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Dr Nippin Anand_The Power of Organizational Learning

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Are we truly learning from accidents? In this compelling episode, Dr. Nippin shares a different perspective on the Costa Concordia disaster, enriched with his deep insights and research, alongside an exclusive interview with Captain Schettino. He delves into a profound understanding of risk and safety, emphasizing the impacts of culture and shared responsibility. Tune in to uncover valuable lessons about the power of organizational learning and how it can help us make meaningful changes.

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Real leaders leave a legacy. They capture the hearts and minds of their teams. Their origin story puts the safety and well-being of their people first. Great companies ubiquitously have safe, yet productive operations. For those companies, safety is an investment, not a cost for the C-suite. It’s a real topic of daily focus. This is the Safety Guru with your host, Eric Michrowski, a globally recognized ops and safety guru, public speaker and author. Are you ready to leave a safety legacy? Your legacy success story begins now.

 Hi, and welcome to the Safety Guru. Today, I’m very excited to have with me, Dr. Nippin Anand. He’s caught my attention because he’s got a deep background in organizational learning. He’s a host of a podcast, Embracing Differences. He has a new book that just came out around, Are We Learning from Accidents? Phenomenal background, phenomenal stories. Looking forward to our conversation. Nippin, why don’t we start maybe with how you got into this space? Because you have a phenomenal story there. 

You mean the title of the book? Yes, it’s very tied up with my life stories. Not just one story, it’s tied up with many stories. I write that in my book as the opening, Eric. Starting off with the idea that failure was never an option for me. I come from a middle-class family in India, a very religious family. I was going to board my first ship as a cadet. This is going back to 1995. The night before I was leaving home, my mom came to me and said that I’m aware that life at sea is very hard and you’re going away for 18 months. Do us one favor, at least. Don’t come back home before you finish your contract and 18 months. That actually put an immense burden on my shoulders. It was a feeling that failure was not an option. I worked for almost about 11 years. I worked a job which I never found appealing from the very first day. And this is very common in many cultures that you end up doing something because of the societal expectations, because of the family expectations. Until I had a near accident, and this was a near collision.

It wasn’t a collision; it was a near collision at sea. We were just approaching a boat first thing in the morning in Japan, and my ship just about touched another ship, also approaching port. It was a very tense situation. And I thought on that night after I finished my watch that because the accident didn’t really happen, there’s no real fuss about it. But the next morning when I woke up, Eric, the whole ship was seeing me very differently. So, from an expert doing a job for almost about 10, 11 years, dedicatedly fulfilling all my responsibilities as a professional, I came to be seen as the idiot of the town. From the next morning, every Everyone, including the seaman who was on look out with me on the night, started to doubt my competence. And at that point, I decided that it was time to… Well, I didn’t at that time, but it took me almost about a year after losing all my confidence to come to the conclusion that this was probably not the job for me. And interestingly, I stayed in that negative spiral for almost about maybe good 8 to 10 years until I came to the UK.

I did a PhD. And after doing the PhD in Anthropology, I discovered the power of narrative and how the same accident could be narrated in so many different ways. And if we truly want to learn, then I think we should be open to all the narratives. Now, Eric, there are very different narratives that we tell in different cultures. I study mythology, I study religion, I study Anthropology. One of the things that you cannot escape is the power of myth, which is belief. Not myth in the way that the Western world understands it. Myth as in what is it that we believe in? What stories do we believe in? If you look at the Christian world, which is where I live right now, I live in Aberdeen. In the Christian world, there are God created the world in seven days or six days. On the seventh day, he put the human beings there. It was a very stable world. The moment you put human beings there and you put your children there and you told them not to do something and they still did it, that’s when human beings became corrupted and could not be trusted.

So, the whole purpose of life is to follow the word of God, which is to follow the process. We call it in safety management system. That’s one way of looking at the world. So, the narrative of an accident investigation is something went wrong because you did not follow the process. That’s the Christian myth. Then there is the Greek myth. The Greek myth is not about compliance. The Greek myth is the opposite. The Greek myth is about defiance. So, there is the oppressor who is all out there to oppress the world, to become a hero, maybe, to attain heights, to attain success in life. You oppressed people. In the Greek myth, your job is to go against the odds. There is chaos out there and you need to create order out of it. So that’s how you become recognized as a hero. So that’s the myth of the heroes and the anti-heroes. People who go to the outside the fringes or the boundaries of the society and do something exceptional, whether it’s good or bad. That’s where you have people like Captain Sully and Captain Francisco Estacio. One becomes the hero because he saves the world.

Another one becomes the anti-hero or the villain, and he actually causes havoc to the world. And that’s the Greek myth at play. That’s how you tell the narrative of an accident or a near miss or whatever you want to call it. And that’s the Greek myth had played. Then you have the Indian myth had played, which is not about compliance or defiance. It’s about self-realization that the world is not stable, and the world is not chaotic. The world is what it is. The important thing is that what do you realize or what do you learn about the world as you go through this journey, what we call life? Sure. In this journey, it’s not It’s not important to understand whether people who were present in an accident, whether they complied with the rules or they went against the rules to save the world. The important thing to understand is when you investigate an accident as an investigator, what do you learn from it? That’s the world of self-realization. I think one of the things I realized is that there is no objective reality out there. It’s how the investigators present the story. It’s how they collect the data, what questions they ask, how they go about processing and analyzing the data, and how they go about presenting the information.

Until the investigator becomes cognizant or aware of their own biases, nothing changes. This applies not just to investigators, it applies to everyone, a leader who goes to the site to engage with people, somebody as an inspector who goes to audit the site or the workplace. The important thing is that we don’t realize we have our own biases. Biases are not a bad thing. Biases is what makes us humans. The important thing is, do we realize that we have certain assumptions, certain narratives, certain experiences, certain qualifications, certain family background, certain aspirations, certain motivations that push us to look at things in a certain way. And a lot of learning opportunities are lost because we are so busy creating objective narratives and making that separation between the narrator and the narrative which does not exist. So, until we become aware that we are biased, and we need to appreciate other narratives, other stories from other people, other point of views, it’s very, very hard to learn anything from accidents and non-events, both. So that was my biggest realization.

Phenomenal. A really interesting story. I’d love to pivot to when you’re talking about incidents, investigations, you had a very unique chance to speak to the captain of the Costa Concordia. I’d love to hear some of the themes, the story, the conversations you had with him along the path we just explored.

Yes. The interesting thing is that because I had a background in safe airing, and I had, at that time, already started blogging, writing blogs. When this accident happened, well, I met him five years after the accident. When that accident happened, my rapport, my blogs, the way I used to write, was very helpful to establish that initial connection with him. I just had to approach him through another person, say that I would like to interview you, and this is my background. And very quickly, he responded with a yes, that yes, it would be nice to meet up. I document that in my book, how we went about it. It was quite easy. I think he also was very appreciative that in those five years, between the time the accident happened, that was in 2012, and the time when I met him, that was in 2017, nobody from the industry had come to speak with him. Nobody. Really? I was the first person who approached him from the industry, apart from lawyers and solicitors, to who genuinely wanted to understand his point of view. So, he was very appreciative of that. From my point of view, the story resonated because what I saw in the press was an extreme form of how I was treated Eric after my own accident at sea.

And there you have an initial resonance already between him and me. Building that rapport and approaching him and making a contact with him was easy. The next thing was, I flew to Sorento, his hometown in Italy, where he was under house arrest, and I spent four days with him. We had a great conversation. We were trying to understand his perspective, not just his perspective, but who he is, his relationship with his community, with his people, with his family, trying to understand him, why he chose a career such as seafaring, and then trying to get to understand how he moved through his career. And then the accident itself. So, a genuine interest in understanding the person even before you dip into the accident case. There’s a reason why I’m saying all this, Eric, because today, a lot of times, we go into accident investigations and audits and inspections, and there is little interest in understanding people. Because there is little interest in understanding people, there is little reciprocation from the other side. If you consider that the origin of all decision making is the unconscious mind, which is the unaware mind, which is the non-rational mind, People will tell you nothing from the non-rational unconscious mind until they see a genuine connection with you, you are making a genuine connection with them.

So, without relationship, there is no learning at all. Absolutely none. And so, getting to know somebody not just as a victim of an accident, but also as a father, as a brother, as a community member, as a husband, as a sibling, is so important before we get to understand why they did what they did on the day of the accident. Because then they can tell you things that you were probably not even expecting. And that’s the beauty of learning, that learning is a discovery. Learning is a discovery, and discoveries can only happen when we find something that we were totally unaware of. And that can only come when we make a genuine connection with people and listen to the unconscious mind of these persons. Yeah, it’s very important. Something we consistently miss in our accident models, whether old ones or contemporary ones, doesn’t matter.

Because you jump straight to the decisions, the occurrences, and you’re trying to track back to a very linear cause an effect. But what did you gain from that? Because four days is a lot of time. You’re really trying to understand the person, you’re trying to understand what was going through his mind, indirectly his mental model, which touches the biases. How does that lead to something different in terms of what transpired?

The biggest learning from this accident was that people involved in accidents, both as part of the experience of the accident, but also as part of being investigated, are traumatized. This is a very traumatic experience, both Not just experience an accident, but also going to an investigation. The first thing I would say is that if you do not know, if you’ve not been trained in trauma, if you have not been trained in how to handle a distressed person, never go into an investigation. Because that’s precisely what happened to me, and it took me nine years to come out of that cycle. It’s the first question, usually, that you ask from the person, sets the tone for the rest of the investigation. If you don’t take the time to connect with the person, you don’t take the time to understand the person, if you don’t see learning and healing should come together, then all you do is come back with data, come back with some extracted information, which is nothing but a story, a very carefully crafted story of a rational mind, a very logical story that people want to tell you because they know that’s what you want to hear.

And so, there is no learning. And a lot of times, we are missing that very crucial point that go with an open mind, connect with the person, listen to them, try to understand their stories. Try to understand what is it that shocks you the most when they’re telling the story. And there you have a very rich story from the person. And do not interrupt at all as the person is speaking, because this is something… When they are giving you something from the unconscious mind, just sit there and absorb as much as you can. There is no need to interrupt. There is no need to feel apprehensive about the silences. There’s no need to feel uncomfortable about things that go against your values, against your culture. Just sit there, be in the moment, and listen as much as you can with open questions. Things like, what would you like to share? Where would you like to begin? What? Walk me through the steps. What have you learned? These are very, very open questions, avoiding any probing, any prompting, even the person goes silent. That’s a very important thing. But Eric, Underneath all this is a methodology which is very important to understand that human beings are fallible.

People will make mistakes.

Of course.

You must embrace the fallible When you’ve seen another person, an imperfect person, just like you, you make the connection there and then. But if you’re so busy trying to fix this person, trying to find a solution, and I think quite often those reactions stop you from listening anything. You say something that you didn’t like, and you make a face, you make a gesture, and it just disconnects you from that person completely. It’s very important to go with a philosophy, with a methodology that accepts another person’s imperfection and fallibility. From there onwards, the flow begins, and you start to listen to the full story. So, your question was that what did I learn from this story? Many things, but I deliberately chose to focus on four important things. The first one was this question that, why did he choose to navigate so close to the land?

Sure.

That was the first thing that… As I spoke to him, Eric, what intrigued me was that here we are sitting so far away, so distanced from the reality, and this person does not see that as a risk at all. For him, this is a normal practice. This is what a cruise line captain does each day, every day. He balances the competing goals between customer satisfaction, which is go close to the land, and safety of navigation, which is to keep a distance. It is important that we pay attention to these things when somebody says that it’s quite a normal practice to do such a thing. Now, the important thing is that words like normal practices have become very fashionable these days. Everyone wants to study normal practices, normal work whatsoever. What we often forget is that your normal is not my normal. You are sitting in the ivory tower. For you, what is normal is completely different from what I see as normal. It’s very important that when we are speaking to people, when we are engaging with them, we try to understand what’s their normal. So on occasions, people might say things like, Oh, it’s okay.

It’s how we do it here. Oh, it’s quite normal. It’s usual. What they are telling you is that’s their culture. In that moment, we become very excited that how can this person go so close to the land when he should be 20 miles away from the land or whatever is documented in the safety management system. What the industry struggles with is the idea of subjectivity and risk tolerance, which is very individual, very subjective to each person, each culture, for that matter. If I show you a video of how people drive cars in India, in the West, and people get shocked. But equally, people get shocked in the West, in India, when they see how cars are driven in the Western world. The point being that every culture has its own normal. Absolutely. If you don’t understand the power of a worldview, a culture, then you are so far away from what is normal and what is normal work. It’s fundamental to understand. Today, when we talk about the idea of work, we don’t understand that aspect of what is normal. Normality often comes from the idea that this is my belief, this is my myth, this is my paradigm.

When I say it’s okay means that it’s consistent with my worldview. It’s consistent with my culture. It does not surprise me because this is something that has become embodied, it’s become part of my body. So, this is important. And that’s something that I highlight in the book. It’s a major part of the book, which is to understand culture through the lenses of what we consider as normal. And every culture has its own normal. We then go into the idea of why people don’t speak up. That’s another topic, and I spent a lot of time. I devoted a lot of time, actually, to it. Eric, we talked about the idea of myth, the Greek myth and the Christian myth, and the Indian myth. What happens is that people don’t realize that this whole idea of why people don’t speak up is very much the Greek myth at play. What do I mean by that? You have this #MeToo campaign in your country every now and then. We have the people in position of power, and they do things, they do injustice to people, and somebody must rise up to the occasion and stop the oppressor from doing wrong things and speak up.

What most organizations today try to do is create what we call psychological safety so that we can empower the oppressed to speak against power, which becomes abusive over a period. This is the Greek method playing, the oppressor and the oppressed. So, you have to defy the oppressor. This goes back to the narrative of defiance. This is not compliance, this is defiance. And what’s interesting in this narrative is that we pay too much focus to the individual. So, if we can empower people, if we can give them psychological safety, then they should somehow speak up. What became very apparent, what became very clear in the Costa Concordia study, and I’ve studied many, many accidents after that in aviation, in health care, in other areas, what is happening is that there is a very… Take the example of aviation. If you take the Ethiopian Airlines air crash, which happened a few years ago, and then followed by the… Sorry, I can’t remember the second one.

Lion air was first, yes.

Lion air was first, yeah.

In both instances, in the Ethiopian Airlines, for example, you have a pilot with more than 10,000 hours of experience sitting next to a co-pilot who had 200 hours of flying experience. Now, you cannot challenge this because from a certification point of view, both are certified. They are both-Correct. The co-pilot is certified for what it does, and the pilot is also certified, of course. The trouble is that we are not talking about hierarchy here, which has always existed in aviation and the maritime and many other industries. What we are talking about is hierarchy blown out of proportion completely. You have an expert who is far too powerful in this game against the novice who has just entered the profession. This is a systemic problem in the industry, and it cannot be solved through the lenses of psychological safety. You cannot send somebody on three days, five days course, attend a course in psychological safety or crew resource management, whichever way you like, and empowered them to speak up because they just… And we go back to the idea of normal, because these two people belong to two different subcultures or cultures, and they see things very differently.

For a captain who’s navigating the ship so close to the land each day, every day, it’s his everyday work, right? That’s what he does every day. He doesn’t see it as a risk. For the novice, because he sees the captain doing it every day, he does not dare to challenge it because he knows if things go wrong, he cannot handle it. What will he say and what will he do? So, what we are dealing with here is not a problem of speaking up or speaking out or listening in. What we are talking about There’s two different subcultures that see the world differently. And until we create that awareness, the problem is not with people not speaking up. The problem is that people don’t know when to speak and what to speak and how to speak. There’s nothing we can do about this. So that was a There was another theme that came up in the book, which is why don’t people speak up? And I explained that through the book. Sure. We then look at the idea of the emergency plans and processes and why they don’t work in practice when an accident happens. So, in this instance, one of the big things that came out was that sense-making in an accident, which is trying to move forward with limited information, sometimes conflicting information, time pressure, language difficulties, the reality of life, are so distanced from documented plans and processes.

And to be able to live through that trauma of an accident. And the interesting bit is not just the comparison between the documented plan and procedures and how emergency is handled in practice. The painful bit is that information and that behavior being taken to the court of law and compared against what is documented in the process, and then establishing a case for culpability and crime based on those processes is absolutely fascinating. To understand that, one has to come to terms with the idea that there’s a huge difference between how people make sense of the crisis, what it means to be a human being in a crisis, let’s put it this way, what it means to be a human being in a crisis and how you are judged or misjudged based on your behavior as part of the court proceedings that part of the investigation is something to think about, Eric. Yes.

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That was the third aspect of it. The final aspect of which really worries me, Eric, is this idea that We have this slogan that you can either blame or you can learn. One of the things that comes out from this accident, and again, many other investigations that I’ve done, is that there is escape from blame. This is more than, well, this is more than 3,000 years old ritual that started in Israel, which we call scapegoating. And unless you acknowledge that in an accident, in order to give meaning to human sufferings, somebody will be blamed. You have to accept that. And once you accept that, you know that there are better ways to put your resources, better areas to allocate your resources, and not spend too much time on accidents of this nature because they will never create the desired results that you want. So, you’d be better off putting your resources into other meaningful areas because you cannot avoid blame, you cannot avoid scapegoating. It’s inevitable in an accident. So, I use the example of the Costa Concordia, but you could easily use any example. And I think this idea that blame fixes nothing needs to be challenged because if we did not blame the captain on the night, the whole cruise industry would have come to a complete halt.

Somebody had to be blamed. When the ship capsizes, somebody has to be blamed. That person may or may not have anything to do with the accident, but that’s how the idea or the ritual of scapegoating works. So, these were the four main areas that I concentrated upon. I’m very happy to take your questions, but just to end, in the end, I actually provide a method on how we should learn from accidents and how can we learn from accidents. And the basic idea is that stop looking for improvements in processes. Of course, those things are important, then they are a by-product of many other things. But do not, as a default, start to look for processes, systems, fail-safe systems, technologies to make the world a safer place. Of course, do not turn to people who have been involved in an accident. Rather, turn it around to your own self to say, okay, what sense do I make of this accident, of this misfortune, or whatever has happened? Until we take that question to our own selves, there’s nothing that will change. The trouble today in most organizations is that we talk about organizational learning as if somebody else has to learn.

That question has to flipped around to our own selves to say, okay, I’ve been on this site, I’ve investigated this accident, I’ve been on this audit, I’ve done this inspection. What has changed in my world after this? And until we address this question, which is back to the myth that I talk about self-realization in the start. So, it’s not about compliance, it’s not about defiance, it’s about my own world. What has changed in my own world after being through this experience? And that’s what the book talks about. So, I talk about my own self, basically, this journey of discovery, learning, and how it has changed me as a person. To me, that’s the most important bit, and we don’t talk about it often. Interesting.

I think one of my main takeaways is the conversations you had with the captain in terms of getting to know the person, not just trying to connect dots to get to a pretty report on the back end. I think that is a very key component, particularly with the comment around most of our decisions are subconscious If it’s subconscious, you need to understand the person to get there. I think that makes sense. What I do disagree is around the blame fix is nothing. What I mean by this is if I think, particularly in the aviation space, a lot of the removing of blame is so that I hear about the near misses, the things that almost happened that I wouldn’t have known without that information. If we think about the near misses, there were very few self-reported near misses prior to removing the blame in aviation. I think that’s an interesting and very important point is to hear about the things that didn’t actually cause an incident, but we could address. If I think in aviation, we fell asleep, we both fell asleep, things of that nature, which I’ve shared before, I wouldn’t self-report that if the blame would turn at me.

There’s generally no consequence if I’m on autopilot that I fell asleep, assuming I’m still on course and it’s not a long-extended period of time. But it then allows me to understand what we are doing in the system that allows fatigue to build up or creep up.

The trouble with taking blame as the focus is that invariably, whether you call it a system or an individual, there is something to fix. So, it may not be the frontline person, as you said, but now it’s not the person who fell asleep. It could be a monitoring technology that failed to give us the desired data. Or maybe this problem could be fixed using a technology or a system or a process or a protocol.

Or training or other pieces. 

Or training, yes. I have no problems with that. Well, I have a couple of things to think about. I’ll leave you with a couple of things to think about. One is that what we are doing is we’re externalizing learning. Instead of taking the person who fell asleep as a victim, there is somewhere else in the system that needs to be fixed. We are still externalizing the learning. It’s a process or a system or a technology or a barrier that failed that needs to be fixed. Now, the trouble is that you can fix that, you can fix that, or you can put another barrier to it, and you never know what new problems you might have created as a result of that.

Yeah, fair.

As a result of When you’re fixing one problem, you might have created another one. And who knows when it might show up. Potentially, yeah. The other thing is that because you have now allocated the problem to somewhere else in the system, you think that that’s the end of it. That’s what we call event learning. So, we learn because we have sorted out the event. And I think that’s dangerous because you still have, I haven’t asked the question, how has it changed my view about the accident, about the person? If your view does not change, if your attitude towards failures does not change or the fallible person doesn’t change, nothing really moves. I’m not against the idea of fixing things, but quite often what happens in blaming or fixing things is that we end up externalizing the problem and we never actually take the I am to reflect upon how this has changed us as a person. And learning, in true sense, relates to change. Change, not in the outside world, change in the inside world. And unless that connection is clear between learning and change, nothing changes. So, I’ll give you an idea. Sure.

Spinoza, if you look at the back cover of my book, there are four monkeys here. There are four monkeys here. And these four monkeys are basically the result of… When I finished the Costa Concordia accident, I conducted several workshops around the world. I went around the world. At one point, I even did some work with Todd Conklin, and we did some workshops together. Some of the themes that started to emerge from those discussions was that people would either respond by making a joke of the captain during the workshops, or they would have They would finger-point at him that he did something which he shouldn’t have done, or they would sympathize with him, apologize for his situation, or they would try to suggest some fixing that maybe he should have done this, maybe the company should have done that, and this shouldn’t have happened. So, this is interesting because as I was doing my research, the Dutch philosopher, Bark Spinoza’s book, one of his quotes stuck me, which is not to laugh, not to lament, not to curse, but to understand. And to me, until you move away from the idea of spending too much time thinking about whether we should blame this person or not, whether we should fix this person or not, laugh at this person or not, and take it back on yourself to say, what have I actually learned from this?

Nothing changes.

But you can combine the two. Yeah, but you could combine the two in the scenario of the pilots that fall asleep. There can be an internal learning because it could be some elements of, I made some choices, didn’t get a good night’s sleep, things of that nature that I chose from a career standpoint, which is an internalized where I’m not blaming, but there’s a self-realization of what was my part, my contribution. Then there’s also the element from a system standpoint to say, how often is this happening? What measures do we need to have to counteract? I’m hearing about new messages that otherwise we would never hear about. I can be addressing it at the individual level, at the cultural level, and the system level, which I think then addresses the learning piece. 

Absolutely, yes. You said something powerful here that if that realization comes from the person himself as part of interviewing or as part of reflection after the interview, that’s immense learning. That’s liberation. That’s healing, actually. If when this person comes to tell me that, we had a wonderful interview together and you asked some good questions, and as you were asking those questions, this is what I came to realize, that’s liberating. You have moved one person. Of course, you have learned something, and that person has learned something. But again, going back to the idea that if you’re not asking open-ended questions, if all you have on mind is to fix this person and determine how many processes he breached or how we can fix the problem through the social context or the technological context, whatever, then there is very little learning, very little, if any use.

And I think where I would agree is if you’re transferring the blame from the individual to the system, which means I’m transferring it to somebody else, I’m still blaming. Absolutely. And I think that’s the one challenge I have with the element of… I fully agree, don’t blame the individual. But there’s an element of learning. But shifting the blame to say, okay, now it’s all the senior executives that made the wrong decision, is still blaming. It’s just a different person because it’s just system indirectly means other people. I think there needs to be a balance between because it needs to be system learning because nothing happens because of one person. Also, at an individual level in terms of that realization and how do I change.

What I’m suggesting is, and I’m not suggesting these things are not important, What I’m suggesting is, as a default, the first question to ask is, from an investigator’s point of view, what have I learned after conducting this investigation? I think if we don’t begin there, nothing changes. Because at the end of the day, the report is someone’s view. With your bias, yes. It has to be. There is nothing objective in a report. You can have all the micro details, not enormous amount of data supported by timelines and facts and evidence, don’t take anything away. And still, it is somebody’s view, somebody’s worldview. So that is something important. So, unless that person shifts his worldview or her worldview, nothing really changes. If they still see in that accident… And this is interesting, Eric, because when organizations are stuck by failures one after another, I think it’s time to slow and ask, are we stuck with our questions? It’s so important.

That’s a good point. I think that’s a key element because, like you said, our decision Decisions are mostly subconscious-driven decisions. So, unless I understand the context, I’m trying to find clues. And as an investigator, I have a bias in what I’m doing, and the organization has a bias in what they’re doing. And to pull back from it, I think, it is really key.

Yes, very important. And the other important thing in this journey is that you cannot escape your belief system. You just cannot. This morning, I was interviewing… No, a couple of days ago, I was interviewing somebody involved in an accident. And he’s a Muslim guy, and he was a frontline worker. I don’t like the word. And he was involved in an accident, and he kept saying the same thing. I said, what have you learned from this towards the end, from this experience? And he said, Well, it’s God’s will. What can I do? I can’t do anything about it. And here you are, pushing him to follow permit to work system, a job hazard analysis, toolbox talk. He will do all of that. But does he really believe in that? And I think This is something we consistently ignore. To some cultures, an accident is a quest, or the solution to an accident is to find a root cause and put a collective action. In certain cultures, it’s the God’s will. It’s happened because of the God’s will. When you employ a multinational crew, you have people from around the world. It is very, very important for investigators to become comfortable with the idea that different cultures see misfortune or accidents differently.

Differently. Very differently. Yeah.

And it’s important to appreciate that. 

I think that’s an interesting point as well. Nippin, fantastic conversation. If somebody wants to get in touch with you, pick up your book, how can they do that?

Eric, my book is available on Amazon, I believe, in Barns & Nobles. It’s called, Are We Learning from Accidents: A Quandary, a Question, and a Way Forward, because there is a method in the end to show how to investigate accidents. Apart from that, I would say I’m active on LinkedIn. I have my own website, which is nippinanand.com. I have my company, Any website called novellus.solutions.

Excellent. Well, really enjoyed having you on the show today, and look forward to maybe continuing the conversation another time 

Sure. It’s a pleasure for me as well. Thank you for reaching out and making the connection.

Thank you for listening to The Safety Guru on C-suite Radio. Leave a legacy. Distinguish yourself from the past. Grow your success. Capture the hearts and minds of your teams. Elevate your safety. Like every successful athlete, top leaders continuously invest in their safety leadership with an expert coach to boost safety performance. Begin your journey at execsafetycoach.com. Come back in two weeks for the next episode with your host, Eric Michrowski. This podcast is powered by Propulo Consulting.  

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ABOUT THE GUEST

Dr. Nippin Anand is a former master mariner with a master’s degree in economics, a PhD in Social Sciences and Anthropology and a desire for life-long learning in the wider disciplines of humanities, social psychology and philosophy. After a near collision at sea, he took up a passion for investigating accidents and helping leaders understand the importance of perspective in human failures. As a former subject matter expert at DNV, Nippin also developed an interest in making compliance meaningful for achieving business goals. He is the host of the podcast Embracing Differences, blogs regularly and is recognised both in the research community and across safety critical industries for his ability to make research accessible to businesses and people at work.

For more information: https://novellus.solutions/about-novellus/

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