going is more the if I expect you to be a problem solver as opposed to following a procedure, then you may be more aware of the risk in front of you.

Absolutely.

But I agree, it’s not the end-all be-all solution because I’ve seen that as well, where something goes wrong and it’s retrained irrespective of what happened. Paul, thank you so much for joining me. Really insightful thoughts in terms of pushing people to really think about the system and how you can have events that really made sense to everyone at the time, and that we need to really start thinking organizationally in terms of, really, how do we start moving towards more of a systems thinking perspective? How do we get everybody realizing how they impact the system through their decision making?

It’s been great to chat, Eric, and there’s really interesting questions. Thank you for having me.

If somebody wants to get in touch with you, What’s the best way to do that?

You can flick me an email, [email protected] or just flick me a message on LinkedIn. You’ll find me on there as well.

Excellent. Thank you so much for joining me today, Paul.

Thanks, Eric.

Thank you for listening to The Safety Guru on C-suite Radio. Leave a legacy. Distinguish yourself from the past. Grow your success. Capture the hearts and minds of your teams. Elevate your safety. Like every successful athlete, top leaders continuously invest in their safety leadership with an expert coach to boost safety performance. Begin your journey at execsafetycoach.com. Come back in two weeks for the next episode with your host, Eric Michrowski. This podcast is powered by Propulo Consulting.

ABOUT THE GUEST

Dr Paul Salmon is a professor of Human Factors and creator of the Centre for Human Factors and Sociotechnical Systems at the University of the Sunshine Coast. He has almost 25 years’ experience of applied Human Factors and systems science research in a diverse set of domains. Paul has co-authored 23 books and over 300 peer-reviewed journal articles. His current research interests are focused on the application of Human Factors and systems science to manage societal and global risks. Paul has received several prestigious awards from the International, Australian, US, and UK Human Factors and Ergonomics societies, and for the past 5 years, The Australian has identified him as Australia’s field leader in the area of quality and reliability.

For more information: https://www.usc.edu.au/staff/professor-paul-salmon#research

RELATED EPISODE

STAY CONNECTED

The Safety Guru with Eric Michrowski

More Episodes: https://thesafetyculture.guru/

C-Suite Radio: https://c-suitenetwork.com/the-safety-guru/

Powered By Propulo Consulting: https://propulo.com/

Eric Michrowski: https://ericmichrowski.com

EXECUTIVE SAFETY COACHING

Like every successful athlete, top leaders continuously invest in their Safety Leadership with an expert coach to boost safety performance.

Safety Leadership coaching has been limited, expensive, and exclusive for too long.

As part of Propulo Consulting’s subscription-based executive membership, our coaching partnership is tailored for top business executives that are motivated to improve safety leadership and commitment.
Unlock your full potential with the only Executive Safety Coaching for Ops & HSE leaders available on the market.
Explore your journey with Executive Safety Coaching at https://www.execsafetycoach.com.
Executive Safety Coaching_Propulo

Aviation Learnings and Human Factors: Turning Complex Challenges into Simple Solutions with Ian Hollingworth

Aviation Learnings and Human Factors: Turning Complex Challenges into Simple Solutions

LISTEN TO THE EPISODE: 

ABOUT THE EPISODE

Drawing from his extensive experience in high-performance aviation, Captain Ian Hollingworth joins The Safety Guru to share powerful insights on aviation learnings and human factors. In this engaging episode, Ian brings riveting real-world case studies to life and explores how key aviation principles can be applied to safety-critical industries. He also unpacks three essential elements of human factors that are vital to improving safety and performance. Whether you’re in aviation or another high-stakes field, Ian’s insights offer practical applications to elevate safety, decision-making, and problem-solving. Don’t miss this episode—you’ll walk away with valuable takeaways to help turn complex systems and challenges into simple, actionable solutions.

READ THE EPISODE

Real leaders leave a legacy. They capture the hearts and minds of their teams. Their origin story puts the safety and well-being of their people first. Great companies ubiquitously have safe, yet productive operations. For those companies, safety is an investment, not a cost for the C-suite. It’s a real topic of daily focus. This is the Safety Guru with your host, Eric Michrowski, a globally recognized ops and safety guru, public speaker and author. Are you ready to leave a safety legacy? Your legacy success story begins now.

Hi, and welcome to the Safety Guru. Today, I’m very excited to have with me Captain Ian Hollingworth. He’s a former fighter pilot as well as a commercial pilot with a lot of experience flying but also brings a lot of expertise in human factors. Ian, welcome to the show. Very excited to have you with me.

It’s great to be here. Thanks very much indeed. I’m looking forward to it as It should be a lot of fun.

Excellent. Let’s start with your background in aviation and safety. You’ve crossed analog last flight decks. We’ll get into all of that very soon. But tell me a little bit about your background and how you got into human factors.

Well, done. You’ve already introduced me as the former fighter pilot and commercial airline captain. Well, for over 40 years, Eric, it’s been a privilege to be involved in aviation as an instructor examiner on the airplane types themselves, which vary from 1980s times in the UK Royal Air Force, flying the lightning, which is akin to the F-104-star fires It’s that generation of airplane. I was firstly flying those as an instructor, very much during the Cold War in the 1980s, which turned out to be quite hot from time to time. It was not cold at all, really. Then Once I’d done that for 12 years or so, and in the meantime, moved on from being a single fellow to being married with kids, I did the hop, which is not unusual to commercial types. I then joined commercial aviation, initially flying the very early 747 model, 747 Jumbos, the one and 200 series, very early analog aeroplanes as well. That was quite comfortable for me, and I had introduction through flight engineers, et cetera, et cetera. Through to more modern types, you might say, through to the 737, where I attained my first command, more models of that, back onto the jumbo as a captain and as a trainer, and then more laterally as a trainer on the Boeing 777 and the 787.

Most of my time, almost all my time has been with Boeing as well as my time in the UK Air Force. How I got into the safety side of things? Well, right now, my business, Cassandra Flight Training in UK and Plainetalks.com, really consult to aviation and non-aviation industry, but principally safety critical organizations such as nuclear, health care, and fire and rescue services here in the UK. Sometimes I work through associate companies as well. It’s great to cross-pollinate and work with other teams. This takes me to all parts of the globe from time to time. More recently, it’s been Africa, the Indian subcontinent, and generally throughout Europe. I do what I’m not doing now. I don’t tend to do a lot of talking. I tend to do much more listening in this environment and facilitate and craft a discussion, generally using case studies, really to get inside the heads of those operators that had been involved in incidents and accidents to work out what was really so compelling and was right about what they were doing that led them to the accidents. That’s it. How I arrived here, to a certain extent, Eric, is still a bit of a mystery to me.

But I was a child of the ’60s and ’70s, and I very much was building those plastic models when I was a kid, throwing them out the window and following the likes of the Gemini and Apollo programs for NASA. I watched the development of Concord. I sat there, my I had at three o’clock in the morning with a black and white TV watching Neil Armstrong land on the moon. How could I not be inspired to go into aviation or other? It wasn’t with any great plan, Eric, at all. I got out of university, really, as the world’s worst physics graduate. But all I wanted to do was to do my best within aviation, which was to fly the most exciting airplanes available that signed to me in the Air Force, which is the Harrier and the Lightning. As far as the safety element of that question goes, I like to aviation, I’ve always been interested in the background as to what makes a complex system work so well. But it’s when safety becomes personal that your mindset develops as it does.

When I look back to the frequent accidents that occurred in and around me in my time on the lightning in particular, the second time I flew the airplane as a single-seat fighter, I had a catastrophic engine failure myself. Oh, my goodness.

No big deal because it had two big engines, and the other one was quite capable of getting me back on the ground again. It was a case of, pick up another airplane, go with it. But we had several accidents which involved the loss of airplane ejection, and also from time to time, the loss of the pilot as well, which really hurt, particularly when it’s your friend. In ’88, in particular, my very best friend at the time was killed in a Red Arrows accident. When we think of the red arrows as a team of excellence, really, akin to other great aviation teams. It was a massive shock to me. But the results of that accident inquiry, essentially, the word pilot error. But there was much, much more involved in that accident from a systemic that really concentrated my mind, I would say. The loss of a friend in the 1985 Manchester 737 accident, a commercial accident, Papa 2 8 Mike, was my wife’s best friend, in fact, my wife’s best friend, really does offer you more in terms of understanding aviation safety. And that’s it, really. But my first formal exposure to CRM, as such, on joining British Airways.

I think I’d always been involved in airmanship, as it was told. Sure. It was. But joining BA, and thereafter much more deeply and enjoyably working with a guy called nick Dahlstrom at Emirates Airlines, probably about 20 years ago now. So that’s me. That’s my general background in aviation and safety.

I’d love to explore in terms of how decision-making has shifted in the aviation world. You alluded to analog versus glass-flight decks and shifting from one to the other, from the older generations of 47, 100 as an example, to more modern to 787. Tell me a little bit more in terms of how decision-making has evolved over time.

Sure. You’re absolutely right. In my case, I’ve been exposed to a lot of analog type airplanes and those systems all the way through to really sophisticated airplanes, glass carpets, et cetera, and digital stuff. Also, operating with basically a single pilot, but within a team, if you like, all the way through to multi-cruise on big airplanes. It’s worth looking at what is still the same, if you like. We still work to a checklist. It’s a checklist environment. We still adhere to standard operating procedures, either in the military or outside. The decisions that we make as a human being are still essentially the quick ones, the experiential ones, the recognition prime ones. If I go back to my engine failure on my second flight on the light, it went bang. I knew what it was. You could instantly recognize that and had to deal with it through a checklist which you practiced, all the way through to the more considered or rule or procedural bound decisions that we run to in more complex systems. So, type one, type two, fast and slow. But the big difference now is the complexity of circumstance. It’s sifting through the large amount of data that’s available to to the operator or to the pilot, and to be able to prioritize exactly what you’re going to do and how you move forward.

Sometimes, I try to offer an analogy to that with the teams that I’m working with. It’s like if you’ve got a deck of cards and the 52 cards in the pack, and each card offers a solution or a part solution or a way forward. Sometimes those cards can be in a pack in your hand, all folded up. Or you can have the same 52 cards all spread out on the table, and you can have a whole group of people having a big discussion about which card you pick up first and why and how it’s going to work. It all depends upon the time that you’ve got. And quite often in aviation, time is limited, or the perception of time is limited. So, you can pick cards up in your hand and you can pick a card up, that doesn’t work. Pick another one up, that doesn’t work. Pick a third card up. That keeps me safe and that allows me time to make another decision. And that’s a way of thinking about decision making. But within this, we’re still the same human being, and the system will become much more complicated and much more complex.

But we’re the same. We haven’t evolved particularly well. We have to manage our time. We’re still subject to the same time constraints, and it is crucial to understand how much time is perceived to be available in order to get these decisions made. So, one of my struck lines, Eric, is trying to simplify solutions to complex problems. And when you have a complex problem, a complex non-normal, let’s say, on an airplane, begin with just starting the clock. Always, always start the clock because the time will run away with you otherwise. Then quite quickly, I think it’s like going back to Apollo 13 and missions that can quickly go so badly wrong. You have to ascertain your bottom lines very quickly. What are the non-negotiables? And work on from there. Once you’ve got the clock running, once you understand how much time you got, once your bottom line’s ascertained, then you can work simply from there. One of the great things that’s worked in the evolution of CRM is the evolution of decision-making models. You may have heard the acronyms FWDEC, DODAR, T DODAR, grade, they’re all doing the same things. They all offer you a framework to build a decision.

So DODAR, for instance, which is well used within aviation, first off, once the time is sorted out, then you spend time in diagnosis of a problem, and the time is rarely wasted diagnosing a problem. Coming up with options, so D and then O, options and risk, how we’re going to categorize risk, decide what you’re going to do, assign the tasks, and then review. So, you’re going through a well-founded circular pattern to go back into your original diagnosis to make sure that what you thought was the problem was actually the problem and that you’re not trying to offer a solution to a problem that isn’t there. In a way, how has decision making shifted? It’s become more sophisticated, and it’s cognizant to the fact that the human being has to be able to break down that complexity of circumstance into a simplified form. Within that, then we can learn how to brief a circumstance and debrief a circumstance and learn from that effectively.

Sometimes you’ve got very short periods of time. We’ll talk about some of the lessons from aviation. Air frost comes to mind in one of those cases to diagnose a problem when autopilot kicks Tell me a little bit about some of the key takeaways in terms of what are really the key essence of human factors and maybe bring some stories and some examples from aviation.

Well, the problem-solving decision making that you’ve just talked about is central to the 9 or 10, let’s say, assessment markers that we use for pilot competencies nowadays in a era. Those pilot competencies are way beyond just the technical ones that that were experiential for me in the 1970s and ’80s, where it was stick and rudder and you were learning to fly the airplane, hand-eye coordination. Really, it now evolves much more into the social skills of leadership, communication, teamwork, et cetera. But the stuff that I work around with is the cognitive factors, the thinking things of the problem solving and how that manifestness itself in terms your workload management, your situational awareness, and your threat and error management understanding. So, the essentials of human factors, as you say, spin out from that. And I’m not going to list them all, but the few that are important to me here, if you like, and some of the others are available. As I’ve said, effective communication really is a skill set that runs through everything that we do in terms of normal and normal operations. Effective communication is much more than what it just says on the 10, if you like.

To have a true understanding, you need to be able to obviously convey information clearly accurately and timely within aviation. But as a crew, you need to be both concise and interactive, and that’s quite difficult to achieve sometimes. Normal communication, generally from one person to the next involves talking effectively to pair of eyes and using body language, which sometimes is mitigated, again, on the flight deck. But it’s, again, the use of the spoken word, again, which is high upon the list of communication within aviation in a way that you’re using both open and closed questions and limiting those questions appropriate to a circumstance. So, Communication runs through everything in human factors. But if I just pick out some other bits and pieces from that. Let’s look at assertiveness, for instance, which in the West of the world, UK in particular, we’re very good at not being very clear. We use mitigating speech the whole time. We playthings down when really in a safety critical environment, you have to be, at all times, clear and concise and well-paced in your delivery and understand that your delivery is only appropriate to the receiver. Can the receiver take that information and understand it?

The package needs to be delivered clearly, objectively, and non-aggressively. So, all those things come up. We see a lot of case studies, a lot of accidents and incidents, whereby people knew what was going on, but they just didn’t communicate that clearly enough to be understood.

Great.

If I might just bring in three other elements that are essential to me. Five things, if you like, that are essential to me in terms of human factors. First of all is threat and error management, which is part of the latest iteration, if you like, of human factors CRM. It’s understanding what the threats in your business, both obvious and not so obvious, the later ones, and how to manage those, and spending most of your time avoiding situations. The anecdote, the one that I learned when I was a kid learning to fly was that superior pilots should avoid situations that might require the use of their superior skills. So, you’re spending your time avoiding threats and managing them rather than working hard to obviate the results or to mitigate the issues. The other two that I build in are absolutely essential, and all these things dovetail. Situational awareness, and I think awareness is a bit of a misnomer. Situational awareness means the perception of a circumstance, your comprehension or understanding of it, and then projection of that understanding into the future. So, you can really work out what you think is going to happen next, five minutes down the line, 30 minutes down the line.

Clearly, if you’re operating transatlantic on a big airplane, what happens? Do they get sick? Where do I divert to? What is the weather, et cetera? That’s your situational awareness. And then is resilience, because there are so many times when you get hit by a problem, and then another, and then another, and then another, that those things for me, communication, assertiveness, threats, and management of your circumstance and the resilience are really important. What I would say is, how does it go wrong? More often than not, we talk about loss of situational awareness rather than trying to regain situational awareness. I had an issue. Well, very early on, I was quite a competent fighter pilot, so mid-1960s in the Cold War, and I was scrambling for what’s called a QRA sortie, which is quick to reaction alert. You’re fully armed. Basically, you’re the policeman of the skies, in my case, around the United Kingdom. I was scrambling at night in the most awful conditions and scrambling from slumber, from bed. But if I take that flight forward about three or four hours, I was fulfilling mission, which was to interrogate the outside of an airplane, which was a Russian airplane, a Russian four-engine bomber, a bear foxtrot, way out over northern Scotland, going out into the Atlantic.

I was taking photographs for intelligence purposes, obviously. But I was very quickly way beyond the capabilities of where the airplane should be. I was flying in an airplane that never carried enough fuel. It burnt whatever fuel it had very, very quickly indeed. You needed air tanker support to get the job done. I stuck myself on a limb and I wanted to get this job done. It was very much a can-do scenario. I had a cockpit fire. I was underneath this airplane, pretty close to this Russian guy, taking photographs of aerials and stuff like that. In those days, you flew the airplane with the control column between your knees because you had a handheld camera. There I am in a squashed-up airplane. That was away from anywhere. Those airplanes were rudimentary. There’s no GPS. There was no initial navigation system, no nothing. It was all to do with mental dead reckoning, how far you’ve been traveling for how long at what speed in what direction. You work out where you would go. When I was on my own, I’d left the tanker a long, long, long way back in order to intercept these guys. So, when I had the cockpit fire, all of a sudden, my mindset turned from a QRA, operational intelligence gathering scenario to, one, a survival Am I going to burn?

Am I going to fire the canopy off and freeze to death? Or am I eventually going to have to eject from this airplane into a sea and never be seen again? And my mindset turned completely. So, how did it go wrong in terms of human factors? And where did it start? I’ve asked myself those questions so many times because I clearly did not think through positively enough about what could happen, how things could possibly go wrong. And at that time, because you’re then in a circumstance with a radar that basically was on fire. It was only about half a meter away from my face. Do I have the cognitive capacity to update myself under those circumstances particularly well? Had I thought this through? No, I hadn’t. And I was in a right old mess, a right old pickle. And I was quite fine, Eric. I really was. But then I had to disengage from that operation and find my tanker, again, just using mental maths. We’re at four o’clock in the morning in a hazy early morning sky north of Scotland in May, trying to find some contrail of what I hope was a tanker and to be able to have him intercept me because I was very short of fuel to grab to get home.

I needed to get the fuel in order to make some landfall back in the UK, maybe more fuel, keep the fire down to be able to land back at pace. It was one thing after another. But I really messed up that day. But It was a great case study for me to reflect on how I got it completely wrong and how fortunate I was in the end to be able to bring the airplane back, along with some pictures for intelligence reasons. And there we go. That’s one of a number of personal studies, and I kidnaped Eric. There are lightning pilots out there that’ve got much better stories than that and many more of them because that was the nature of the operation.

This episode of the Safety Guru podcast is brought to you by Propulo Consulting, the leading safety and safety culture advisory firm. Whether you are looking to assess your safety culture, develop strategies to level up your safety performance, introduce human performance capabilities, re-energize your BBS program, enhance supervisory safety capabilities, or introduce unique safety leadership training and talent solutions, Propulo has you covered. Visit us at propulo.com.

It gets to what you were mentioning before around making it personal as well, that safety is personal in a circumstance like this from a learning standpoint.

I was a complete rookie. I didn’t think I was. I was a second tourist. Most accidents and incidents happened to people that were the most experienced guys on the squadron. They were tasked with the more difficult scenarios. Sometimes it was the can-do attitude. You were good enough. You were fully operational. You could do all these things, but sometimes you stuck your neck out far too far. That’s what I did on this occasion. But it got me thinking about myself, my self-awareness in terms of my capabilities or lack of in this case. Then as I went into commercial aviation a little later on, you’ve asked me about things like Tenerife and Air France 447. What are those things bringing? Clearly, anybody that knows about this this circumstance and have analyzed those accidents in considerable detail. But I try to look at accidents with colleagues through different eyes, really, and go beyond the accident report. For instance, if you look at the Tenerife accident and essentially, the KLM captain, Jacob van Zante, was a very senior training captain within- Very senior. Yeah. That accident was caused by a whole bunch of circumstances. The American side doesn’t quite agree with the KLM side, the Dutch side.

But essentially, the captain’s mindset was very much can do on that day. You have to try to work out why was that? Is that just his personality, or can we shift that behavior? Okay, he was very, very clear about what he wanted to do. And we had perhaps a less than assertive crew copilot within there. But the mindset of that captain was probably driven as much as anything else by the fact you spend a lot of time in the simulator. When you’re training in the simulator, Eric, you can utilize the four hours that’s in there as best you possibly can as a trainer. We don’t spend a lot of time, as you would do in real-time circumstances, taxiing around as they were in Tener Reef, you can reposition the simulator instantly to another point, debrief, even brief for another approach. You If you can reposition the airplane in the sky or on the ground. But if you’re minded like that, that you can do stuff and circumvent time to a certain extent, I can understand where Captain Van Zante just wanted to get this this airplane, airborne as quickly as to get to these destination within time, within the flight time limitations for the rest of the crew and so on and so forth and make that commercial viable.

There’s a lot of things that go in there. Into the mix that are not just the obvious. Sure. And there we go. So poor outcomes from that. Similarly, the Air France 447, 20 years later, June 2009, we come up with now a very sophisticated airplane of Petro Cube icing, which compromises a highly complex system, not necessarily easily recognized by the crew. Then if they’re not trained in dealing with that in this circumstance, then what’s the outcome going to be? It’s generally going to be less than ideal. Finding those positive outcomes, the great stories, there’s less outcome. But clearly, in ’89, for those people that want to research this is a really interesting one is United 2: 32 that landed at Sioux City, which the headline is, Eric. It was survivability from a non-survivable accident. How did that happen? By to have great communication and quality CRM in action from the very early days of a formal CRM being taught, a superb Al Haynes-led incident from which we learn a huge amount from as well. There we go. I’ve rambled on for a bit, haven’t I? Essentially, human factors.

Human factors, yes.

It’s the case studies that are important. It’s not somebody like we’re talking about. Absolutely. It’s the case studies that always surprise, and it’s the case studies that are really interesting.

You mentioned the word CRM. For anybody in aviation, that’s a very common word. Tell me a little bit more in terms of for somebody who may be outside of the aviation industry, what is CRM and how has it really evolved? Because it’s a very key component to a lot of the progress that’s been made in safety in aviation.

Perfect. Well, put indeed. I mean, the definition is out there, and it’s what it says, really. It’s utilizing all resources, human and others, other human beings, the technical side of stuff, in order to get the best and the safest outcome from any circumstance that you might find yourself in. That is essentially it. How has it evolved within aviation? Aviation has obviously been the background to CRM. My first understanding of CRM which is crew resource management, was actually cockpit resource management. Let’s say the late 1980s, evolving from NASA studies and high-profile accidents all the way from late ’60s, ’70s, it became cockpit resource management, meaning captain resource management, to start off with, understanding how the captain led a team and stuff. Then recognizing that it was more than just one man or one lady. It was to do with a crew and a team and all those elements that go into a safe operation. It then started to evolve, and there are a number of iterations of which we’re now looking at the sixth and generating the seventh. But it involves understanding the fact that error is a human issue. Error is out there. We’re never going to change the fact that the human being creates errors all the time.

So, it was trying to mitigate errors and then understanding that errors actually are generally systemic, understanding that they’re part of a system and a procedure. Right now, we’ve got evolution of CRM with the sixth iteration, which is threat and error management right at its core. But it’s also evolving along with the technology. It’s evolving along with the training systems. And now we’re into We’re learning systems that mirror exactly what the needs of the system are. It’s competency-based training, not learning to do just one thing, deal with an engine failure on takeoff. But it’s enhancing all the skills are softer skills, that allow us to take those skills in a translational way into any circumstance. The evolution considers the early analog structures, the training systems that reflected the fact that machines initially were unreliable and could be regarded as dangerous, through to So the more modern stuff, which innovations, GPS, performance tools, digitalization, super reliability. But constantly, we’re trying to align human capability with a level of the tech system that’s there at the time and what we do best. So, producing super reliability probably reduces human resilience because we’re not exposed to the same stuff as we were, thankfully, 30, 40 years ago.

It’s trying to make sure that we, as human beings, still do the stuff that we’re best at, which is decision making and allowing the system to do what it does best, which with highly complex systems is generally monitoring the systems themselves and data analysis. It’s constantly on the move. We need to perceive the erosion, if you like, of traditional pilot skills. We still need to have manual handling skills. We still need to have this situational awareness. It’s marrying all those things together. We now have a very complex understanding of training systems and how we manage training systems within the sphere of CRM, which leads to things like evolving cultures and just cultures, where we can really learn, and business can learn from aviation.

I think that’s a good segue in terms of how do these principles we talked about from human factors to CRM, to some of the elements around decision making, more complex systems, how can this translate into other industries? A lot of the work you mentioned that you do now is in other industries that are also high risk or require high reliability in bringing some of these principles from aviation to them.

That’s a fantastic question. The learnings for industry are so many. We just talked about just culture, and I don’t know whether an understanding of a true just culture needs to be probably defined first. Trust, which is a proactive and generative culture. Trust and transparency need to be there and accountability. It promotes learning from mistakes, effectively, to understand that we’re distinguishing between the good behaviors and the bad behaviors, aiming to create the ideal environment to support a good organization. In terms of particularly industry, which industry is the safety critical stuff? First, you have to ask from a high level whether that particular business has the moral courage and vision to move forward with this and have the passion for a possible reset of an organization if things are not going quite so well. That is a big buy-in to start off with, courage and vision. But because you’re going to be looking at organizational performance from the top down, from the philosophies driven by management all the way through to the procedures and practices, in my case. Sure. There are some big questions to be asked first before you embark on this, but the consequences, the positives are myriad and absolutely fantastic, if you can embrace it.

When I work with, for instance, work with nuclear power for the first time, and I was working predominantly with nuclear reactor control room staff and how they were assessed in role. Basically, in the UK, at the time, there were eight nuclear power stations. All of them were different because there were all sorts of prototypes. The systems were different, and the people involved in running the control systems had been in place for 20, 25 years, so lots of legacy items going on. How do we learn from aviation in terms of managing this and keeping the system safe? Well, first of all, it doesn’t start with the sharp and the interactive control room staff. You have to pay close attention to effectively the organizational blunt end of your operation and understand that within your system, error is the human precondition to start off with. But if you got frequent error in any of those systems or any of the way in which people work, it It’s really a system of a less ideal circumstance within the system. And then understanding. The third thing I would say is understanding the levels of accountability and trust that are placed within those people within your team, those safety critical members.

Once you’ve done that, so you analyze what you’re doing, then you can find, and this is the crucial bit, you need to find the stuff within your system that is latent, is unsafe, that nobody knows about, because that’s the stuff that’s going to cause harm in the end. It’s not the accidents and the incidents that we that we analyze. It’s the stuff that’s been in there for years and years. It’s built into the system. You can do that by, again, using your people. You need to embrace a dynamic and facilitative series of discussion and learn how to brief and debrief efficiently and giving people the opportunity to do that by setting up, for instance, human factors CRM sessions in a company, let’s say, a nuclear or an aviation or a maritime company that involves initial CRM. Everybody gets to know the culture of the company. Then you revisit that on an annual basis or semi-annual basis and refresh it all the time by having these discussions. And within that, you can then explore and analyze your industry case studies or your personal case studies within the business and encourage people to be imaginative and creative in their thought.

And this is quite fun, actually. It does cost a little bit of money, but it’s a great exercise to get people actively involved in understanding the culture of their business. From there, stuff drops out. People begin to find those latent threats and make them less latent, more observable. You can then start to properly explore strategies that develop the resilience in your business, both individual and systemic, to continue, to obviously make you a safer and more effective entity. You’re going well beyond regulatory compliance or a need to know this, and you need to have serious, from a business perspective, outcome-based conversation, what you want out of this rather than how much is it going to cost.

Right. In How do you surface, you touched a little bit on it in terms of some of those lean conditions, because that’s a key element in terms of really addressing some of the system factors.

You talked about some training, but there’s also workshops conversations. Tell me a little bit more in terms of what that looks like, if you can. The workshops that I run generally work from an organizational perspective. If you got, let’s say, between 6 and 12 people in a room, and it’s a classroom environment. This is not something that’s technically difficult to achieve. It is a real privilege to be involved in these circumstances where you are utterly comfortable in saying what you need to say and feel without feeling of compromise or of blame. This is who doesn’t just culture. And generally, within a simple environment, cup of coffee, classroom, whiteboards, flip charts, not doing everybody’s death with PowerPoint, a management video, but straightforward, having an understanding, find Fred, the guy who is really critical to your organization. It might not be the CEO in the business that’s most critical to your organization and the way in which it works. It’s somebody further down the peaking order. So, this is a bottom-up circumstance where everybody is getting to understand the culture of the business. And from time to time, you were involved in a circumstance happened a couple of weeks ago where I was in a classroom week with some guys from Air Baltic, from Latvia, smart airlines, smart people, seven or eight training captains.

We talked for a week about how we can improve various circumstances within the business, training systems in particular. It was a complete joy. Once everybody got to know one another, we’d introduce one another and each other’s background. We then get into the anecdotes, the case studies. Those are the things that people learn from area. It’s the personal stuff, and it has to be entirely relevant to what they’re doing and how they see themselves. Quite often, it’s a journey of self-knowledge, to be quite honest, understanding where you fit in the system, but being assertive enough and comfortable enough within the system to be able to deliver whatever material it is that feeds back into the system. And feedback is absolutely critical. And that’s all that we’re trying to do. And I facilitate that as best I can. I don’t talk through it. I allow people to talk and spend a lot of time listening and try to work out cognitively, sometimes paraphrase what people have said, but try to work out cognitively what this actually means within the business. James Reason, and you may have heard of Professor James Reason, sadly, he passed away earlier on this month.

He was one of the greatest giants of human factors. I don’t know whether you know he passed away. I didn’t. No. He was so instrumental in the way in which human factors work, both in aviation and outside aviation. He’s famous for the Swiss cheese model. Yeah? Yeah. Great. Yeah. He’s in recognition for the Swiss cheese model. Most people know about Swiss cheese. I won’t go into that. But He said that the operator in accidents is operating but adding the final garnish to a lethal stew whose ingredients have already been. Right. With that, a phrase that sticks with me at the end of every day and before I go to work is having, as he said, a sense of chronic unease about what you do. If you can teach your staff in a safety critical environment that. When I mean chronic unease, it’s not being scared about what’s happening. It’s just knowing about what ifs are going to happen today, how my day is going to finish. Everybody that’s crashed an airplane that’s had a problem at sea didn’t think that the day was going to end up with their demand. It’s always thinking about the what ifs in the future.

Chronic on ease will keep you safe within your system, if you can say that your system is about safety and more, and it’s about what we do, and that is a strapped line that works, then it’s good enough for me. It’s The lesson is learned.

That’s it. There we go. That’s it. I think that’s a key piece, this element of chronic unease. It’s almost a healthy form of paranoia of being prepared for what could happen, as opposed to what I often see in key industries is an overconfidence of, I know my craft, I know what I’m doing.

You’re absolutely right. You have to take into fact that the skill of the craft, if you’re a director control room team supervisor, is essentially what it’s all about. But I really enjoy the cross-pollination of taking circumstance from aviation into, let’s say, nuclear industry. To have these open discussions, it’s a really healthy place to be. Similarly with the healthcare scenarios, nobody knows everything. The more I’m around, the less I feel that I know. That’s a very good analogy.

So, Ian, thank you very much for joining me today and for sharing some of the key elements around human factors, CRM, but also the applicability in other industries. If somebody wants to get in touch with you, what’s the best way to do that? In many ways.

You can find me on LinkedIn, on YouTube. My Gmail address, which is simple, [email protected] It will almost get me there. I’m quite happy to pick up anything at any time, and I’ll always respond. That’s it. Excellent. Well, thank you so much for joining me today.

It’s been a great pleasure, Eric.

Thanks a lot for the invitation.

I appreciate it. Absolutely. Thank you.

Thank you for listening to The Safety Guru on C-suite Radio. Leave a legacy. Distinguish yourself from the past. Grow your success. Capture the hearts and minds of your teams. Elevate your safety. Like every successful athlete, top leaders continuously invest in their safety leadership with an expert coach to boost safety performance. Begin your journey at execsafetycoach.com. Come back in two weeks for the next episode with your host, Eric Michrowski. This podcast is powered by Propulo Consulting.

ABOUT THE GUEST

Having been an integral member of some of the world’s most respected high-performance aviation organizations, Ian Hollingworth is able to share unique insights into truly world-class standards, behaviors, and cultures and how they are both built and maintained. 

Drawing upon his unique experiences flying military fast jets and within commercial aviation, Ian will engage your audience with anecdotes and tips on how to build winning teams, inspire great leadership, and overcome adversity whilst maintaining focus in challenging and pressurized scenarios. 

Ian is extremely passionate about people reaching their full potential and setting big goals; for the past 20 years has worked with some of the world’s most respected businesses in order to develop the talent of tomorrow. 

For more information: https://www.planetalks.com

RELATED EPISODE

STAY CONNECTED

The Safety Guru with Eric Michrowski

More Episodes: https://thesafetyculture.guru/

C-Suite Radio: https://c-suitenetwork.com/the-safety-guru/

Powered By Propulo Consulting: https://propulo.com/

Eric Michrowski: https://ericmichrowski.com

EXECUTIVE SAFETY COACHING

Like every successful athlete, top leaders continuously invest in their Safety Leadership with an expert coach to boost safety performance.

Safety Leadership coaching has been limited, expensive, and exclusive for too long.

As part of Propulo Consulting’s subscription-based executive membership, our coaching partnership is tailored for top business executives that are motivated to improve safety leadership and commitment.
Unlock your full potential with the only Executive Safety Coaching for Ops & HSE leaders available on the market.
Explore your journey with Executive Safety Coaching at https://www.execsafetycoach.com.
Executive Safety Coaching_Propulo