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Prepare for the Unexpected: Leadership and Safety Lessons from an Offshore Explosion with Lee Ellis

Prepare for the Unexpected: Leadership and Safety Lessons from an Offshore Explosion with Lee Ellis

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ABOUT THE EPISODE

In this powerful episode of The Safety Guru, Lee Ellis from Proud2BSafe shares his firsthand experience of a catastrophic offshore explosion in 2020, involving a commercial fishing vessel off the UK coast, and the critical leadership and safety lessons that emerged from it. Through vivid storytelling, he takes us into the heart of the crisis, revealing what it truly means to prepare for the unexpected. Drawing from this life-altering event, Lee explores essential lessons in safety leadership under pressure, risk identification and mitigation, and the true value of recurring training—not just completing it but truly trusting it when it matters most. He highlights the importance of prioritizing mental health support, fostering a strong debrief culture, and providing ongoing support in the aftermath of trauma. Lee also emphasizes that exchanging experiences and knowledge across teams, along with adopting a growth mindset, is vital to strengthening safety culture and ensuring teams are truly prepared for unexpected situations. Tune in now to experience his powerful story and discover these impactful lessons, as he challenges us to move beyond routine safety practices and actively prepare for the unexpected.

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Real leaders leave a legacy. They capture the hearts and minds of their teams. Their origin story puts the safety and well-being of their people first. Great companies ubiquitously have safe yet productive operations. For those companies, safety is an investment, not a cost. For the C suite, it’s a real topic of daily focus. This is the Safety Guru with your host, Eric Michrowski, a globally recognized ops and safety guru, public speaker and author. Are you ready to leave a safety legacy? Your legacy success story begins now.

Hi and welcome to the Safety Guru. Today I’m very excited to have with me Lee Ellis. He’s an offshore maritime professional who’s going to share with us today a pretty exceptional story about an incident at sea and some of the learnings from it. Lee, welcome to the show. Excited to have you with me.

Thank you very much, Eric.

So, Lee, why don’t you start out with your story and what happened in, in that, that day in 2020?

Yeah. So, I was working on a service operations vessel on off of the east coast of the Uk supporting wind farm operations. We were doing service and maintenance and on this particular day, there’s nothing significantly different about it. It was quite a bright, sunny December day. It was quite pleasant. But we were involved as a, as a craft with the, an incident involved a fishing vessel by the name of Gal wadi Moore, which has had a catastrophic underwater explosion. So, it started as a regular day for our wind farm. The SOV was called the Sag Nord. So, we had part Norwegian crew, part Dutch crew, part Danish crew. Sorry. And then UK resident technicians and a nice mix of general different nationalities now on board, all working together. So, yeah, on this day, just gone past 11:00am, cool, bright sunny morning, as I said, December 15th and there was a very loud bang. I was in my office on the operations, in the operations management office on board the vessel.

Yep.

And yes, the air fell silent for a few seconds after this bang and then all of a sudden there was quite a lot of commotion in the changing room which was located right next door. A lot of the crew members were rushing into the, the rescue equipment locker. And then my desk phone started to ring. It was the vessel captain, and he was calling to let me know that they just received a mayday call from the fishing boat and it was located approximately three, three miles away from, from us from our current location at that point in time to the north of our position. So just a little bit out of the wind farm and that the SOV itself was going to deploy its fast rescue boat and its fast transfer vessel, which are Two small rib type craft with three, three crew on each, driver, navigator and an assistant person, rescue person, if you will. And they were going to go to the location to assist where possible with this news. I called all the, for all the work within the wind farm to be stopped immediately. And so, we did have a couple of teams out on locations already.

At that point they had to play deployed on two different turb. So, I gave them a shout on the radio and also to the control room, put a full stop work order on the whole wind farm, everybody to just stop what they’re doing, go to their nearest safe place within the wind farm or within their wind turbines and just take a break and wait for further news. We also deployed, we had a, a small service vessel, transfer vessel with us as well. Kind of moderate size, twin catamaran hull. She could carry up to 12 people. And I deployed her out to go sit with two teams between their turbines so they can provide support facilities if they want to go back on board, use the toilet facilities, stuff like that, or fresh water supply. They were there available for them.

Sure.

Until we knew, you know, if we needed any additional resource, we knew where to find them. But for the meantime, they’re in a safe place. So, once they must have in the safe areas and received the messages back, we started to receive more information from the fast boats that were seen at the scene of the vessel, the fishing vessel, where the explosion had taken place. And they’re in the process at that point of rescuing all seven of the fishing boat crew. Some of these crew members were in very serious condition. So, to put it into context, the skipper, he was in, he received in the wheelhouse at the time, he actually had three broken vertebrae.

Wow.

Broken cracked sternum and orbital bone and significant knee injuries. The first deckhand let’s find him. He, he was a fractured skull, fractured pelvis, arm, ribs and toes and a ruptured bladder.

Wow.

The second deckhand had a broken leg, damaged knees, damaged knees and elbow and a punctured lung. The third deck had the deck hand. My apologies. He had significant eye injuries, plate to cranium fracture. So, it’s skull fracture and loss of sight in one eye. The fourth deckhand, he had minor injuries to his shoulder, ankles, knees, neck and back where he’d been thrown around in the blast. The fifth deckhand just had minor cuts and bruises. He was the guy who was on deck of the vessel, fishing vessel at the time. He kind of got thrown in the air and landed back on his feet and then fell over. So, he had Minor injuries. And then there was the night watchman who was in below decks. He was being the night watchman. He was asleep in his bunk, and he got thrown clear of his bunk. So, he was in the prone position in the upper bunk. He had a broken leg, broken hip and a broken shoulder where he was thrown out of his bunk completely. So fairly substantial significant injuries there. And yeah, so it was quite a quite difficult time for dealing with those casualties as they were coming back to the vessel.

So, everyone who wasn’t directly involved in the running of the critical vessel operations, we assembled them out on the back of the rear deck where the fast boats are recovered back to the, the main service operations vessel. And we made it into a; the deck area became a triage basically for the administration of first aid and pain relief. So, on board the vessel as well as having the, the basic first aid training that we all have to do to go offshore, we also had a vessel medic. We had an independent medic on board as well for being in farm paramedic grade medic with us who had been doing additional training on days when we weren’t able to work. He would give us an additional first aid training lessons and progressed our first aid level skills up to an advanced level.

Sure.

To the point where we could administer a pain relief in the form of a drug called Pentorex, which is an oral, oral pain relief. It’s like a little cylinder capsule. You pop the capsule and you take it like an inhaler. But it’s quite a strong, potent pain relief which we would been trained to use. So, he was out there as well. So he was, he was organizing the triage. Basically, we set up accidental emergency on the back of an offshore vessel. So it was, it was quite an interesting, interesting morning at that point. So, as well as controlling things in the wind farm, I was also hands on with the. Administering first aid to both the fishing boat skipper and the second deckhand. I, I did the bandaging of the skipper’s legs. So, I actually saw his, his bone, his shin bones.

Wow.

Where he had been thrown in the wheelhouse. His shins and his knees had taken out the counter console of the wheelhouse itself, and it basically skinned his shins on both legs. So try to patch him back up as best we could just so that he was able to transit back to shore at that point. Right. The other guys had the other, more, more serious casualties out on deck on, on stretchers and spine boards and we’re administering additional pain relief to them as well. Obviously, the Paramedic and the, the ship second officer were far more highly trained. They could administer more different pain reliefs that they had available to them. So, they were going through those and putting IV drips and stuff in as well. So yeah, it was quite a significant time.

And do we know what happened that caused that explosion?

Yes, we do. So, there was after the event a few, a few months later, well, the vessel was towed back to shore and assessed. She didn’t sink. Surprisingly she did take on water, but she didn’t sink. There was significant, the significant damage throughout the vessel. The, the hole was rippled as well. The bulkheads had moved; the engine mountains had moved by six inches. It actually shifted the whole engine inside the vessel off of its engine mountains in, in the, in the depths of the. The hull.

Wow.

But yeah, she was actually token back to hull in, in Yorkshire to a maritime yard there and assessed by the maritime agency. And it was determined that it was a Second World War bomb that had been caught crabbing. That. Yeah, yeah. But it’s not as crazy as you might think and I’ll get onto that bit in a minute. This is, yeah, she, she dragged up. They reckon It’s a 250-kilo bomb damage that they assessed it to be and then they did send down a, a dive robot a few, a few months later and they found fragments. There were also fragments in one of the pots, the crabbing pots that remained on the seabed where it parted the line and they found pieces of that. So, it was significant physical evidence to say exactly what it was. And they reckon it was a, say a 250 kilo German Second World War bomb. But yeah, so due to the unfortunate events of that day and being a completely random nature, but it’s still estimated, you say about the bomb, about a hundred thousand tons of unexploded bombs in and around the UK waters.

So, 100,000.

100,000 tons. Yeah.

That makes it risky to do anything that touches the.

Whoa. Yeah.

Deep water surface.

Yeah, exactly. So yeah, it’s, you know, it’s a, it’s a real big. 

It’s.

They, they still pull stuff up all the time. Occasionally the fishing boats will pull up an old sea mine or something like that and you hear of the lifeboat, or a naval vessel will go out, and minesweeper will go out and try and deal with it or they’ll locate it. Things get dragged up and then they get destroyed by the bomb disposal. Whether it be depends on where it sits as well on the shoreline. If it’s higher than the tide mark, then the army have to deal with it. If it’s lower than the tide mark, then the navy will drag it out to see him and make a big water splash. So. But yeah, there’s a lot of it out there still, especially around the east coast, obviously, because it was closest to mainland Europe. So, yeah, so there’s a lot of that out there.

Wow. So, in this example, how, how would you characterize leadership under pressure? Because you, you were in a routine day, or what appeared to be a routine day until about 11am and in, in a high-pressure environment, how do you prepare for this type of decision making? 

You have to rely on your training. And there’s no, there’s no specific training for that scenario, sure, no, and there probably never will, but you can always, you can always maybe surmise it may happen, but the risk factor is very minimal. But in the offshore renewables and in the offshore industry on a whole, it’s always about the training of what you, you prepare for the worst conditions is it particularly a high-risk environment. And so, there’s a lot of time, you know, it’s all about having good risk identification and mitigation factors. And it’s the same with a lot of land-based industries. You, you train to identify what is the potential risk to yourself, your team, your crew and also in the environment. And this, however, being at sea is purely complicated by that fact that you are isolated and well away from regular emergency services. You’ve got no fire, you’ve got no ambulance, you do have helicopters and we do have helicopter support from shore. The, the Coast Guard agency in the UK have interspersed helicopters around the UK coastline. But again, where you are in the North Sea, you could be an hour away from one of those.

We were, we were 45 minutes at the outset and that was a direct flight to us. And he was, he was hightailing as fast as he could in a large rescue helicopter and that was still 45 minutes away. So, you know, you are isolated, so you have to deal and you have to be prepared as best you can. Anybody who goes offshore has to be trained in the basics of emergency firefighting, first aid, management of control of certain situations as well. So, you do those as undertakings, but then you progress and you learn, you take as many more additional trainings as you can over periods of time. You, you basically, you increase and advance your portfolio, and you also add experiences into that. So, in this situation, although unprepared for it, having never faced an explosion before, it’s a case of, well, what Can I deal with and how can I deal with it? And it’s. So, it was a case of us. You’ve got to keep calm. It’s first, first and foremost in any situation, at any management level, you’ve got to keep calm and look at the facts and see what it is you’re actually dealing with.  

And what can you do to help and aid that situation or make things better or make improvements. You get the rescue parties moving as fast as you can. Which was dealt with in this situation by, by the vessel crew, by the captain on the bridge. He sent out his rescue teams on their fast boats. And from my side of things, for managing my personnel that I was directly responsible for, it was to make sure that the initial teams I had out, as I said before, they, I made sure they went to a safe place and they stopped work so they couldn’t come to any further harm of what they were doing. The turbine that they were working on was shut down. There was still power available. They still had, they had food and water, and they had a support vessel there for other needs that was necessary. You could ask why, why didn’t they just get on that support vessel and sit there all day? But actually, if it’s quite a bit, if there’s a little bit of lump or swell out there and you’re not that well-seasoned a maritime traveler, a wind turbine is actually a far more stable place to be than traveling around on a boat all day.

So, you know, some of the lads do have to deal with seasickness. They’re quite happy sitting on a big boat because that doesn’t move so much. But they don’t want to sit there all day, Bobb, if they don’t have to. So, they’d much rather be in a more comfortable situation on the turbine. So, so yes, there’s other things you have to deal with, but basically, it’s, it’s to keep a cool, calm and collective head about yourself and deal with each thing as you come across it.

So, so there’s an element of also being prepared for the unexpected. I think that that, that comes through from your story because I think in most trades, we tend to assume the best possible outcome. And as you said, there’s conditions. It’s a little bit like when you’re in the, when you’re in the air for pilot or if you’re at sea, you’ve got to be self-sufficient and find your way through whatever is happening in front of you because of that extended distance. I’ve been to many offshore wind onshore wind farms. But I can’t fathom to imagine the exponential difference in risk when you’re offshore and you’re dealing with the same wind farms.

Yeah. I mean between being on the actual wind turbine, the risk is exactly the same. That part it’s all, it’s all about the getting to and from. It’s, it’s about that element of working at sea and in, in high-risk environments like the offshore renewable industry, you have to build, you have to build your culture daily risk awareness and it’s all about the good safety culture. So, the development along with the training, you develop a good safety culture. It’s something that every company wind farm site strives to achieve and maintain, and it takes the involvement of all parties. So right from every new visitor that starts on site, they have to start with a thorough site induction as well as the site induction. You do a safety induction, you go through all the relevant toolboxes talk talks, incidents that have happened, recent historical facts with the safety related within the wind farm. Along with that initial induction. The team, if they’re going out, will have pre-sale briefings. So again, you’re looking at the reef risk factors again and the toolbox talk as well. You’ve got to have a toolbox talk every day before you do anything.

Regardless of what industry are onshore, offshore.

Yeah.

In America, maritime, aviation. All the same, everybody has a toolbox talk periodically as well to make that safety culture long standing and get the buy in of everybody you’re looking for. We do safety focused stand down days and stuff like that and team building days designed to make sure that everybody you know is, is both fully engaged and comfortable and confident in identifying the, and discussing and reporting on positive and negative safety issues and risk jobs used in this way that creates a very productive safety culture which should you know, part the way for everybody having a safe and productive but everybody coming home safely at the end of the day. And that’s the number one most important thing.

This episode of the Safety Guru podcast is brought to you by Propulo Consulting, the leading safety and safety culture advisory firm. Whether you are looking to assess your safety culture, develop strategies to level up your safety performance, introduce human performance capabilities, re-energize your BBS program, enhance supervisory safety capabilities, or introduce unique safety leadership training and talent solutions. Propulo has you covered. Visit us at propolo.com

and there’s also, I hear in your story a lot of elements of recurring recurrent training as well. Right. So, what you were talking about in terms of the medic it’s not okay I’m qualified with first aid, it’s how do I continue to upskill while we’ve got some downtime so that my skills are prepared for an unexpected event like what happened that day.

Yeah, absolutely. With, with any training it’s always about keeping it fresh as well and doing. You have, as I mentioned, the basic periodical trainings that everybody has to go offshore. They call them the GWOs, the global wind Industry Organization trainings which covers your fire awareness and those, all the basics, that’s fine, you repeat them every couple of years at a training college but in the meantime it’s expanding on those skills and making yourself a better training portfolio for yourself and making your skills sets fresh. And as you mentioned, the paramedic on board, he was an ex British army paramedic. Absolutely lovely guy. But he was, he was adamant that if we had days when we weren’t doing a lot because the weather was too bad, we were training with him. He, he didn’t, you know, you couldn’t go down to the games room and play computer games. No, no. Today we’ve got a training session and we would do two or three hours of advanced first aid to the point where he pushed it and to his credit, absolute credit and on this occasion he, he pushed us through to doing our advanced first aid certificates and we were under him to do advanced first aid which is, it’s maybe a two, one or two steps below UK paramedic level.

Certainly, it’s like an ambulance technician level where you’re able to do the splinting, a lot of the traction stuff, putting into baskets, putting, preparing for spine boarding. We also went to the level where we could give minimal pain relief in the form of the Penford, which is, it’s like an oral inhaled pain relief which is what we’re permitted to do. So. Yeah, so you know, you can never stop learning and the training is, is valid and significant but it’s, it’s very well and good doing it in the two-year cycle. But if, if you don’t keep up those periods of training more often and keep it fresh in your mind and things become stale and stagnant and you forget.  

So yeah, it also takes a mindset around training to maximize the value to, from a growth mindset to also say how do I get to the best version of myself from a safety standpoint because I can pay attention to training, soak it up or assume it will never happen to me.

Yes, definitely. And with these sort of things it’s Very easy to, to say, oh yeah, you do that when you speak to the new guys I mentioned before, you have to the new, a new visitor or a new technician comes to the site and you say well what advice would I give them? And my advice would be quiet, quiet, quite short and simple to them really. It’s never stop learning and sharing that knowledge. If you, if you’ve had experience with things, these industries from people, you go further through life. You meet different people who come from different walks of life. They’ve done different things. They may have ex-military backgrounds, they may have done, worked around the world. Me personally, I came to this industry from a brief spin stint in oil and gas. Before that I was working in factories. So, I’ve seen things and done things and been involved in general life. You know, people, people experience things in their lives different to everybody else. And the best thing you can do is share that experience. If you’ve seen something done better or you’ve experienced that some somewhere else, share it with a guy who hasn’t.

You know, you may have done a training course, but the knowledge more often comes from, from that experience. And so, it’s always best to try and learn from that as well. Whether that comes from, you know, an experienced colleague sharing a story on something or from something that you’ve actually witnessed yourself. You know, maybe you, you were first to witness a car accident or something like that. You’ve had to do first aid. I mean it’s, they’re not nice situations and you never really learn from a nice situation. That’s the unfortunate thing about life in general, you know, so, you know, but don’t ever be afraid to share that knowledge and, and that experience or ask for that knowledge and experience if you know, somebody’s got a little bit of a history in that. So, know what, how have you dealt with this situation? What have you seen before? What’s your backstory? You know, get to know your colleagues on a boat, it’s a lot easier because you sit around in the evening watching telly and chat, just chatting the day away. Some of the guys that we used to share the boat with, they were xref for, for a start.  

So, they’d been to some of them in both the Iraq campaigns and stuff like that. One guy was ex-army, he’d been in Bosnia, things like this, you know, significant military background and you can learn a lot from them. But some of it’s really scary but the experience is still valid. So yeah, it’s a shared knowledge that helps you build your experience. Not your personal experience, but it can help you with how you would deal with a situation.

And I think one thing that struck me when we first talked about your story is also the element of mental health, but also the debrief that occurred the day after. So rather than run back to work, when all was said and done and everybody was back on the sov, you didn’t jump right back into work. Tell me a little bit about how you handle mental health, but also the debrief that’s so important after an event like this.

Yeah, absolutely. I mean, the debrief started pretty much after the last helicopter had taken the last significant casualty off of the. Off the boat, and we were starting to return back to actually go and pick up ours. Our stranded team members who were back in the wind farm where we’d sailed away to do the helicopter operations. At that point, it was about an hour and a half sail back to the wind farm, and we kind of all just sat around in a bit. A little bit of a state of shock, if you will, just trying to process. Yeah, everybody’s trying to process. Nobody really said a lot. Everything was just trying to process personally, what on earth just happened. You know, there’s that big question mark you might go, did we do the right thing? Didn’t we do the right thing? Have we. Have we done what we best we could have? We could. We’ve done it better. And it’s like, okay, that’s fine. Everybody will ask those questions. And that. That is your own mental health to his tea. Sure. But what we did when we got everybody back on board, because we debriefed the guys when they came back on board as well.

And we got everybody up. We went to the anchor ground, and we got everybody up from the crew and everybody who was involved up on. In. In the bridge. It’s a large bridge area. There was about 50 of us in total, all stood up there in the end. And we had a general chat session, and it was led by the captain, and he was. He was talking about, you know, what happened, how. How we go about dealing with the situation. What do we think? Palm reflection? How do we think we were. Things went. And it was. It was kind of. It’s a bit of a strange one. So, the captain, when we all stood up there initially, we all gathered up there and the captain broke the silence and he gave a brief recount of the whole event, which he’d taken from his ship’s log directly. And then he personally praised every one of us for professionalism and the collaboration with the rescue effort, you know, with the guys who went out on fast boats. We helped them get the, the casualties off. Everybody mucked in with the helicopter, helicopter operations. And then we started to open up conversations and, and just talking about the things, how we were involved, what we did, where we were, what we were doing.

And just kind of a little bit of a breakdown analysis. Not too in depth but just kind of post incident. And then in the following days after that there were individual and group counseling sessions that were offered to everybody. We didn’t go back to work the following day. Certainly not. There was a couple of days actually we didn’t get back to work. It was just best just we were in a good position with the wind farm anyway. But that wouldn’t have mattered.

Sure.

You know, we didn’t have anything significantly broken. We were ahead of service, so it was like fine. But if that hadn’t been the case, that would have just waited. And management were really good about that. They turned around and said, you guys need to, you need to decompress, you need to take your time. We need to make sure everybody’s okay. And the mental health accent on that was really significant. And I was quite impressed with the, the company that managed that we work for on how they dealt with that. So much so that they had especially psychologists and counseling sessions. You could either do group ones; we all did group ones anyway to start with. And then they offered an extended that to individual sessions if you want to schedule them yourself, if you want to have a chat. We also, we were also having little breakout areas around the boat and just having little group chats and stuff and would go and have a coffee with one of our colleagues from the canteen or someone from the engine room. And because everybody ended up interspersed throughout the whole vessel during the incident. So, everybody was working with people they never really worked with on a day-to-day basis.

Some of the guys did have sleepless nights and it did affect them. Certainly, some of the younger lads, those who hadn’t had significant military backgrounds and things like that, maybe they weren’t. So, it’s, it’s a nasty phrase. But battle hardened, if you will, hadn’t had the experiences of traumatic experience so much so some of them were fresh out of college. So literally they’ve only ever seen was school.

Right.

So, you know, they’ve done an apprenticeship, become an engineer and thrown onto a wind turbine and that’s where they were, you know, and no face with this in their first year out from college. So yeah, absolutely. Yikes. And some of Those guys did need a little bit more support as well and that was given to them as well as best we could on the vessel. And again, with the onshore support and we actually made port on the third day. We went back and dropped a few guys off and made sure they got home. Some, some weren’t, some lived a few hundred miles away as well and they weren’t, they weren’t allowed to drive home. They were driven home and their vehicles were taken home for them. So that was quite a really nice supporting touch I thought. Or they were put onto trains, and their vehicles were arranged to be picked up or whatever means when it made necessary for them. But the ongoing from that was the long term on the mental support. It kept going. It wasn’t just when they went back to work.

Right.

That was at the end of did carry on. If you needed to talk to someone there would be a program put in place for you. And it was as you wanted it. It was a really good supporting feature of the company.

Yeah. Well Lee, tell me, thank you so much for sharing your story. I think there’s some really good learnings as well in terms of preparing for the unexpected in terms of professional orientation that happens in the, in that environment. But also, how you debrief and how all the practices to make sure that people return to work in good shape after a traumatic event like this. It’s a really, really good. Because it’s one thing to have a one-time intervention like you said, versus ongoing support recognizing that it’s a pretty traumatic event that happened.

Yeah, it certainly was. There is a, a bitter note to the end of that story unfortunately.

Okay.

So, when I presented my initial talk it was a two-day event for the company I now work for. And one of the participants in the audience, he was actually, he’s a vessel skipper, he’s a captain on one of the smaller vessels and he was actually that day he was the lifeboat skipper who came out and rescued some of the, the, the medium and minor injured personnel. The ones that weren’t helicoptered off.

Sure.

And that day I learned that even though with all our company orientated all our mental health support and everything, the captain of the fishing boat himself 18 months after the event succumbed to amount mental health insurance. So, he left behind a wife and two children. And it was because he has. Because they’re essentially, they work for themselves. So, they work for a very small, not big. The fishing industry is, is not huge, not big companies that they don’t have that kind of support or that, that and yeah, he unfortunately in the end, 18 months later, he didn’t make it.

And the others, the other six.

The others, the others certainly I’m aware that the ones with the significant life changing injuries, two of them never went back offshore again, but they are moving on with their lives. And the other three who didn’t have such significant injuries, I think they went back to fishing again. Sure.

So, thank you for sharing that. Unfortunately, that final note and it is true because there isn’t the support mechanism that exist in larger companies for industries like phishing that are highly decentralized small companies for the most part.

Yeah.

So, thank you. If somebody wants to get in touch with you, Lee, what’s the best way to do that?

Probably best to contact me through Proud to be Safe through P2Bs through the UK and they will. They will message through from this.

Excellent. Thank you so much for sharing your story.

Thank you very much for your time.

Thank you.

Thank you for listening to The Safety Guru on C-suite Radio. Leave a legacy. Distinguish yourself from the past. Grow your success. Capture the hearts and minds of your teams. Elevate your safety. Like every successful athlete, top leaders continuously invest in their safety leadership with an expert coach to boost safety performance. Begin your journey at execsafetycoach.com. Come back in two weeks for the next episode with your host, Eric Michrowski. This podcast is powered by Propulo Consulting.

ABOUT THE GUEST

Lee Ellis is a seasoned maritime professional and survivor of one of the UK’s most serious commercial fishing incidents in recent years. On 15 December 2020, while serving as duty operations coordinator, Lee was directly involved in the emergency response to a catastrophic underwater explosion aboard the crab potting vessel Galwad-Y-Mor, 25 miles off the Norfolk coast. The blast left the vessel severely damaged, injured multiple crew members, and triggered a complex rescue operation involving the RNLI, coastguard helicopters, and offshore support vessels.

In his powerful talk, Lee recounts the events of that day with raw honesty and vivid storytelling, using presentation visuals to help audiences understand not only the incident itself, but the split-second decisions and teamwork that followed. His session includes a 15-minute personal account that places listeners on the deck with the crew — feeling the impact, confusion, and courage required in the face of the unknown.

But Lee’s message goes far beyond the incident. He speaks to the value of training — not just attending it, but trusting it when it matters most — and the critical importance of mental health support in the aftermath of trauma. Most importantly, Lee challenges teams and individuals to think beyond routine safety: to go above and beyond in their preparation for the unexpected. Because when the unthinkable happens, it’s not just knowledge that counts — it’s mindset, readiness, and the ability to act without hesitation.

Lee’s delivery is calm, relatable, and deeply authentic — the kind of message that resonates particularly well with operational teams, offshore workers, young professionals, and anyone involved in high-risk environments. His session serves as a stark reminder of why safety training, preparedness, and emotional support aren’t just checkboxes — they’re lifelines.

For more information: https://www.p2bs.org/safety-speakers/

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Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Breaking Down Psychological Distance to Improve Safety with Dr. David Hofmann

Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Breaking Down Psychological Distance to Improve Safety with Dr. David Hofmann

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We’re thrilled to welcome back Dr. David Hofmann for another compelling and thought-provoking episode of The Safety Guru! In this episode, Dave dives into his latest groundbreaking research: “Out of Sight, Out of Mind: How High-Level Construals Can Decrease the Ethical Framing of Risk-Mitigating Behavior.” He explores how psychological distance, an often-overlooked barrier, can influence perceptions, increase risk, and lead to unsafe behaviors and decisions. Grounded in solid research and real-world organizational examples, Dave highlights what leaders can do to bridge that gap, bringing risks back into focus and reducing them effectively to improve safety. Learn how organizations can keep risk-mitigating considerations front and center, ensuring that every safety decision reflects a deep commitment to protecting frontline team members and maintaining safety as a clear and consistent value and priority. Don’t miss this must-listen episode filled with practical insights to elevate safety so that it’s never out of sight, out of mind!

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Real leaders leave a legacy. They capture the hearts and minds of their teams. Their origin story puts the safety and well-being of their people first. Great companies ubiquitously have safe, yet productive operations. For those companies, safety is an investment, not a cost for the C-suite. It’s a real topic of daily focus. This is the Safety Guru with your host, Eric Michrowski, a globally recognized ops and safety guru, public speaker and author. Are you ready to leave a safety legacy? Your legacy success story begins now.

Hi, and welcome to the Safety Guru. Today, I’m very excited to have back with me Dr. David Hoffmann. He’s a Distinguished Professor of Leadership and Organizational Behavior at UNC Kenan Flagler. He was previously on our show. We had an excellent conversation around psychological distance, brought a lot of conversation. Really key topic. He’s just writing a new article, our new piece of research, “Out of Sight, Out of Mind”. David, welcome to the show. Very excited to have you back.

Thanks, Eric. It’s great to be back, and I’m excited for our conversation today.

Absolutely. So maybe tell me a little bit about the research you did on construal theory and psychological distance. What was some of the motivation behind that research?

Okay, great. We’ll get into the details of the research, I’m sure. But let me tell you just a little bit about where it came because it started actually a number of years ago. As this research process works, sometimes you get an initial idea, and then it just builds over time. The first nugget of this idea was I served on the National Academy of Science Commission that investigated the BP Deepwater Horizon accident. We visited as part of that investigation an onshore monitoring location of one of the major oil companies. Sure. And so that is onshore, sitting in an office in Houston, watching offshore drilling operations several hundred miles away. And I was just struck by the person being that far away from the real-time operations and the equipment and the sound and all of that thing that you’re divorced from in that location. And at the same time, one of our doctoral students was getting into this research on construal level theory and psychological distance, which we can define later. Sure. It was just the marrying of those two things. I started talking with a student about this idea. To further research the idea, we sat down with some folks that worked in an onshore command Center but had all worked offshore.

They had navigated from offshore drilling operations, et cetera, to onshore. We just got about four or five of these folks together, and we just said, you know that transition from Offshore to onshore, how did that affect how you think about your job? Super open-ended question. It was really interesting. They just started talking about, well, you just don’t feel the time pressure or the urgency. You can step back and take a little bit more of a systems view of how things are unfolding. If you see something, you can get up and you can go to the window and get a cup of coffee and you can think about it, versus being onshore where you have the equipment and the sound and this a perceived pressure to make a fast decision. They said, it just really changes your perspective. I asked, well, is it helpful having worked offshore being onshore? They said, oh, yeah, super helpful because you can imagine what it’s like being, what safety people would call the sharp end being on the rig. But then one of their other colleagues said something interesting, and they said, Yeah, but it’s amazing how quickly you go native, and you forget.

I thought that was an interesting observation. We continued to noodle on the idea after that, and we just thought there’s something to this notion of being far removed from the work environment that we think could have some interesting implications for safety. That’s where it started.

Tell me a little bit about the research. We talked about previously with psychological distance. Obviously, this comes up in this research as well as the control theory part. Tell me a little bit about what you uncovered.

Yeah, we were in the midst of this research, I think, last time we talked. I alluded to it, but I didn’t want to get into details because it hadn’t been published yet. We were still in the process of trying to get it through the journal. But okay, so let me step back for a minute and just high-level define this thing called psychological distance or construe-level theory, and hopefully, your listeners have not gone to sleep just hearing those two terms, but I’ll try to keep it high level. So can true-level theory and psychological distance, the same thing. They talk about how we can conceptualize goals and other things at certain levels of abstraction. We could think about things way off in the distance. We typically conceptualize at an abstract level, and we think about the why, why we might want to do something. Then as it gets closer in time, the details become a lot more concrete, and we think about the how. Sure. Let me give you an example. You have this amazing opportunity. Somebody reaches out and says, Eric, we would I love for you to come be a keynote speaker at this conference in Singapore, and it’s going to be all these amazing people.

You’re going to meet all these amazing people, and it’s a year from now. You say, oh, wow, that sounds amazing. I can meet all these amazing people, and I can be this keynote. It makes me feel good to get this keynote opportunity. You commit to it because of the why, because it’s way off in the distance. You’re not really thinking much about the how. Then as you get closer, close, and you think, oh, it’s going to be a 12-hour time inversion. I’m like, Bio-rhymes are going to be totally off, and it’s expensive to get there and then get back. I’ve got these other demands popping up right into this thing. What was I thinking? That’s a little bit of, we can commit to things way off in the distance because we think about the why, we don’t think about the how. As it becomes more concrete, the how becomes a lot more salient. That’s a little bit about how this control level theory works.

Sure.

It’s very, very well-researched in social psychology. Decades of research on this, and it’s a very powerful effect. What we thought with respect to safety is that moral and ethical values, religious values, typically in the literature, are construed at a pretty abstract level. That I have a certain value or religious commitment that says, I want to treat the others the way I want to be treated, the way I’d like to be treated. That’s an abstract principle. Because it’s an abstract principle, I can apply it in multiple situations. That’s why we abstract that principle so we can apply it consistently across different scenarios and situations. Ethical values and moral morality, moral ethics, typically have been found to be these abstract principles. But we thought that this notion of distance in some situations could actually work the opposite way, in that something far off in the distance might actually create less of an ethical and moral imperative. That was really what we sought out to research in this paper.

Something like safety would fall, likely in this category, where I I don’t want to harm anybody, but in a corporate head office, it’s abstract as a concept. I want to be a good person. I want to make the right decision that doesn’t harm people. I feel bad when somebody gets injured, but it’s pretty abstract if you’re a CFO or CEO or COO. Yeah. 

That’s exactly where we went with the study. Because there is a lot of research that what makes something an ethical or moral imperative is the potential to harm someone else. That when there’s a potential harming of another human, that puts an ethical moral lens on it. What we thought in the research was that, if we go back to that example to make it more concrete, pun intended, to take it out of the abstract conversation, make it more concrete, if we go back to that remote operating person. They’re sitting in front of six or seven computer screens. They’re watching operations that are happening 4,000 or 5,000 miles, or 4,000 or 5,000 miles, if it’s another part of the world. Our thought was that it’s going to be hard for them to conceptualize the harm that can construe, even if they had worked offshore and navigated onshore because of that one colleague that says, Yeah, you get acclimated quickly to this environment. We set out to look at that. I’ll just give you a couple One of the examples. One of the… What I thought was the coolest study we did is that we took offshore drillers, and we showed offshore.

We randomly assigned the offshore drillers into two conditions. In one condition, they saw abstract aerial views of drilling rigs from their company. Then the other half of the participants saw photos of a rig floor, like You’re on the offshore drilling rig. We made sure there were no people in any of the images. We didn’t have people in the close-up images and not people in the distance images. Just images, no people.

Sure.

Then we asked them just, what do you observe? They typed in some things. Then we had 10 safety behaviors, like ensuring people are wearing PPE and other types of just safety behaviors. We said, To what extent safety behaviors ethical or moral obligations? Just on a five point, seven-point scale, it’s not an ethical moral obligation at all, or it’s an ethical moral narrative. Sure. It’s a pretty simple study and what we found is that when the people saw the distant images, so the aerial views of the helicopter view of the drilling rate, they viewed these safety behaviors as less of an ethical moral obligation, in part because of the perception of harm, which we also coded in the study. Interesting. And so, what you saw is that as I get more removed from the work environment, I no longer perceive the harm. I view safety as less of an ethical moral obligation and duty. And then we did a few other studies we can talk about, but that was a what I thought was the coolest study, because I don’t know of a study that had been done. I don’t know of a study just like, hey, let’s show us some photographs.

It’s a different perspective on the work environment and see how it affects their moral and ethical judgments around safety, and we found that a pretty nice effect.

Interesting. I know my aha after last conversation was really a realization that corporate America, any country, corporate Canada, corporate Australia, United Kingdom, is very far removed from the day-to-day operation. Even if you think about Houston or Denver that have a big oil and gas presence, there’s no drilling occurring in that immediate vicinity. Even utilities have a very large service territory. Even manufacturing, they may have started with the corporate office close to the manufacturing plant, but they’re typically quite far away from the day-to-day. In some cases, we’ll probably get to that very soon, companies’ corporate offices move away from it. Boeing was a very key case study where their operations were out in Seattle, and then they moved to Chicago.

Yeah, in the flying blind, that’s one of the levers that the author talks about as a reduction of the safety culture is that it was really a double removal or a double distance because one, they moved corporate headquarters from Seattle to Chicago. And then also the senior leaders, they started putting in place senior leaders that didn’t have an engineering aviation background. And so now there’s professional distances as well, which is professional training to really understand that. Related to what you just mentioned, the Houston and Seattle, and Chicago, we actually did two studies, but one of them with nurses, which we took a sample of nurses, and we actually manipulated this distance of the work environment in two ways. So, one way, we repeated the photographs. So, we showed them an outdoor picture of a hospital from outside the hospital. And then we showed them a picture of a hospital floor, nursing station, and hospital rooms and whatever. No people in either photo. So, we tried to eliminate that compound. But then we also said, we asked the nurses what the closest major city is to where they work. And so, you can imagine a nurse says, the major city that I work close to is your hometown, Toronto.

And so, the nurse types in Toronto, and then we randomly assign people. And so, what we did is we said, the people who saw the outside view of the hospital, and they’re working in Toronto, we actually say, imagine that This is a hospital in Miami, Florida. And then the other nurse, say two nurses do our study from Toronto. The other nurse says that they work in Toronto, and they see the inside view of the hospital. And we say, imagine that hospital is in Toronto. So, we gave outside views in a city far, far away. It was Miami for everybody because Miami is pretty far away from most everywhere. And then we did control, actually. If we had somebody from Fort Lauderdale in a sample, we controlled for that. We had outside view of the hospital, Miami, inside view of the hospital, in your hometown. Then we repeated, to what extent is there likely to be a nurse harmed or a patient harmed in this environment in the next 30 days? And then to what extent is safety an ethical moral obligation? And then we also had them look at safety behaviors. And then in one of the studies, we actually had them invest money into productivity or safety.

And again, we repeated the finding in the sense that people who were viewing a work environment that was way off in the distance via photos, a faraway city, they perceived less harm was going to happen, perceived safety is less of an ethical moral obligation. Then when they were given the opportunity to spend $10,000 on increasing productivity or ensuring safety, those folks were more likely to put the money towards productivity if you perceived less harm and you were far away. We went all the way through a behavioral investment decision, at least in one of the studies. This notion of it can be perceived distance, just the photos. It can be physical distance, the cities. They found levels of the hierarchy in an organization. The higher you are up in an organization, the more abstractly you can strew the goals and objectives of the organization. We went through. That notion of city differences, we investigated in a couple of the studies.

Phenomenal research. Scary in some ways in terms of implications. Let’s get into some of the implications.

This episode of The Safety Guru podcast is brought to you by Propulo Consulting, the leading safety and safety culture advisory firm. Whether you are looking to assess your safety culture, develop strategies to level up your safety performance, introduce human performance capabilities, free energy Organize your BBS program, enhance supervisory safety capabilities, or introduce unique safety leadership training and talent solutions, Propulo has you covered. Visit us at propulo.com.

I know one of the things that comes to mind when you bring this up is often when I speak to executives, they say, I have a 34,000-foot view or 38,000-foot view of the operation, which is very I could, based on what you’re sharing.

Yeah, that’s the good news and the bad news. Right. I mean, they need that 38,000-foot view of the organization to think about long-term strategy, to think about industry dynamics, industry changes, how to stay in front of those industry changes from an innovation standpoint, from a product standpoint, from a profitability standpoint. But simultaneously, the opposite side of that same coin, is that they do have a 38,000-foot view. They lose sight of some of the harm that can accrue in some of the perhaps financial decisions, investment decisions that they’re making, investments in safety research, or if we go back to the California wildfires, tree trimming budget. Can we just cut that 10% a little bit and then get a little bit more money for innovation for these changes that are happening in the industry. And so, they just cut that budget 10 %, nothing happens. And they’re like, okay, I guess we didn’t need to spend that much money on that. And they just keep going. And so, yeah, you need those executives to have that 38,000-foot view for a lot of different reasons. But the flip side of that is that they lose the 10-foot view, which is some of the harm that can accrue to some of the downstream implications of some of the decisions that they’re making.

Those really are key implications. Tell me about some of the ways an executive can fix that, or a senior leader in an organization How can you fix this distance?

Yeah, that’s a $64 million dollar question, right? So, we don’t have a lot of data on this, but we have other people’s research and our own thoughts on what are the implications for this and how do you fix it? And I think one of the things that you have… So, part of it is the harm is they no longer perceive the harm. Okay, so that’s one problem to solve, is that we have to make sure that they continue to have some accurate perception of the harm. Fairly frequent visits to the job site to really understanding the work that’s being done, what you’re asking there of people. This whole notion of what undercover boss, I think is actually… It’s a little bit predictable. Yes. Just as the show, they always meet an amazing person and a not amazing person and so on. But that notion of the CEO showing up to do the work when they don’t know it’s the CEO. It’s so powerful for that person to realize like, oh, wow, this is hard work. The fact that in some of those shows, it’s like, Yeah, we don’t have fall protection, and so we’re all taking risk.

They’re like, so you’re just climbing up there without fall protection. It’s like, Yeah, the company won’t invest in it. The CEO What do you mean? Oftentimes, the CEO is like, how come I didn’t know about this? There’s a filtering mechanism. But I think there’s… So, one solution is you have to make sure that people, in an ongoing way, have real exposure to keeping that perception of harm as salient as you can. That might monthly or quarterly visits from a senior executive to a job site. But I think it can’t be what we would call a performative visit, which is you show up and you take the tour and nobody’s really working, or people are working at half speed and you’re chatting with somebody and cracking a joke and moving on. But when do you really see the operations? That’s why I like the undercover boss is because Nobody’s performative. It’s like, this is the real work because we don’t know who this person is. I think that notion of we have to somehow keep the perception of harm salient. That could be visits. I think when you’re looking at onshore operations, often those communications are via chat.

That further, that coarseness of that communication channel further removes people. We We’ve thought of, would it be helpful for the onshore command center to have photos of the people on the rig, perhaps photos of the people on the rig with their family? I interact with Eric, who’s on the offshore rig, but all of a sudden, Eric is… Here’s Eric with his wife and two kids in my queue. I need to make sure like, oh, that’s who I’m interacting with. That’s who this decision is going to affect. Somehow bringing the work environment closer in so that perception of harm remains real or as real as it can be one big implication. I think it’s also a lot for senior leaders, too. But I think those middle managers often get pretty removed. I think it’s important for them to… Because they’re the ones making a lot of the day-to-day trade-off decisions across competing priorities. Absolutely. To have those middle managers really attuned to that perception of harm as well. There’s an interesting study that we signed in the paper from, I think it’s a radiologist. Radiologist reading scan. It’s just a scan. Is it really a person after I’ve seen 5,000 in a day?

But they ran an experiment where they put a picture of the patient along with the radiology scan. What they found is that if the picture of the patient was connected to the radiology, the X-ray or the scan, they improved the reading of the scan and the accuracy because the patient’s photo. That notion of bringing the work environment closer into those people that are far away, I think, is one big implication. How do we exactly I think there’s all kinds of different ways you could do that. You could visit them, you could use photos, you could have all kinds of things. But I think the problem we’re trying to solve is for it not to be just an abstract thing 400 miles in the ocean somewhere, where I forget about the people, and the people aren’t real. They’re just part of a system that’s working. Just thinking about, as a senior executive, how do we make sure that those onshore command centers, those middle managers that haven’t worked at a production facility or offshore, wherever, in six or seven or eight years, how do we just make sure those people are staying connected to for harm?

Sure. I think there’s There are all kinds of different ways you can do it, but I think that’s ultimately the goal is to make sure that harm remains salient.

I think one of the pieces that struck me from our last conversation, but I think it’s coming even more front of mind with our conversation today, is it’s not just the CEO, COO. You’ve got to do it across because you talked about middle management. It’s not just in operations. It’s the finance folks that are making decisions. When you talked about the 10% budget, they’re making abstract decisions based on a balance sheet or a spreadsheet. That is, you can’t get more removed from the day-to-day than a spreadsheet, not understanding how it translates. If I cut training as an example, the implication could be down the road skills training for a frontline team member, somebody’s not as well equipped than is in harm’s way. But that risk could be 10 years down the road, especially when you’re thinking that most of these crafts are learned through an apprenticeship type of environment.

Yeah, that’s the rub, right? I interviewed the head of cyber security and international company. Sure. I said, okay, so how do you get capital investment for essentially a cost, right? Preventing cyber security is… I mean, maybe there’s a way that generates revenue, but I mean, if you’re not a cyber security company.

It generates a lot of revenue if you’re that.

But I was like, It’s a cost. So how do you not get it slowly eaten away over time with just tweaks to the budget. The person said an interesting thing. He said, well, you only want to build the wall one brick higher than the enemy is willing to climb. My first My first take was that I wrote down that quote really quickly because I was like, oh, I’m going to use this down the road. But it actually made me quite nervous if I was a senior executive in that company, because there’s a lot of assumptions behind that, which is- No kidding. You know who the enemy is. You know that they’re climbing as opposed to digging a tunnel, and you have some perception of how high they’re willing to climb. His point was that you don’t want to gold plate everything, because you can absolutely gold plate every single system in your company, but then you’re just not competitive, and you’ll be out of business because your cost structure gets too high. Sure. There’s this tension point between you want to invest in safety training and tree trimming and those sorts of things. But at the same time, you don’t want to spend $200 million when actually $175 million is sufficient to prevent harm.

But it’s really hard to figure out where that line should be drawn. Correct. Exactly because of your point, because the feedback cycle is really, really, really long. You cut the budget and nothing happens, but nothing really is going to materialize from that in terms of a learning standpoint. Point for maybe five, six, seven, eight, nine years. Then when it does materialize, nobody tracks it back to, oh, well, it was often paid to cut the training budgets nine years ago. That’s been a major contributor to this accident. There’s just no connection back to those types of decisions. There is this tension point between you want to keep the harm salient, you want to invest. You need to make sure you’re predicting harm. But at the same time, you’re running a business, and you have to compete in the marketplace from a price and cost schedule. There is this tension point, I think, for middle managers of navigating that allocation of scarce resources across competing goals. I think the tendency is, I think what we show is that when that perception of harm goes down, it just becomes a little bit too easy to cut some of these budgets without really thinking too hard about the long-term consequences of that.

I think that’s how this operational drift and risk starts to accumulate over time.

Yeah, and you’re introducing risk across the system. Like you said, it’s not one decision that causes a fatality or a serious event. It’s accumulation of these events that are introducing risk.

And many of those decisions are not made in proximity to the event. They’re made months, weeks, or years ahead upstream from that event. It’s an ongoing challenge to how do you keep harm really salient? How do you make sure you’re not making decisions that are increasing risk and harm? But at the same time, how do you be responsible to shareholders and other investors and compete in the marketplace in terms of price and cost and schedule and everything else. It’s a complicated set of decisions that have to be made. I think our research just provides one lens into that to say, hey, there’s a tendency when you get into middle senior managers and you’re not on the sharp end anymore, there’s a psychological natural tendency to no longer perceive the harm. That has implications. We need to just remind people that there’s harm, real harm could happen, get them exposed to that in a fairly frequent, not the harm, but where harm can happen in a fairly frequent way. That just becomes a criterion or a lens through which they start to see these decisions that they’re making every day.

There’s a cost to that, but it’s also a huge investment to spend that time. But I’ve seen the rewards on a regular basis. It’s an easy fix. What you’re describing is putting pictures, getting people to go out on a regular basis. Very achievable.

Yeah, I think so. I agree.

Thank you again for joining me. Great research, great insights. What I love is how easy it is for an executive to say; I can make a difference in this area. It reminds me of the concept of Gemba Walks that comes out very much on lean manufacturing side of the equation in safety. People talk about listening tours, but it’s really saying, how do I get this across the organization as a repetitive pattern to really understand what goes on, including in the remote parts of my service territory or my business.

Yeah, 100% agree.

Thank you so much for joining me. Again, a pleasure to have you on the show.

It’s great to be back on the show, Eric, and great to see you again.

Excellent. Thank you.

Thank you for listening to The Safety Guru on C-suite Radio. Leave a legacy. Distinguish yourself from the past. Grow your success. Capture the hearts and minds of your teams. Elevate your safety. Like every successful athlete, top leaders continuously invest in their safety leadership with an expert coach to boost safety performance. Begin your journey at execsafetycoach.com. Come back in two weeks for the next episode with your host, Eric Michrowski. This podcast is powered by Propulo Consulting.

ABOUT THE GUEST

Dr. Dave Hofmann’s research focuses on organizational climate, leadership, organizational change, organizational design, and decision-making. He teaches courses in organizational behavior, leadership, and the complexities of middle management.

Dr. Hofmann served as associate dean for the full-time MBA Program, area chair of organizational behavior, and senior associate dean of academic affairs. A specific focus of his research is the impact of leadership and organizational culture on safety and errors in organizations that operate in high-risk environments. He has edited two scholarly books on these topics, including “Errors in Organizations” with Michael Frese.

In recognition of his work’s applied implications, he received the American Psychological Association’s Decade of Behavior Research Award in 2006. He received a Fulbright Senior Scholar Award to study errors and safety issues in organizations at the University of Giessen in Germany, and a Robert Wood Johnson Foundation grant to investigate error management and organizational learning on nursing units.

He has served on two National Research Council/National Academy of Engineering committees. The first investigated the causes of the BP Deepwater Horizon accident, and the second focused on how to improve safety culture in the offshore industry.

Dr. Hofmann has presented his research or conducted executive development sessions in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong, India, the Netherlands, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland, the UAE, and the U.K.

He earned his PhD in industrial and organizational psychology from Pennsylvania State University, his master’s degree in industrial and organizational psychology from the University of Central Florida, and his bachelor’s degree in business administration from Furman University.

For more information: https://www.kenan-flagler.unc.edu/faculty/directory/david-hofmann/

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EXECUTIVE SAFETY COACHING

Like every successful athlete, top leaders continuously invest in their Safety Leadership with an expert coach to boost safety performance.

Safety Leadership coaching has been limited, expensive, and exclusive for too long.

As part of Propulo Consulting’s subscription-based executive membership, our coaching partnership is tailored for top business executives that are motivated to improve safety leadership and commitment.
Unlock your full potential with the only Executive Safety Coaching for Ops & HSE leaders available on the market.
Explore your journey with Executive Safety Coaching at https://www.execsafetycoach.com.
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