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Bridging the Gap: Empowering Leaders to Connect, Listen, and Lead with Curiosity with Kelvin Genn

Bridging the Gap: Empowering Leaders to Connect, Listen, and Lead with Curiosity

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“Curiosity is the number one tool a safety professional should have.” In this compelling episode, we welcome Kelvin Genn, a seasoned leader with decades of experience across diverse industries. Kelvin shares his valuable insights on how leaders can bridge the gap between the boardroom and the frontline by fostering a culture of curiosity, unlocking the power of inquiry to ask better questions, and empowering their teams. He details how leaders can connect, listen, and lead with curiosity to build stronger connections and greater engagement. This episode is filled with sound strategies and actionable approaches that will help you foster a safer, more engaged workplace culture. Tune in now for an enlightening conversation packed with valuable takeaways!

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Real leaders leave a legacy. They capture the hearts and minds of their teams. Their origin story puts the safety and well-being of their people first. Great companies ubiquitously have safe yet productive operations. For those companies, safety is an investment, not a cost. For the C suite, it’s a real topic of daily focus. This is the Safety Guru with Your host, Eric Michrowski, a globally recognized ops and safety guru, public speaker and author. Are you ready to leave a safety legacy? Your legacy success story begins now.

Hi and welcome to the Safety Guru. Today I’m very excited to have with me Kelvin Genn, Executive director from Art of Work. We’ll be talking about how to reduce the distance between the board and the frontline, enabling leaders to ask better questions with curiosity. Kelvin has worked at the board and executive levels across aviation, healthcare, defense, manufacturing, mining, construction, government and telecommunication. A very broad range of experience. Kelvin, welcome to the show. Very excited to have you with me today.

Eric, glad to be speaking with you.

Excellent. So maybe let’s get started with your journey because you have a very interesting journey through safety over the years. Lots of experiences, learnings, pitfalls. So, tell me a little bit about how you got here.

Yeah, that’s always interesting. Good point for reflection. And I keep thinking the more I more experience I have, the more I’ve learned, the more I need to know. So, in that journey, I began my journey in the military, and I spent about 13 years in the Royal Australian Air Force. And in that job, my job was to do workplace health and safety, both in a support role, but in an operational role. And so, it was interesting from my perspective, coming into a military environment, very much command and control and very much from the format that we just need people to follow directions. And given that they follow directions, all will be good in that space. My 13 years in the military very much taught me that that was a very flawed premise.

Yes.

So that’s how I began. From there, I migrated out into industry from that point forward, I then started to work in logistics, a big, large logistics organization. And I then moved into a very large global support services company that had clients like the military and had some experiences that were unusual, like supporting the first Gulf War and doing other military operations from an external point of view rather than an internal point of view. And again, learned a lot in that perspective and from there really moved into health and I was looking after patient quality and safety for a very large healthcare organization with 110,000 clinicians in it and again had a lot of experiences in trying to understand our notions of safety and had to really reform my thinking. And that was helped a lot with my interactions, and I suppose the partnership that I formed with Professor Sydney Decker and from there moved into a large engineering business and did large mobilizations of engineering projects across Australia and Africa and North America and Europe. And it was from there that I sort of moved into where I am now, art of work, and started to take those learnings and try and reinterpret them and share them back with industry.

And over those years, I know when we originally spoke, you’ve experienced lots of different shifts in thinking and ideas and safety, from behavior-based safety to resilience engineering models and designing people out. Tell me a little bit more about kind of what were some of the takeaways you saw from a lot of those methods? What worked? What were some of the challenges?

Yeah, you go through different cycles and learnings and experiences, I think over your career. And as you can reflect, I’ve had nearly about 40 years of that experience. And coming from the military, we really started from the point that we just simply needed to design the person out of the system. All the potential for error was by having people in the system.

Sure.

So, every effort that we needed to make was to think how we could remove people from contributing to decision making to all those things. And that sort of moved forward into a large focus around, if you like, the behavioral management models. We just needed to comply and work out how we could constrain and reduce their contribution and keep them. I often talk about coloring within the lines. Just keep them coloring outside the lines.

Right.

And as we got into. And increasingly you test these ideas out and you would see that you would not be solving the core problems, you would be going and applying these strategies. And you just saw the reemergence of the same issues and problems and time and time again. And so that really questioned my thinking. And really the critical change for me was coming into the work of Professor Sydney Decker and Professor Eric Hufnagel and Dave Woods. You know, all these people. It was Sydney that introduced me into this thinking and really into the ideas of complexity. And I think it was insightful work in that resilience engineering space, which goes back to the premise of understanding complexity and that the system is imperfect, it cannot accommodate and describe the nature of the work and all the variations that people have to deal with. And from that it was clear that people were the solution in the problem, not the problem that had to be resolved. So, people were constantly bridging the gaps in what was not present in the System, what you’re not provided with the different circumstances and. And the challenge became a different challenge in how do you harness people as a solution in that space?

And how do you enable them or give them tools to make better decisions to support them in that process? So, in that shift, that shift was a shift from thinking about expertise. And I think you start to get into this mode where we’re subject matter experts in a whole range of different areas and that we simply need people to follow our direction and wisdom to achieve the right result. And increasingly I’ve learned from my experience of being out in the field that what we missed in that process is the wisdom that sits out there with where people do the work, where work is done.

Yeah.

And what we need to be able to do is harness their intelligence and insight and combine that with the subject matter expertise to work in a collaborative fashion in this space. So, it was really health that really gave me that experience. And in health, the reason was we were working with medical error in that space and the complexities of making decisions in patients. And there were nearly two schools of thought going on at that time. One was what we need to do is just create protocols, and we just want the clinical teams to follow the protocols and all will be good. Now, the problem with that protocols are linear by nature and patients are not. They’re multifactorial. And so, you would have a lot of different. And what we really learned in that space is that the clinicians that are good were much more intuitive and communicative and engagement. They were much more about being curious and learning from the patient and the people around them than being enslaved in the protocol. That tended to be somewhere where people felt safe, that they stayed with, but it wasn’t helping the patient to be safe in terms of how they were treated.

So, it was really health that made a really big difference to my thinking. And really understanding that complexity was something that we needed to engage in and use different tools. And those tools were fundamentally built around being curious.

Yeah. And I think let’s delve a little bit more into that part because I agree with you. The answer is really in those that are closest to the front line. I think you’ve made a very strong case for that in terms of the knowledge that’s there that often gets overlooked. But it’s a very simple concept, yet so often overlooked.

Why?

Why is it so often overlooked?

Look, it’s interesting. I think this comes into the nature of leadership and management to some degree. I often think about where people feel most comfortable and what people are rewarded for sure. And nearly there’s. We’ve got different domains within management, so we obviously got the executive and the senior leadership with within organizations. And then we’ve got. If you want that broadcast of people, we generally label middle management, who tend to be the people who have to deal with the resource limitations and deliver the outcomes that the business expects in that space. And then you’ve got the line management people directly in that space. I think in our work in this space, we often find that leadership are much more open to challenging the notion and thinking differently about how work is done and trying to learn differently. The group that is more challenging is the middle management piece who are much more comfortable in a controlled environment where they’re much more comfortable in defining the nature of work and how things need to be done, holding people accountable to that process because it’s a much more uncomfortable piece to step into. A piece where you’re open to curiosity, inquiry and in essence allowing things to emerge and develop, but you can’t predict exactly where that’s going to go.

So, in a controlled system, middle management, I think often more comfortable in working with a flawed system because they justify working in a flawed. In a flawed system saying, yep, we’re doing what’s been asked of us with what. With what’s been given to us and we’re getting the best results that we can, as opposed to taking a risk and doing something different, which might be much better, but it could fail as well.

And that’s been my same experience. And sometimes people talk about concrete middle or clay layer, but I think it’s actually very different. Those terms came from more of the change management space. It’s. While engaging the frontline employees is very empowering for them. It’s in many ways disempowering for middle management because I used to control the decision making. What gets escalated, what gets moved forward and suddenly I don’t fully control it. It’s empowering for the craft.

Yeah, yeah. And I suppose there’s some notions in that space it’s come around holacracy and those sorts of principles where that whole notion has been challenged as to what role that it has.

So, what are some of the ways that you bring this to life in an organization? Because as we talked about, it’s a simple yet incredibly powerful principle. But that’s so often missed in organizations. How do you bring it? What are some of the things to keep in mind as you start to empower? Obviously, the risk around the middle management and how they respond to It. But what are some of the ways that you’ve seen work successfully?

It’s interesting because I’ve been having some of these discussions with some CEOs and board members even in recent days, and we came to this notion of thinking about leadership and them expressing a notion of having informed leadership in this space, which I thought was interesting. And so, the challenge is how you enable leadership to have a clearer view to the nature of work is done and how work is done so they can have better intelligence to work with about the decisions that need to be made to enable them to achieve the business objectives. And in essence, so part of that, and our notion has been trying to have leaders more connected to where work is done and having opportunities to do that, but that is a space that they’re not comfortable in as leaders. As leaders, they don’t really want to be exposed at the front line to potentially have, if you like, a deficiency in knowledge and expertise when they’re talking to the people who are doing their business out there, doing the work. So, part of this exercise is thinking about shifting the perspective of leadership to enable them to engage more directly in that frontline space differently.

And I think it’s about giving them the confidence not to be the expert, to be the starting point of that.

Sure.

So, a lot of that has been giving them the tools of curiosity, I suppose. We’ve used a lot of tools around appreciative inquiry, thinking about how you engage and invoke and let people tell their stories and not be the person who has to judge or correct or fix anything that is presented to you in that transaction. So that’s been. I think the first part is thinking about how we reduce the gap in the distance. The big problem for senior leadership is there’s all these filters that sits between.

Oh, yes.

And where the business is. So, we all, you know, I think Sydney Deckers use a term that we have, looking good indexes. Right. So, what we. What we tend to do is that leaders try and have processes of governance, and they try and, you know, in the safety space they’re looking for all these data and feeds, most of that has been sanitized and qualified to be looking good when it comes through to them. Rarely do they get the unfiltered and difficult work. And some of the conversations we’re having with leaders now is being uncomfortable about the greenwashed dashboards that come through and thinking about how you get the other information to flow through the narrative where things are challenging or problematic and celebrating that as being a shift in that space. So really, I think the thing that we’ve been working with is firstly empowering leaders in that space, but in doing that is doing it in a way where you aren’t disempowering the operational management in space. Because the last thing that you want really is for your leadership to arrive at the front line, make all these discoveries and suddenly come back to your middle management with holding them to account for these things that they in that space.

So, part of it is about shifting them, but shifting the middle management team with you in that space to collaborate and work to shift the way that they’re engaging. And I suppose it’s engaging that space is how do we enable people; how do we get better intelligence and how do we shift from this cause and effect and blame to how do we move to being a problem-solving collaborative as such. So, it’s a, it’s a shift in that, it’s a shift in dynamics of how people interact, communicate and hopefully shift to this learning space of trying to understand and being in a continuous improvement of problem-solving loop.

Right. And I think what you describe is the most senior, at least in the conversations I had, the most senior people in an organization, CEOs, the board probably get the most filtered message. And I’ve talked to many people as they got promoted to CEO and their comment is often, I used to get information, now I’m not sure I trust the information that comes to me. And it just, it gets managed by people that are better at managing as it gets closer to the top. And that element of how we connect back to the front line, I think is really, key. How do we make this an ongoing component, Appreciative inquiry, Very, very powerful tool. I remember starting using it 20-some-odd years ago, if not more. Just great ways of getting ideas and getting people to share their stories and listening to the goodness of what’s working. Well, you touched as well. When we first connected, you talked about one inspiration you also came across was around Edgar Shine’s work around culture change. You talked about the curious inquiry. Tell me a little bit more about that part as well.

Yeah, and you know, again, I think Edgar Shine work, you know, it’s well documented, well celebrated, but yeah, safety is still immature in its adoption of the thinking of Shine. And really for me, I think one of the big things for me was the notion of expertise and of curious inquiry is it’s nearly an individual thing. But you have to start with yourself in that space and see whether you can step in and being a curious inquirer and sort of combines with Shine’s work, but also with Hufnagel’s work as well, is looking at work as done, really engaging in the stories of work. And whilst I’m saying that I’m saying don’t engage in the safety of work, engage in work is done, I think that’s a really big difference. It’s a shift because often with safety professionals, they step in and I think when they’re going to engage the front line, they have to talk about safety. I would suggest they should never talk about safety to be controversial. And what they should do is be curious. And for the things that you see that are most challenging is step into that notion that Hufnagel has about trying to understand why that makes sense to the person that you’re interacting with.

You know, how. How. What are the conditions and everything that support around that, that lead to that point, because that will then enable you to then think differently about the notion of expertise and where you might source and partner expertise and where you might harness that perspective differently. So, for me, curiosity now is the number one tool that a safety professional should have. You’ve probably experienced this, but I’ve been involved in many, you know, significant incidents and investigations, and I can remember a number of occasions where an event has occurred and the leader investigator has just been appointed and they’ve come to me, they had no interaction other than the reporting of the event at this point and told me, I know what caused this. And so, before they’ve spoken to anyone.

Before talking to anyone. Well, yeah, obviously learning very well.

Yeah, yeah. But it’s that notion of, you know, I’m going to come in here and put things right and my experience has told me these are all the reasons why this. You’re immediately in a very difficult space. And we do a lot of that safety experts is we step in knowing what the problem is with these processes and what the solutions are to them. And I think nearly universally, we should not be the source of any of the solutions in that space. We should be an enabler, a facilitator of it, not the source of it. There are exceptions, but in general.

Yeah, but you’re also killing the knowledge that the sharing. If you start prejudging and you’re coming in with a pre. A preview of what occurred. 

Yes. So if I be as controversial as I can in this space and, you know, for a long time in safety we’ve talked about, what you walk past is, you know, what you accept or encourage in this mode, the interesting space is being a curious mode, you cannot do that, you cannot intervene or something. So, this is where I think this is really challenging and difficult. If you’re trying to move into the space of understanding work is done and being truly curious and you’re experiencing something that is clearly problematic. Right.

Sure.

You can recognize the nature and hazard of it. And we’ve worked with leaders, taking them into this space of even working with them to step back from their immediate desire to intervene and correct the problem. We really come from a point that is once you do that, you’re going to cut off the air supply. So, you will not see anything else that is going to happen that might be problematic. Because when you’re in the space of your truly curious and you’re engaging with work that’s done and people share, they’re often sharing it with you because of their frustrations or because of a whole range of other space things that are happening in their space that they can’t get correct, can’t do what they need to be doing.

Sure.

So, by seeing something and acting in that space, there might be something far more interesting or problematic that once you take that intervention, you’re not going to see those transactions happening forward. Now, I’m not suggesting that there’s no intervention or action to happen when you see these sorts of transactions, but it’s a much more subtle approach that you need to take. And rather than doing it in the moment, it needs to be done elsewhere.

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And there could be as well ways. I’ve seen leaders that don’t come from the craft, that didn’t get promoted from whatever expertise of the shop floor is because they don’t necessarily know what’s right or right wrong, what’s wrong. They come in from a position of curiosity. Tell me about why we’re doing it this way. What are some of the risks in front of you? So, right with that inquiry, you’re not jumping into conclusion and to attack, you’re jumping into tell me and understand. And then you may realize, okay, we never actually thought through the risks of this job or something else as opposed to judging.

Yeah, Correct. And it’s an interesting point you make because naivety can be an asset. Right. And we often even say that with new engineers coming in, their naivety can enable them to ask the questions that need to be asked. And that’s a difficult thing because where you’ve got leaders that have come out of working in those environments and worked their way through and have emerged into those leadership space, they had trouble stepping back from the knowledge of the time when they were working these spaces. And I think that’s part of. As a group, they need additional support to try and transition out of the knowledge space into the curious leadership space, can step back their experience. Now, that doesn’t mean that experience doesn’t have some currency. It’s in a different space to that transaction.

Yeah. One of the things I know that we discussed when we first connected was that in many cases, if there’s a process that’s more difficult, it increases the likelihood to introduce shortcuts. And I know I had somebody on the. On the podcast earlier that talked about how convenience kills. Ultimately, very similar concept that if it’s complicated, we will find a convenient path out. Tell me a little bit about this element of complexity that gets introduced and how do we unpack it? Because part of the system, we talked about the complexity, part of it is we created the complexity as well at times in the system.

This is an area we’re very interested in. We are doing a lot of work around this space and in the notions of if we go into that space of, you know, critical risks and critical hazards that sort of face and think about the control strategies. Now, I think fundamentally, we had quite a flawed approach to critical risk and critical controls because we’ve burdened it with subject matter expertise. And in essence, what happens is, if we’re working, you can pick any critical risk and control that you like, but in essence, particularly in the world of bow ties or whatever, what happens is you’ll get all these subject matter experts into a room, they will design a whole set of controls, often as industry. In recent studies, when we’ve looked at this, nearly 80% of them are administrative. Only in that.

Which is unfortunately the case.

Yeah. Yes. And the people in that room are not people who do the work. They’re not immersed in all the complexity. So, I’ll just park that aside. So, in the work that sort of come out of resilience engineering and some of Hufnagel’s ideas and some of the work that we’ve been doing, is we’re really interested in work that’s done in the space around critical hazards and firstly in the notion of capacity. So that notion is about what do we give people to do the job? You know, it might be the tools, equipment, the work methods, the training, the support, all those things. But then there’s the other domain of demand, is what is the nature of demand that they must work within? So, this is the KPIs, the delivery timeframes, all the unreasonable pressures that people must function. So, what’s interesting in the control space, and this is how do you design the controls and how do you test them as to what people do? So, the approach that we’ve been doing is taking the work out to where work is done and taking the people who do the work through those controls to feed us back to us is how do those controls align to the task that they’re doing or the job that they’re delivering isn’t making their work easier or harder.

It can be as simple as a very poorly designed piece of personal protective equipment. That’s interesting, but there’s lots of space in there. So, in that domain, we’ve taken feedback from that, and what we’ve seen emerge out of that is where the controls are poorly designed and don’t fit well with the work, and they make the work considerably harder. It’s a significant and predictive workaround.

Makes sense.

Different way to do it. So, this is the nature of when we’re trying to understand why people, you know, take a different approach. You know, do something. You, if you’re not understanding that demand piece in there is about what they must achieve within that, what are we giving them to do that and how well is it designed? They might have a much better idea about how to do this, but we don’t harness that. So, when we test controls and we test effectiveness, we’ve got this notion that whatever was done in the room is a good design and it’s effective. If we go to a work site and we go and do an order of people doing it, that has no connection to what happens out in the field. And it’s. So, part of this is, you know, you need to. We need to really think about the unintended consequences. If we design something, put something in place from a safety perspective, what are the effects of that? What does it do from an, you know, it might mean that the business has to have additional resources that they haven’t budgeted.

Sure.

They might have to engage different contractors. There’s a whole range of impacts in that space.

Right.

So, I think in that workaround space, the reason, you know, everyone talks about, you know, people doing workarounds, it’s because we don’t stand enough in the shoes of the people who do the work to understand all the different demands that they’re trying to balance.

It reminds me of completely adjacent space in the quality movement. Some of the changes that came out, I think it’s back in the 80s and 90s GE was had this cool equation which is the quality of the change you’re trying to implement times the acceptance of that change goes the effectiveness of the change. Right. So, you could have the best quality change 10 out of 10. But if the acceptance, because it doesn’t make Sense is a 1 out of 10, your effectiveness is 10. And essentially their message is you’re better to have maybe a lower quality, quote unquote solution that was designed and engineered by the craft employees that resonate with them, that made sense in their contacts and therefore had a higher buy in. In which case the effectiveness of the change, even with five times five is still better than a ten times one.

Yeah, we, I suppose from our perspective, we use a lot now the tools around human centered design and user experience models, which are nearly absent in safety, you know, and you sort of wonder why. But that goes into the space that you’re talking about is that it’s important to test these things with user experience models and is it credible? Is it usable? Does it make sense to the person who’s is it findable? For example, all these things are things that we don’t do in safety. We prescribe and write another 80-page procedure to do something which has no relevance to the nature of how the work is done right.

Now. It gets to a question, we touched on this briefly, but when you’re trying to get to this inquiry mode, having frontline engagement, one of the pushbacks I’ve heard many times is I might end up with different solutions in different locations because this group, this is what they think will work versus a centralized office. One person says, okay, this is a policy worldwide, but maybe it doesn’t work the same way in different locations, or they have different work methods, or the equipment is different. How do we reconcile this desire for consistency with when you’re getting more grassroots engagement, you’re going to have multiple, potentially multiple different solutions.

Yes. So first, if you go into resilience engineering, you know, and the philosophy is there, it really demands of us to embrace variability which is counter to A lot of the safety stuff that says we’re going to make one size fits all this is just. And what we know in that space is I suppose a couple of. But the approach that we’ve worked with for a long time is the notion of freedom within a framework. So, there are certain, you know, and in doing that it’s understanding the nature of the work that you’re doing. And, the levels of freedom can change depending on the nature of hazard or risk that you’re working with. But you’re ultimately recognizing that you want people to make decisions about the choices. So, we’ve done some work in this space with a very large mining company where we looked at critical controls and the specialized controls and tested them in one mine site, which might be in Australia, and we tested the same controls in another site in South America. And what we found in the Australian context that control works very well and in the South American it worked very poorly.

And that’s because when we’re talking about controls, the piece that we are poor at is understanding human dependency about what are your human and organizational dependencies that work depends on and control. So, it was very clear in this example where the South American had very different structure around the support for how this control function and the environment they were working with from the Australian environment. The one size didn’t fit, fit all. But another control worked much better in that environment.

Sure.

And so that’s within that thinking. I think this is important that it’s very hard to get. There are certain things you can get to, certain, you know, universal things. If we talk about things like, you know, fall from hydroelectrical, there are some things that you can get that are at a high level, but stepping below that into the operational design. What we need is a much better list of here’s a range of options that we’ve got. This works well in this context, and you choose right. So, this is the informed decision making. So the benefits that we can have is by letting work is done and having that expertise and having some subject matter expertise which harnesses the knowledge, thinking about how do we bring that to the front line and letting them make the choice and saying in this circumstance this suits us well, we’re going to adapt and use this approach to manage the hazard and risks that we’re working with and empower them to do so. And if that works, it doesn’t work. Use that as an intelligence collecting where you feedback and evolve your learnings. So, I think there’s nothing wrong with having systems and standardization, but Rick Just really understanding where they have currency and application and not doing it.

And I’ve seen this so many times, seen it in the aviation industry a lot, where they come in and make one rule right across the organization and in a different aircraft environment, it’s had significantly increased the level of hazard because they haven’t interpreted something else that’s happening in space that they’re not aware of in the generalized rule.

I like how you position this in terms of freedom within a framework, because it’s not anarchy, it’s the structure to it. But you can have localized decision making in many of these pieces. Again, it reminds me, I’m going back to the Quality days and some of the research I was doing a while back around Toyota as an example. One thing that people didn’t get is Toyota could have. They were building the same vehicle anywhere in the world, but it could have one method in one plant that was slightly different. And people would say, okay, this is the right method. But then two weeks later that could change because they found a better way to deliver the same thing. So, there’s this element of constantly learning from my operations, constantly driving, continuous improvement. And so, the solution from last week may not be the solution for now, if there’s controls to it, because it’s not. You want. You don’t want to get different Corollas in different parts of the world, different quality.

I really. And equally I’ve, you know, studied a lot the Toyota quality method, you know, and there’s a lot to learn, safety in that space. And often we sort of these things pass and, you know, we forget to look back into these methods and do that. So, I think. And that method, you know, the Toyota method, and ultimately that whole approach to quality management was founded in some good principles, is trying to make decisions where work is done all the time.

Exactly.

Collective intelligence. That was its purpose. And encouraging. That’s the key in safety. We’ve done the opposite. You know, I’ve been involved in situations where there was a problem with a hazard control and a procedure that was identified and taken five years to work through to get the change made in that process. Because sometimes I think it becomes harder to change the notion of how work is done within a safety context than to alter verses in the Bible. It’s probably easier to do that. Thanks.

Yes. Love it. Kelvin, tell me a little bit about the Art of Work. One, I love the name of your organization. Tell me a little bit about what you do within the Art of Work.

Yeah, so we’re really Interested in work as such. So, I think when we came at this from, we started, you know, very much a lot of our work comes from it through a safety lens of one form or another. And the first thing that we do with organizations is really immerse in two things, is we’re really interested in the work that’s done and how it’s done. And we talk a lot about how we enable people in that process.

Sure.

We do a lot, as I sort of indicated before, of talking less about safety when we get brought in and thinking about the nature of work. And it’s interesting because we do a lot of work in learning teams, that sort of work. We do a lot in terms of redesigning systems to be much more human centered in that space. We think a lot about how we get the right information to the right person. So, we talk about systems within this space, particularly safety management systems, of how that becomes something that comes to you rather than you to the system in that space. So. So you shouldn’t even need to know where something relates to. If you go to a particular area which has a particular set of hazards, you shouldn’t even need to know where to go and find information about that system. It should just come to you when you’re there, through geofencing or whatever, all those sorts of things. So, we’re really interested in work and by immersing in work, a lot of safety things emerge. And it’s quite interesting. You start to see things about. It might be the teams and the capabilities; it might be the way a shift and people are organized and communicated.

It might be a way that we design measurement in that space. And we’re quite often finding that the safety measures have been very unhealthy. An operational measure is much more useful in this space. One organization we’re working with our, they had some issues around the amount of back injury that they’re getting, for example, and so they had very conventional measures around lost time and all those things. And that wasn’t helping them as such. Of course, what they did have was a measure. They’re a large retail warehousing business and they had a measure that the operations use around the overstocking of the warehouses and that was a key measure for them. And so, what was found is where the warehouses were overstocked, it correlated with the that they had and that’s because everything was stored over and above on the racks and, you know, there’s a whole range of issues in it. So again, this is an example of thinking about work rather than safety and then just work with the stores to identify, let’s not have another safety measure, let’s tap into something that actually gives us, they’re already interested in and it gives us intelligence to help us in how do we work in and assist that work to be done in a more productive and safe manner.

So, in the art of work, I think we’re really interested in bringing this idea of improving work as being how we focus on this and safety is an emergent property and that’s very much coming from a people centered approach. I think about all the different industries we work in; we’ve got expertise in none of them, but the expertise is already there within the organizations that we work with. And what we try and do is bring that expertise to be harnessed and utilized to solve the problem.

It’s a concept of curious inquiry you just talked about.

Yeah, yeah. So that’s the art of work is we’re very interested in work, we’re very interested in how we empower and engage people and we’re very. And in that, you know, the work that we do around the organization, shifting the leadership’s view in that space to be more open and hopefully we get them to be a little bit more adventurous and curious as a result.

Sure. Excellent. Well Kelvin, thank you so much for joining me today. If somebody wants to get in touch with you or the Art of Work, what’s the best way to do that? What’s the website?

The website is Art of work is one-word solutions and if you Google Art of work.

Excellent. Well, thank you so much for joining me, Kelvin.

Thank you.

Cheers.

Thank you for listening to The Safety Guru on C-suite Radio. Leave a legacy. Distinguish yourself from the past. Grow your success. Capture the hearts and minds of your teams. Elevate your safety. Like every successful athlete, top leaders continuously invest in their safety leadership with an expert coach to boost safety performance. Begin your journey at execsafetycoach.com. Come back in two weeks for the next episode with your host, Eric Michrowski. This podcast is powered by Propulo Consulting.

ABOUT THE GUEST

Kelvin Genn is a founder of Safety Differently and a key designer and creator of the Due Diligence Index.  Kelvin is a strategic systems practitioner with extensive experience in Human Factors and organizational re-engineering. He developed his systems thinking approach working in the Royal Australian Air Force. 

He is the Managing Director of Art of Work, which has led the implementation of Safety Differently worldwide. 

He led systems and risk management programs across Asia Pacific and Europe with Compass Group Plc, the world’s largest support service company with more than 750,000 employees. 

At (SKM) Sinclair Knight Merz, he was the Global General Manager for Safety and Wellness, delivering safety for major project construction in mining, energy, and infrastructure across the globe.

As a Board Member for NSW Health, Kelvin has worked as the NSW Health Director for Clinical Quality and Patient Safety. He has also worked with the Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care to develop the national accreditation system for all Health Care providers across Australia.

Kelvin is a Fellow of the Australian Institute of Health and Safety.

For more information: www.artofwork.solutions

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The Impact of Leaders and Their Decisions in Improving Safety Culture with Dr. David Hofmann

The Impact of Leaders and Their Decisions in Improving Safety Culture

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“Culture comes from the top and is enacted from the bottom.” Dr. David Hofmann has been researching safety climate and leadership for over 20 years and joins the podcast this week to discuss the multi-level aspects of improving safety culture and the daily micro-decisions leaders make that in turn affect safety performance. Tune in to learn strategies for leaders to personalize safety in a tangible way, foster trust, and reduce psychological distance from the frontline.

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Real leaders leave a legacy. They capture the hearts and minds of their teams. Their origin story puts the safety and well-being of their people first. Great companies ubiquitously have safe yet productive operations. For those companies, safety is an investment, not a cost for the C-suite. It’s a real topic of daily focus. This is The Safety guru with your host, Eric Michrowski, a globally recognized ops and safety guru, public speaker, and author. Are you ready to leave a safety legacy? Your legacy’s success story begins now.

Hi, and welcome to The Safety guru. Today I’m very excited to have with me Dr. David Hofmann, who’s a professor in organizational behavior at University of North Carolina in Chapel Hill. He’s a researcher who’s applied extensive research to safety, safety culture. Dave, really excited to have you with me on the podcast today.

Thanks, Eric. Glad to be here.

Let’s first start. We’ve touched on the topic of safety culture in the past on the podcast. Would love to hear some of your perspective around what you call multi-level aspects of culture.  

Let me just give you just your listeners a little bit of background on me. I am an organizational behavior faculty member, PhD in organizational psychology. I’ve been studying safety, climate, leadership things for about 20 years now, plus 20 years plus. And where we think about this multi-level aspect of safety culture is culture comes from the top and is enacted from the bottom. The way I think about culture is you have the espoused culture of the core values and the key assumptions and then the org structure and the artifacts as well as the metrics and all those things that are coming from the top. And then at the bottom and the middle of the organization, this culture gets enacted day in and day out. I’ve written a little bit with a friend and colleague by the name of Dove Zohar about these micro decisions that frontline and middle managers face every day. And often those micro decisions involve competing priorities. And those managers have some degree of discretion in terms of how they prioritize one of those priorities, a little redundant, over the other. And over time, as I watch, as an employee, I watch these micro decisions getting made every day.

And if cost is always just a nudge higher than safety, or schedule is always a nudge higher than safety, so it always went out in the end. Then what happens as I watch these decisions is that I get a gestalt impression about what’s really valued, expected, rewarded, and supported in the organization. And we call that the enacted culture. And so, then you can start thinking about the enacted culture coming from below. And then it intersects with the espoused culture coming from the top. And then that’s where in the middle you see the gaps between the espoused and the enacted culture. I think this is something you see very regularly and sometimes I think almost happens. It feels like it’s happening unintentionally. I was talking to a group not long ago and they were talking about recognition, and they kept recognizing examples. They had a recognition where people that worked the weekend, people that worked extra hours, which again reinforces productivity. And when it came to reinforcing or recognition around safety, it was, thank you for doing that job safely, but really, are you recognizing safety or are you just saying you came back and you weren’t injured, but you have no idea what happened and how the work occurred?

Yeah. It’s the absence of an outcome gets recognized as opposed to the presence of proactive behavior that really drove that outcome to be a safe manner. I see that quite a bit is that there’s this notion of the absence of something means we must have done something well. And it’s like, well, maybe, maybe the absence of something, it might be the absence of something means you just got lucky. Correct. I don’t think people make that distinction very often. But in this instance, you’re hearing constantly this message around getting the job working harder productivity, not somebody saying, get this job ahead of safety, but it still sends that message if I’m hearing you correctly.

Yeah. Well, at the end of the day, if you want a safe organization, they should do absolutely nothing. There is this notion of there is risk in many of the industries that you’ve worked in and the industries that I am familiar with and where I do my research. There is this notion of there is going to be some risk that you must really manage. But I think this notion of thinking about safety as a bit of a dynamic non-event is something that I’ve spent some time thinking about and talking about as well. And this, probably the most recent example I talked about this was I was asked to do a presentation to the California Public Utilities Commission, a public hearing, and they called me and asked me to just kick off the day with a talk on safety culture. And one of the things that this model I’ve been working on and doing some research on with some of my colleagues is if you think about safety and cybersecurity and several other types in the risk domain, they’re that we would term a dynamic non-event, which is you work hard, so there’s a lot of dynamic behavior going on.

But at the end of the day, if you’re successful, then nothing happens. If cyber security is successful, then you did not have a breach. If safety is successful, then you didn’t have an injury. And I know my safety professionals listening would say, Well, that’s not right. There’s a lot of things happening. And I hear you. I can hear the listener saying that I agree. But if you think from a non-safety professional practitioner perspective, they think about these as dynamic non-events. And so, one of the things I highlighted in this presentation of the California Public Utilities Commission is it’s the middle managers that really have to prioritize budgets and funding and all of that thing. And this was the example I used. If I put a dollar over here in this investment, then I know I’m going to get a dollar, depending on what my internal rate of return is, a dollar tin back. And if I spend a dollar on safety or cybersecurity, or in this case, tree trimming or repairing lines, then nothing happens. Well, I’m left as that manager with the idea of, well, what if I would have spent 95 cents on safety?

Would nothing has happened. And then I can put a dollar five over here and make a little bit more of my return. And that’s where my metrics are. That’s where if there’s a bonus structure, that’s where the bonus structure often is. And those performance metrics are measured every single month, week, quarter. And the safety metrics are a little bit long. So, it’s really easy for me to just turn this little dial and say, well, let me invest 95 cents over here in safety. Put a dollar five over there. Nothing happens. It’s like, well, maybe I can do 92 cents this year. Nothing will happen. And what happens then is those managers think that they’re actually learning because they’re updating their model. They’re like, oh, what I learned is that you only have to spend 92 cents on safety or tree trimming or cybersecurity and nothing will happen. And I think that’s really a false notion of learning.

Is there something as well there in terms of… You mentioned when we talked before in terms of the psychological distance between the decision and the outcome. Can you expand maybe a little bit on that front?

Yeah. So, this is some research that came from I served on the National Academy of Science Committee that was charged with investigating the BP Deepwater Horizon accident. And our charge was to go up until the moment the accident happened. None of the recovery efforts. And one of the things that we did is we went to an oil and gas company’s onshore command center for offshore drilling. Sure. I’ll say that onshore command center for offshore drilling, for those folks that are driving in the car or something. So, this is in Houston normally. And you see it’s a quiet office park, office. And you have seven or eight computer screens in front of you, and the person is there just monitoring offshore drilling, drilling operations that are happening for 500 miles offshore. And I just was struck by that environment. The other thing that we did as part of that committee is we flew out to an offshore oil rig. And so, you could get a little bit of a contrast of what does it look like to be on the oil rig thinking about safety issues versus 400 miles away? And that started me thinking about this notion of in social psychology, there’s a whole body of research on Construct level theory.

And Construct level theory just basically says how psychologically distant are things from you. So, in that sense, to put some flesh on the bones of what that concept means before your listeners fall asleep is that you could think about, if I’m in Houston watching drill operations 400 miles away, that’s a very distant, psychologically distant thing. Where if I’m on the rig with drill pipe and everything, it’s very psychologically close. It’s very concrete. So, the research shows that things that are close up, we conceptualize in very concrete terms. It’s very the how we do things versus the why we do things. And things that are way off in the distance, we construe at a much more abstract conceptual level ethics and values.

For example, core values, religious belief, ethics are often consternated at high level, very abstract level of these abstract principles. They’re constrained abstractly because we want them to converse time so that we can apply them in different situations. Anyway, I was thinking about that notion of concrete versus abstractness. Fast forward now, any number of years, we finally have a research paper with about five or six studies where we show that if you construe a work context is psychologically distant, you view safety as less of an ethical moral obligation.

And that’s in part driven by the reduced perception of harm. Sure. So, to put it in real practitioner terms, if I’m watching drilling operations happening 400 or 500 miles away, the realness of those people and their potential for harm just dissipates in the background. And then you add to that that I communicate with those folks through chats and coarse communication modes, often not even video feeds. And again, this becomes faceless people, and I’m less likely to view ethics as a moral obligation.

So, what are some strategies organizations can drive to address that element? Because I could see that as well happening. You talked about the onshore command center. Imagine it can also happen at the C suite level. The more you remove from the front line, you can feel further removed. What are some strategies organizations can do to try to mitigate on that?

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Yeah, I think you’re exactly right that there are any number of different ways in which psychological distance can be operationalized. And so, in the study is actually one of the ways in which we operationalized it just to give you a sense of this. So, one was we had offshore drillers view aerial pictures, photos of their drilling rigs versus photos of the drill floor. There were no people in any of the photos because we didn’t want to confound this notion of potential personal harm. And what we did is just randomly assigned people to the aerial photos. I see a helicopter view versus a drill floor view. And we asked them to what extent are these 25 safety behaviors a moral, ethical responsibility? We found significant differences. But we also operationalized that by having a group of nurses tell us what city they worked in. And then we coded into the subsequent survey. Either they were a manager in a hospital in the city which they said they worked in, or we randomly picked Miami as a as a place that’s far away from most everything, except I guess Fort Lauderdale. But we can control for that in the study. And then we said, Imagine you’re an administrator in a hospital in Miami. Now, think about the amount of potential harm that could happen and the extent to which these safety behaviors are moral and ethical obligations. And we find that if you’re thinking about being an administrator in a hospital that’s a thousand miles away, you think about it in a different way. Research has also shown that organizational level, as you go up management different levels, you think about things in a more abstract way. So, you’re right in the sense that leaders often construe things in a little bit more abstract way. There’s a couple of implications for that. First is that they see tighter connections between things. So, there is this notion of, well, if you do things safe, then you’re also going to be highly productive. And I think that these two things can go together. Safety and quality. For example, go together. Can go together. And I would say, over time, I think there is some truth to that. But day in and day out, and so the leaders see these things, these concepts as very abstract, which means they can see tighter relationships to these things. But then the frontline managers, they’re faced with a real concrete decision this afternoon of we can either pause for three hours to try to get this part, or we can do a makeshift thing and be back up in 15 minutes, and they see those things competing. So, what do managers do? What do they need to do in terms of practical implications? I think first, they need to continually remind themselves of what the work really looks like on the front lines. And I don’t mean remind themselves, like, remember when they did it 15 years ago or 20 years ago. They need to get some exposure to how is it done now in a much more dynamic, competitive cost pressure environment than maybe they faced 10 or 15 years ago when they did it. And part of it is reminding themselves of that. I think day in and day out, a symbolic reminder of the harm that can potentially occur.

Really thinking about your employees and getting to know… You can’t get to know everybody in your organization if you’re running a big organization. But boy, to the extent that you can really know some people on the frontline supervisors who really are facing this harm, so they become real people and you know something about their families and their children so that you think about, oh, if something bad happens, that’s Jim or Sue. That’s not just some random person that I have passed on the plant side at some point.

That element of personalisation, I think, is I remember in the customer experience space, people would often say, if you put people actual pictures in a call center as an example of your customers and you remember, who am I here for? I’ve seen some organization in the safety space do similar areas where they put actual pictures of team members doing the work and encourage more regular visits to frontline work to understand, to listen, to understand how their work impacts a perfect day for them so that gets more proximity.  

There’s some research where they have given health care professionals who are reading radiology, for example, or something similar to that, a distant person that’s just sitting in an office reading X rays or looking at blood samples or something, a blood test. And what they did is they randomly attached a photo of the patient to the file. And when they attached the photo to the patient, the read was more accurate because it became a real person. So, I think all of those things are really good. We actually opened and closed this research paper with the Canadian iron ring, which you may know something about, the iron ring, the Ceremony of the Iron Ring for Engineers, is that when you become a licensed engineer in Canada, you go through this iron ring ceremony and you wear a little ring on your, I guess, your right hand little finger, I think, to remind you of the ethical moral responsibility of a professional engineer, there’s an apocryphal story about those being made from the bridge collapse in Montreal. It turns out that’s not really true. Maybe once upon a time it was true. They ran out of metal. But that notion of this constant reminder of decisions that I make at the drafting table have downstream consequences. I think anything that you can do to make sure that that abstract notion becomes is always salient and particularly around the potential for harm would be beneficial. And if I touch on the example that you shared before in terms of the middle manager making a trade-off, I take $0.05, maybe I take $0.07, an extra $0.02. What are some strategies to mitigate that? Because it sounds like it would just be in the story in the news around the incident in around the derailment, sounds like it was, we took, we took, we took until eventually the budgets run out and something went too far. Obviously, we don’t know yet the full conclusions, but the early signs seem to be that their budgets kept being cut until it was too much. I think that’s a common story, actually, unfortunately. And I think it’s common in part because the dynamic non-events are this abstract phenomenon that are hard to imagine and therefore easy to discount the likelihood that something bad is going to happen versus a very concrete metric that you’re held accountable for every quarter for delivering or even shorter on delivering the product. So, a couple of things come to mind. I wish I had this is my next 10 years of research to try to sort this out. But I think the first thing that I would recommend is to understand the difference between what I would call real learning and superstitious learning. Now, real learning involves the reduction of uncertainty, that you were missing information, some degree of uncertainty, and that uncertainty has been removed in some substantive way. Superstitious learning is probably not that familiar. That definition of real learning, I think people are like, well, yeah, that makes sense. But what is superstitious learning? Superstitious learning goes all the way back to Pavlovy in psychology. And superstitious is defined as an incorrect pairing of a stimulus and response. Okay? Okay. So, when I take those five cents away from the dollar and nothing happens, I conclude that I have learned that I can spend 95 cents, and nothing happens. And it’s like, no, you have not reduced any uncertainty in that equation. And it’s very difficult to do that because those kinds of things, like you cut the training budget for whatever safety protocol, or you cut 10 % of your tree trimmers from a utility company, that decision is not going to manifest into demonstrative risk for sometimes many years. And by that point, all the middle managers are off into different jobs, and nobody remembers. So, you can’t really connect the two. So first, I would want to say, to what extent are you really learning? And do you understand what learning really means as opposed to just getting lucky? And so, a lot of times you’re cutting these budgets and you’re just it’s just there’s a really long feedback cycle and it’s fuzzy. And so, nothing’s happened, even though the risk is continuing to accrue. But you’re concluding that you’re learning that you don’t need to spend as much on safety and nothing will happen. So, the first thing I think is just really for people to grapple with this notion of, if I cut this budget, am I really learning anything given the flow feedback cycles, the stochastic nature of that, the fuzzing of the criteria, etc.

So, there’s a lot of ways in which you’re not really learning. I think the second thing goes to this notion of a really strong safety culture throughout the organization. Another piece of research that was done by my friend Dove Zohar with another one of his colleagues, showed that if you have a really strongly agreed upon and strong safety culture at the top of the organization, then it actually reduces the amount of discretion that mental managers enact with respect to safety. So, safety becomes a nonnegotiable. So that’s where it loops us back to the beginning of our conversation around safety culture, is that you have a really strongly held view at the top of the organization that safety is an extremely important criteria. And that’s strongly held, symbolically reinforced, top of the organization talked about, communicated about, invested in, so people see not only the words, but the actions behind the words, the money behind the words. And that my job is designed to be safe. My manager is talking about safety, then all of a sudden it reduces the amount of perceived discretion that I have. And so, I’m going to be less likely to take that $0.05 and move it from the dynamic non-event into the other criteria.

The two things that come to mind is really getting really clear on what organizational learning means. And then forcing people to justify it, like, oh, if you’re going to cut the budget this year and you don’t think it’s going to be risky, how do you know? You’ve got to give me the criteria, the data that you’re using, the assumptions you’re making. And then secondly, I think just creating that really strong safety culture throughout the organization to reduce the amount of discretion that those frontline and middle managers perceive that they have with respect to safety.

I think it’s an important point because what you mentioned, even at the top management team, I’ve seen very mature organizations where even when somebody say, I could save X amount of money in my budget, finance will say, well, what would be the impact on safety? Help you think through, because sometimes the impact is… It’s not just cutting the safety budgets, not cutting the training budgets, not just taking your PPE out. Sometimes I hear now of examples of, in 2008, we didn’t recruit for two years, and as a result, we lost some learnings as people retired because we didn’t create the next generation. And we’re now 14 years later, and people are starting to realize the effect of a hiring freeze that happened in 2008. And so, it’s really trying to think about what could go wrong from these pieces that are not necessarily a safety budget. This was just a recruiting budget, promotion budgets in an organization.

Yeah, that is a great series of questions that would go a long way to fleshing these out. And then trying to make, in reverse, connect some of those dots so you do learn from them to say, oh, we did cut that training budget. And now, five years later, six years later, when we’ve got to expand operations, we don’t have people trained up to do it. And this needs to be a lesson learned. We need to do an after-action review. We need to file some learnings with the senior managers so that we can act on it and continue to move forward positively.

Absolutely. So, Dave, thank you so much for sharing those examples. I think they’re very powerful examples of safety culture, the role of leaders, and how you really instill those right decisions, both in terms of the concept of the proximity you talked about in terms of the onshore or offshore locations, but also in terms of the role of leaders and the decisions that they’re making day in and day out.

Well, thank you for having me. I’m so happy to be here.

Excellent.

Thank you for listening to the Safety Guru on C-Suite Radio. Leave a legacy, distinguish yourself from the pack, grow your success. Capture the hearts and minds of your teams. Elevate your safety. Like every successful athlete, top leaders continuously invest in their safety leadership with an expert coach to boost safety performance. Begin your journey at execsafety coach.com. Come back in two weeks for the next episode with your host, Eric Michrowski. This podcast is powered by Propulo Consulting.

ABOUT THE GUEST

Dave Hofmann’s research focuses on organizational climate, leadership, and organizational change, organizational design and decision-making. He teaches courses in organizational behavior, leadership and the complexities of middle management. Dr. Hofmann served as associate dean for the full-time MBA Program, area chair of organizational behavior and senior associate dean of academic affairs. A specific focus of his research is the impact of leadership and organizational culture on safety and errors in organizations that operate in high-risk environments. He has edited two scholarly books on these topics, including “Errors in Organizations” with Michael Frese.

In recognition of his work’s applied implications, he received the American Psychological Association’s Decade of Behavior Research Award in 2006. He received a Fulbright Senior Scholar Award to study errors and safety issues in organizations at the University of Giessen in Germany, and Robert Wood Johnson Foundation grant to investigate error management and organizational learning on nursing units. He has served on two National Research Council/National Academy of Engineering committees. The first investigated the causes of the BP Deepwater Horizon accident, and the second focused on how to improve safety culture in the offshore industry.

Dr. Hofmann has presented his research or conducted executive development sessions in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Netherlands, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland, UAE and the U.K. He earned his PhD in industrial and organizational psychology from Pennsylvania State University, his master’s degree in industrial and organizational psychology from the University of Central Florida, and his bachelor’s degree in business administration from Furman University.

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As part of Propulo Consulting’s subscription-based executive membership, our coaching partnership is tailored for top business executives that are motivated to improve safety leadership and commitment.
Unlock your full potential with the only Executive Safety Coaching for Ops & HSE leaders available on the market.
Explore your journey with Executive Safety Coaching at https://www.execsafetycoach.com.
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